MAHAMAHOPADHYAY GOPINATH KAVIRAJ
MEMORIAL LECTURES—1980

Gopinath Kaviraj's Thoughts
—towards a Systematic study—

KALIDAS BHATTACHARYYA

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PREFACE

Gopinath Kaviraj, extraordinarily versed in philosophical and religious literature of India and the west, was himself every inch an original thinker, throwing new light almost on every problem and assessing different solutions in respect of one another in a rare liberal attitude, doing all possible justice to every major solution that has ever been offered. But what surpasses all this is that he was a *sādhaka*—a genuine researcher in matters spiritual—since his younger days and, on all evidence, attained complete success, i.e. realized the complete Ultimate Truth, in his later life. Most of the works on which I have based my present chapters were products of his later life, either written by him or compiled from the talks he had with his disciples and other enquirers.

Naturally, for people like us who have neither the elementary spiritual realization nor even a fraction of his originality and scholarship there are only three ways left if we are to present his entire philosophy in a systematic manner : either (i) we present it all more or less mechanically, though with every possible literary flourish, as is often done with truths of deep transcendental significance that are catered to the so-called elite of our country, or (ii) we just *mechanically* support (or reject or modify where necessary) these 'truths' by *intellectual* clarification and arguments, all supplied *ab extra,* oftener than not a brilliant intellectual acrobatic, or (iii) we try to follow the philosopher in question not only intellectually but also through direct experience—natural or trans-natural—as far as possible. This 'as far as possible' is of particular significance so far as this third alternative is concerned. Negatively, we, surely, cannot follow the experience of this philosopher to its farthest end, but, positively—and that precisely constitutes the beauty of this procedure—to whatever extent we follow it in our direct experience, we always perceive some further such experience lying ahead and beckoning us (how exactly, we shall discuss in the first two chapters). What adds further strength to this procedure is that the trans-natural experience is *also* intellectually analysed and argued to, though, as will be shown at the appropriate place, this is largely gratuitous in spite of its being undoubtedly helpful.

By now it is clear that I opt for the third line of procedure. I consider the first way to be all useless and the second way, considered by itself, as only vicariously satisfying. It is only because I have opted for the third way that I have dared devoting the entire first section of the first chapter to the study of the very notion of transcendence.

Gopinath Kaviraj, principally a Śaivite—particularly of the monistic type—has, however, developed his Śaiva philosophy in such a manner that with some small change or twist here and there it turns easily into Śaiva dualism, other forms of Tantrism and Yoga, and also into different forms of Mahāyāna Buddhism and Vaiṣṇavism (and so beautifully into the Gauḍīya form of the latter too), and even into the Śaṅkarite form of Advaita-Vedānta. This shows the broadness of his mind, an unusual catholicity, a fraction of which could save the world from so many religio-cultural fissions of disastrous consequences. This type of catholicity is only a recent-day phenomenon, first proclaimed and practised in all seriousness by Ramakrishna Paramhamsa and then by a few others in various walks of life.

But though Gopinath Kaviraj was, that way, a liberal thinker it must not for a moment be forgotten that he was fundamentally a Śaivite and discovered that liberalism in the heart of Śaivism itself. Naturally, in these chapters I have been concerned principally with Śaiva philosophy, but, wherever necessary, I have studied it *vis-a-vis* other forms of transcendental philosophy.

I must at this place acknowledge my further limitations. In spite of my best attempts I have not understood, to any reasonable degree of satisfaction, many items that are often discussed in Śaivism and other Tantric literature and on which Gopinath Kaviraj has said so much at so many places in his different works. I have thought it wise not to touch them. Several of these topics I may mention here. They are (i) *ṣaḍadhvā*, (ii) *kuṇḍalinī* and *cakras*, (iii) *mātrikā* and *mālinī*, (iv) tantra rituals, (v) the three *upāyas—āṇava, śākta* and *śāmbhava* —and *anupāya*, etc.

Once I have written down all the chapters I find that in Chapter I, I have not clearly distinguished between 'transcendent' and 'transcendental'. Indeed, I have never liked to distinguish them : I have deliberately used the two terms indiscriminately. If any distinction is to be drawn it would be that while the transcendent is *viśvottīrṇa*—standing on the other side of Nature —the transcendental is *viśvarūpa* too, i.e. immanent also in Nature as constituting its informing principle—indeed, the very Truth of Nature and all the while imbedded in it. The transcendental is as much *viśvottīrṇa* as *viśvarūpa*. Even if in these chapters I have sometimes called it transcendent and sometimes again transcendental, I have meant both the aspects; and that is Śaivism as distinct from the traditional Advaita-Vedānta.

While discussing, in Chapter I, different grounds for transcendence I have said that in a subsequent chapter I shall discuss one of these grounds, viz. the emergence of paradoxes at a level to be solved only at the next level but, along with that solution, getting involved in further paradoxes to be solved at the next higher level; and so on. As a matter of fact, however, I have not discussed it in any subsequent chapter., I had to drop the discussion because the chapters that I was writing were too rapidly growing in size. I refer the inquisitive reader to K. C. Bhattacharyya's monograph 'Subject as Freedom' in his *Studies in Philosophy,* edited by Gopinath Bhattacharyya, published by Progressive Publishers (the second edition to be shortly published by Matilal Vanarsidass of Delhi).

I admit also that I ought to have studied the concepts of *kalā* (both *pravṛtti* and *nivṛtti kalā*) and *sakala* and *niṣkala* in a more detailed manner. I dropped this further discussion because of space-shortage once again.

I thank the authorities of the University of Calcutta for their having offered me an opportunity to speak on Gopinath Kaviraj's philosophy. My special thanks are due to Sri Jagadiswar Pal, Estates & Trust Officer, Calcutta University, who so kindly made all arrangements for my lectures and always encouraged me to study and write on Gopinath Kaviraj.

Needless to add, I equally thank the authorities of the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, Gol Park, Calcutta, who so kindly lent their Sivānanda Hall for these lectures.

Read "Subject as Freedom" by K C Bhattacha
& The Nature of Reflection (in Philosophy, Logic,
& Language) by K D Bhattacharya · P. 3, 38-3

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CHAPTER 1

THE NOTION OF TRANSCENDENCE : ITS JUSTIFICATION AND DIFFERENT APPROACHES

A

Ai

Philosophy, including metaphysics and epistemology, has developed in two quite different forms.

In one form, it is only an intellectual account—a system of theories (hypotheses) about the nature and behaviours of whatever is real—much as it is the case with Science too, though here, in the case of philosophy, more advanced because claiming concern with deeper and more fundamental features of reality. Just, again, as a scientific theory requires prior noting of data, systematic analysis of propositions, careful inductive passage from perceived data to newer situations that have not till then been perceived and then building out of all these a whole systematic account, so too, we are told, is the case with philosophy. Like science, philosophy, they say, is a system of propositions, valid, first, because the account, in either case, has not till now clashed with anything that is unquestionably accepted and, secondly, either because actual events could be calculated in advance or, in the least, because the whole theory, or any the least part of it, stands falsifiable by whatever pettiest situation stands already accepted as a fact over there. Science, we are told, always passes this test; indeed, to pass this test is almost a religion with the sciences. Philosophy on the other hand, we are equally told, has, in its inordinate love for fundamentals and sweeping generalizations, often overlooked this simple caution and, not undeservedly, given the bad name 'speculative' and sought to be hanged.

This mostly the advanced empiricists' notion of philosophy. Their attitude differs from that of the grosser empiricists in that while the latter take whatever system they construct to be, at least very largely, a faithful picture of reality, with almost one-one correspondence, advanced empiricists—say the logical empiricists and linguistic philosophers in the West and, in India, the neo-Naiyāyikas and those of the latter-day Indian philosophers who have toed their line—take the entire philosophy as a constructed axiomatic with just that much use of (experienced) data as would only validate their theories.

There is, however, another kind of philosophy—both in India and the West—ever running parallel to this 'intellectual' philosophy. It consists of statements—of course, as far systematic and intelligible as possible—of what one actually experiences through sustained attention. In this philosophy intellect in the form of logical analysis, definition, deduction, etc. is never made a fetish of; intellectual manipulation is not resorted to unless absolutely needed—where precisely, we shall presently see. Theories and hypotheses are never permitted to get the upper hand.

Systematic account, as far as possible, of one's actual experience, it yet is no account of one's *sensuous* experience. Of sensuous experience there cannot be any systematic account that also wholly (at least very largely) descriptive. This is so because sensuous experience being of its own nature always of limited extension and ever shifting, any systematic account of such truncated, fleeting experience will have to be supplemented, at every step, by so much inference and theory-building that, in no time, such intellectual manoeuvring exceeds the actual experience, and exceeds it beyond all measure. And this exactly was the procedure of the advanced empiricists. The second type of philosophy we propose to pass to is quite different.

Empirical philosophy is, at its worst, a passing description of what is being sensuously experienced, and, at its best, an intellectual account, a systematic *theory*, of what is and can be so experienced. This is why the modern empiricists have insisted so much on the criterion of verifiability in terms of observation, meaning that whatever is claimed to be real must at least be intelligible in terms of sensuous experience. In terms of sensuous experience ! This means that they cannot be asserted, taken as acceptable at all, except somehow in the context of sense-percetion—in effect as tied to this our world of daily experience, i.e. to Nature—not necessarily that they themselves have to be sense-perceived. What, in short, these advanced empiricists mean is that there is but one world, Nature though not always amenable to our normal sensuous experience, and, definitely, not two worlds—one, Nature, called the phenomenal, *vyāvahārika*, world, and the other trans-Nature, the transcendent, which whether it is one or several such in a hierarchy, is called *pāramārthika* world.

As opposed to this empirical philosophy, there has always been, and parallel with it ever since the earliest days, quite a new brand of philosophy, called transcendental—a philosophy which is an as-far-as-possible systematic account of what much of this *pāramārthika* world we actually experience. The experience of this world—if one likes, of the items of this world—is never sensuous, though claimed yet to be as direct and *prima facie* convincing as sensuous perception. Commonly, it is termed spiritual perception, intuition, enlightenment, etc., and, technically, rational intuition, transcendental reflection, *a priori* anticipation (of Nature and its diverse features), (phenomenological) intention, (the existentialist's) authentictiy, etc. If it is different from sensuous perception which is concerned with the *vyāvahārika* world, called Nature, it is different equally from what is called thought, reason or intellect in that it is a sort of *direct* awareness which this latter—this thought, reason or intellect—is not. Intellect as a sort of distant manouvring of data handles transcendentally-experienced data exactly in the same manner in which it handles those that are sensuously experienced. Only, it is not as much operative and necessary in the transcendental field as in the empirical. In the empirical field, i.e. with regard to the items of Nature, it is needed, as we have seen, for any the least systematic account : what we have of them without intellectual manipulation is only sporadic, truncated, ever-fleeting sense-experience, no philosophy or science. With regard to the transcendental field, on the other hand, intellect is never needed that much ; one could even dispense with it. For, whatever in the transcendental field we experience—necessarily through transcendental reflection which is as much reflective, i.e. self-conscious, as direct and which clarifies and extends itself more and more as self-consciousness is more and more deepened—whatever of the transcendental field we experience that way is some apriority, some category, some *a priori* feature of Nature.[1] Such *a priori* features are, first, all of them positive wholes, genuine totalities, though, in case of an indefinite number of particulars and, secondly, of themselves, they stand more or less systematically connected with one another—not only as arranged in a hierarchy of ever-widening sweeps (something which is obvious) but also (which is less obvious but can be laid bare through closer and closer attention) in sorts of cross-connexion almost deducible from their apriority. This latter we shall discuss more fully later.

Normally, from the empirical point of view, i.e. in Nature, there cannot be any genuine totality of an indefinite (i.e. unending) number of particulars. Here, in the trans-Nature field, on the other hand, every item experienced as an *a priori* category of whatever comprehension is definitely such a genuine totality, always covering an indefinite number of particulars in Nature. This exactly is what the transcendentalists mean by '*a priori* anticipation'—anticipation, in a single act—of *all these* infinite numer of particulars.[2]

What it all means is, first, that the transcendental consciousness of each category is *ipso facto* the consciousness of an indefinite number of particulars in some unity—exactly the function of intellect in the empirical world, though there performed artificially—and, secondly, that, each category being subordinated to a higher one, we are continuously having richer and richer such unities automatically in the transcendental field, till at last, if at all, we have the highest unity, the grandest system, again exactly what, in the empirical field, intellect has been achieving, though vicariously.

The transcendentalists mostly hold that the *a priori* categories and their experience are, in each case, non-different, meaning that they are never things independent of all consciousness but consciousness and things in one, non-different though apparently different,

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[1] And, of course, that self-consciousness as itself too—first, as anticipating those features and then as in itself.

[2] The empiricists' too easy division of classes into 'closed' and 'open' ones is only a conceptual makeshift and does not throw any light on the difficulties involved, The Nyāya theory of universals is a better solution, only because, as we shall show later, it is half on the way to transcendentalism.

not even in the relation known as identity-in-difference. This is only because these *a priori* categories are anticipation *sui generis* of Nature in its diverse features, not 'natural' impressions of these features somehow caused in the mind, equally an item of Nature. If in this sense they are somtimes called construction, creation, etc. it does not mean that once constructed or created they get detached and from then on stand independent of that transcendental experience. Fundamentally, they are that experience itself, though experience with a content *sui generis*, exactly what is meant too when they are called forms of pure subjectivity, i.e. of transcendental experiencing itself.[1]

The case may be compared profitably, though to an extent misguidingly too, with how the traditional Advaita-Vedāntin has understood the phenomenon of illusion. The snake that is wrongly perceived in a rope is nothing independent of the perceiving consciousness and yet not reduced wholly to it when the illusion is corrected. The corrected snake is retrospectively spoken of as what stood there as an object, though somehow hanging on to the perceiving consciousness even then. Once corrected, it is known as never detached, never an independent object, unlike what it had appeared to be before that correction. Once the illusion is corrected, that experienced-in-the-past snake and that experience itself are *now* experienced, i.e. somehow directly felt, as one and the same and, since there was no independent snake then, as that subjective experience somehow positing itself as an object over there. Between that experiencing and the present one which discovers the true state of affairs there is no difference except that, unlike the latter, the past experiencing was not conscious of having posited that snake from out of itself, and this was because the exact content posited was very largely, almost wholly, determined by some actual natural experience of some snake already in Nature, that experience now working i the form of a disposition (*saṁskāra*). So far, thus, as spontaneou positing is concerned (and even there not regarding the precis content posited), the traditional Advaita-Vedānta account of error i in line with what we have called transcendental anticipation of Nature

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[1] In Indian transcendental philosophies of many Vedāntins, Śaivas and Śaktas these categories, just understood this way, are called *Śuddhatattvas* or *Śuddhasattvas*, and the whole region of these *Śuddhatattvas* called *Suddha* world, *bhāva*-world, *baindava* world, region of *Mahāmāya*, *cidākāsa*, etc. When Leibnitz in the West and many neo-Kantians call them '*possible* objects' they, much as the Vedāntic and Śaiva dualists, lean a bit too much on the object-side.

But the next step in the full Advaita-Vedānta account of illusion which, as we shall immediately see, is not in tune with the notion of transcendence that we have developed so far, seems unwarranted, though decidedly in pursuance of a profound truth. It holds that ultimately this semi-transcendental positing too—in objective language, the posited snake, even detected as so posited—has to eliminate itself. This, it holds, is guaranteed by the fact that in correction the illusory snake is not only known to be not independent of the positing of it though somehow appearing to be there—known, that is to say, as neither independently real nor nothing therefor—along with that correction, or immediately after that, it also comes to liquidate itself wholesale : it ceases even to appear. And, from this the Advaita-Vedānta draws the conclusion that the positing itself has also to be necessarily withdrawn from. He even holds that this principle of positing, called *māyā*, has to be rejected, better, self-rejected leaving only the experiencing, i.e. pure subjectivity, as the ultimate reality.

It appears that Advaita-Vedānta has here made too much of the phenomenon of correction. Certainly, with correction the snake forfeits its independence altogether[1] : it never is nor was independently there. Correction, undoubtedly, is the realisation-experience (a sort of transcendental experience) that the snake was posited *sui generis* (though also, as we have said, in deference to some actual snake experienced in Nature). But the reflective experience carries no such elements incompatible with one another as would necessitate a further purge. Pure (transcendental) experience, self-consciously aware of itself as pure and that way self-contained, may yet, without in the least affecting its purity and self-containedness, posit objects that *appear to be* other than it but are realized from the beginning

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[1] We do not discuss here the realistic theories of correction.

as only *a priori* anticipations, i.e. pure catagories. In the case of the snake-illusion under consideration there is, of course, some borrowing from Nature (in the form of dispositions = *saṁskarās*), and certainly, to that extent, the full autonomy of subjective experiencing gets compromised. But that is quite another cosideration : its intrinsic forward-lookingness in different *a priori* modes stands unaffected. The *a priori* anticipation of the categorial features of Nature is thus in no way inimical to the self-containedness of pure transcendental consciousness. As the *māyā* of the Advaita-Vedāntin is only another name of this pure forward-lookingness, what it all comes to mean is that one is under no necessity to get rid of māyā. Māyā is pure consciousness's free reference to Nature, free positing of its *a priori* features. As it is free positing, this consciousness is ever free equally to remain confined to itself in its self-containedness.

Further, was the liquidation of that snake necessary at all ? If, as a matter of fact, that snake disappeared, this happened because another thing, the rope, had to be accommodated in the same locus at the same time. There may well be perceptual errors which, even as known to be errors, do not require to be replaced. The distinction between *parokṣa bādha* and *aparokṣa bādha* is not of any metaphysical importance. '*Aparokṣa bādha*' means only that the replacing agency comes to be obtrusively evident, and it cannot be so evident unless the former appearance is ousted lock, stock & barrel. This is all an accidental addition to correction. We do not find it in *parokṣa bādha*, though that too is correction in its fulness.

Aii

There are three fundamental modes of transcendental experience, three basic directions that it takes. One, which we have been considering till now, is transcendental consciousness as pure anticipation of Nature, experience in its intrinsic forward-lookingness. The Kantian thinkers and the phenomenologists are so much for it that they have never paid adequate attention to consciousness asserting, at every regressive step of wider and wider such anticipation, its self-containedness too. In their transcendental philosophy they have preferred to remain ever in the forward-looking, objective attitude so much so that whenever they have been forced to turn toward consciousness itself, as distinct from the forward reference they have faltered. And that explains too why, according to them the entire transcendental consciousness not merely in its self-containedness but equally in its forward-looking attitude is unassertive no knowledge, and also that (what, again, is the same thing, only put in object-language) consciousness, as much self-contained as forward-looking, is nothing real. It is basically this idea which has led them to equate reality with Nature.

None of these, however, was necessary, if only along with the forward-looking attitude of pure transcendental consciousness they had also noticed the in-itselfness of that consciousness, sometimes called (pure) Ego. This other side is the second mode of transcendental consciousness, its second basic direction. If these thinkers had noticed this in-itselfness of consciousness—not certainly in objective attitude but in an attitude which is wholly reversed, viz. the inward or subjective attitude, apart, in other words, from any talk of Nature, actual or anticipated—if only these thinkers had noticed this in-itselfness of consciousness they could not have taken it to be a mere transcendental presupposition, beyond the pale of reality, to be real only as referring to Nature that is already somehow real. For, why after all, should they have taken Nature as real[1]? Certainly not because it is *sensuously* perceived : There is no reason why sensuousness should guarantee reality. Whatever is sensuously perceived is accepted as real only because it is found as *given*. It is givenness which guarantees the reality of what is given. The given must not, of course, be contradicted by anything else that is given or understood as giveable. But, then, that something too is real precisely because it is *given*. Givenness, after all, is the basic criterion of reality. To be in the proper place in an intellectually constructed system does not make a content real (actual) ; it only *validates* the idea of that content in the sense that something real

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[1] This problem we have tackled in another way on p. 25. The problem has been tackled again in Chapter II.

(actual) could be predicted from that content-as-in-that-system or, in the minimum, that it stands falsifiable by whatever is already accepted as real (actual).

If then, it is the givenness of a content which makes it real, consciousness as in-itself, as self-contained is real precisely on that ground. For it too stands given, and so also does consciousness as anticipating, i.e. intrinsically forward-looking. The only difference from other reals is that while these latter are given to something (viz. consciousness) which is different from them and in relation to which they are each an 'other', this is not the case with consciousness itself as real. If it is an 'other' it is so to itself. Continuing as itself it also, at the same time, posits itself as its other. Contrary to what many think, there is no self-contradiction here, consciousness here is as much substantive—the self as also functional, i.e. consciousness as act ; and if prior to self-consciousness (reflective awareness of oneself) the substantive consciousness and the functional consciousness were in absolute unison—undistinguished as in stupor—, in self-consciousness they stand as much in the relation of identity as it that of difference. One may compare the two modes to those of a flame in relation to its burning power. When something is put in that flame[1] and gets burnt people say that the flame had till then a *power* of burning, actualized only when something is put into it, and also that in the form of power—as long, in other words, as it was dormant—it was non-assertively, non-operatively, *one with* that flame. Similarly, prior to self-consciousness, consciousness as functional, i.e. operative, was felt, if at all, as only dormant and, that far, non-distinct from consciousness as substantive self[2] ; and, yet in the state of self-consciousness, one gets assured that it was potentially distinct before, even as dormant. In that dormant state, therefore, it was both distinct and non-distinct, but all this in a peculiar sense, viz. that in their non-distinction their distinction was still not undenied. In the state of self-consciousness, on the other hand, their distinction and non-distinction get equally evide equally asserted. This is the proper, concrete, characterization self-consciousness. This is the robust, integral, Śaiva notion of se consciousness (*vimarśa*) which we shall have occasion to discu in detail later. The pre-self-conscious non-difference of the pote tially different substantive and function is called in Śaivism *sāmarasy* it is the *sāmarasya* of *Śiva* and *Śakti*, substantive pure consciousne and functional pure consciousness. According to this integral vie in self-consciousness consciousness as self-consciousness in itself— thus *given* to consciousness as act, and is, on this ground, *rea* and this self-consciousness too, i.e. the functional consciousne (consciousness, in other words, of the consciousness that is sub tantive), is, on this very ground, *knowledge*, no mere transcenden presupposition as Kant and Husserl would have it.

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[1] How that flame originally came into being is not our concern here.

[2] All unreflective knowledge or other objects is as much *revealed* to substantive consciousness as *referred* to by consciousness as act, revelation being wholly a passive phenomenon.

It is because the Kantians and the phenomenologists miss the in-itselfness, the substantive character, of pure consciousness a concentrated wholly on its functional forward-lookingness that th missed the reality, as also the intrinsic cognitive character, of t consciousness. Just in the opposite attitude, the traditional Advai Vedāntins have proposed to do away altogether with the forwar looking character of pure consciousness, i.e. pure consciousness an intrinsic act of reference, whether to itself or to anything el This is the third attitude, we mentioned above, to transcendent consciousness. Under the notion that this functional charac of consciousness is incompatible with its in-itselfness, inasmu this in-itselfness as fully self-contained cannot spill over into a pure reference-function, they propose to reject it ultimately, howe peacefully the two sides may *appear* to coexist. While the integ transcendentalists hold that if the two sides even appear to coex peacefully they cannot be incompatible with each other—and have seen that as a matter of fact they are not incompatible—a while the votaries of mere functional consciousness deny the real and the congnitive character of transcendental consciousness, th Vedāntins, concentrating wholly on the in-itselfness of this co ciousness, reject the functional consciousness altogether as anti-' itself'. These extreme functionalists and extreme substantivists ha

oth failed to account satisfactorily for self-consciousness as distinct rom unreflective consciousness. The functionalists have either gnored the problem altogether or joined hands with the substantivists in understanding self-consciousness to be just consciousness s phosphorescent, self-luminous, little imagining that a glowing orpse is not for that reason a living body or a phosphorescent ntity does not reveal itself *to itself*. True, whatever, other than onsciousness, is revealed by it is always revealed to itself. But rom this it does not follow that when it reveals itself that revelation is necessarily a revelation to itself. What follows, rather, is hat when it is a question of revealing itself, that must be meant or some other consciousness, whether another consciousness alogether, i.e. another person, or the same consciousness in quite nother mode—we mean, the functional consciousness coming to eveal to itself consciousness that is substantive. Undoubtedly, onsciousness, whether functional or substantive, is intrinsically and wholly phosphorescent, meaning that whatever consciousness there s *ipso facto* felt to be there, i.e. *noticed* immediately. But this notice' is not so far *reflective*; it is no form of self-consciousness yet. The problem, therefore, is how precisely to distinguish rom this luminous noticing consciousness the consciousness which, ccording to the Advaita-Vedāntins, is self-luminous, i.e. self-lluminating. We find no wholly satisfying answer from them.

While describing the three attitudes, or directions, of transcendental consciousness we have unambiguously shown our preference for he second. It is consciousness in the integral attitude, basically he substantive and the functional consciousness as one (in *sāmarasya* elation) and, at the level of self-consciousness, in the relation of dentity-in-difference. It is this integral attitude which prevents he transcendental seeker from being lost for good in a sort of ranscendental stupor (*turīyāvasthā*). Even at the last stage of ealization it keeps one as much in the *turīyāvasthā* as also self-onscious (in *vimarśa*)—at least potentially so, if not actually—and, s we have seen further, ever in the forward-looking attitude too.

See p. 55

There is a fourth way too, and even a fifth, if not a sixth lso, of understanding the transcendental. The fourth way is to understand it not in terms of consciousness, whether by itsel as referring, i.e. anticipating, *a priori*, but only as an entity entities that could be so referred to—in other words, as *obje* This is how many Rationalists in the West, headed by Plato, h understood the transcendent ; and in some forms of Indian tr cendentalism—say, in Śaivism—the *śuddha* world is said to be p pled precisely by such *objects*. In both the cases, these obj are understood either all by themselves, everything else in whate other world of objects being only their unsubstantial imitation—s philosophies being, that far, exact counterparts of the traditio Advaita-Vedānta—, or—and this is the fifth way—in a more inte manner, as really constituting, bringing forth *a priori* from ou themselves, i.e. creating or constructing, all out of themselves wholly *a priori*—one might even say, concretizing themselves int lower grades of objects, down to the grossest natural and, if ne ssary, also tracing their way back from Nature to themsel This integral objective transcendentalism is that of Aristotle like-minded philosophers.

In the sixth form of transcendentalism, none of these tra cendental objects are, as objects, taken to be self-contained : t are understood as necessarily hanging on to some transcender consciousness. They could at all be in their so-called distinct s containedness only as they are distinguished by reflective tra cendental consciousness and stand, that way, as intended, constr ted, by it. The so-called autonomous forms, for example, co at all be there only as in reflection we have distinguished th from out of the complex where, as unreflectively grasped, t stood in undistinguished fusion. Forms, in other words, could there, only as reflection had distinguished them from out of s homogeneous wholes. That does not mean, however, that t were not in those complexes before they could be reflectiv experienced ; for we feel assured thet they did not originate the first time when we reflected : they had been there all alo Yet, again, it does not mean that before they were distinguish in reflection in their clear self-containedness they had been th so clear and self-contained ; for, at the unreflective stage we ne

perience them that way. As clear, manipulable, distinctive, self-ontained forms, they are experienced only at the (self-conscious) flective level and never, of their own constitution, before that. his is what we mean by their 'necessary hanging on to consciousness'. he case is parallel, again, though vicariously, to an illusory snake ing there only as it is perceived, never by itself[1]. More of this ter. The *śuddha-tattvas* or *bhāvas* in monistic Śaivism and also some forms of Vaiṣṇavism, specially of the Bengal school, have en understood exactly in this way.[2]

Aiii

Philosophy, we have held, is either mainly an intellectual ccount, a logically well-knit system of theories about reality, hough in its broadest aspects, or an as-far-as-practicable logically eat description of our direct experience of these broad aspects, each, owever, as much in detail as possible. The experience, *in the* tter case, is, we have seen, transcendental, and we have also seen hat precisely is meant by 'transcendental experience'. Of direct nsuous experience there cannot be much of a systematic account, ecause such experience, however gestaltic, is always discrete and ne cannot represent such discrete truncated experiences in a ystematic account without inducting logic and conceptual construc- on in a huge measure. As, however, transcendental experience, hich is also direct awareness of a sort, concerns only broad ategorial features of Nature, in ever-expanding comprehension, nd as their outlines and categorial details too are all directly xperienced and, further too, as these details, because categorial,

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May we go further and claim that just as before being experienced as forms these forms were in undistinguished fusion in the total content of unreflective experience, so might be the case with the snake also ? But of that we are not quite sure. This is why we have said that the case of illusion is only vicariously parallel.

Only, these Śaivas and Vaiṣṇavas have, as we shall see in Chap. II, recognised still another level of reality, more transcendent than the *śuddha* or the *bhāva* world—the *tattvātīta* level—consisting of the highest, as much in its self-contained substantive form as also in the form of function (śakti).

i.e. anticipated *a priori*, and the categories themselves, beca *a priori*, are systematically, at least hierarchically, connected w one another, no account of transcendental experience is much need of external logic and artificial constructions in the form theories and hypotheses. A transcendental account is self-systema and that system too is as directly experienced as what are in system.

Transcendental philosophy is experiential out and out. T philosophy is itself a form of spiritual exercise, *sādhana* or, bet *yoga*. Through more and more, i.e. higher and higher, spirit effort—in our language, through deeper and deeper transcenden reflection, crossing evermore into higher and higher transcenden regions—one finds categories behind categories, wider and wid anticipations of Nature and at the same time richer and rich in details—in the language of *yoga*, higher and higher, purer a purer and, at the same time, more and more comprehensive, sp ritual truths.

Not that everyone is to start with this method. Unless gifte from the beginning—which is very rare—one will have to make hir self competent for this *yoga* exercise. One could, of course, ma himself competent by *trying* to practise *yoga*, though falteringly an through failures, till the exercise is stabilized, much as a baby lear to walk. But even this is for a fortunate few who, like children in tinctively urged toward walking, have a decided leaning to spiritu exercise. Otherwise, for the vast majority of those who are to co on this line, external training is needed. The spiritual exercise, th transcendental reflection that we are talking of here is the well-kno triad *dhāraṇā-dhyāna-samādhi* and the preliminaries for the supren *yoga* constitute the external training, *vahiraṅga-sādhana*. Ordinaril in Indian philosophy they are understood as certain physical an mental ritualistic exercises and some exercises in moral upliftmen Undoubtedly, through such sustained extrinsic practice of payin attention and eliminating the selfish ego-sense (corresponding to th elimination of personal equation elsewhere) one does often acqui the capacity for transcendental reflection ; but the problem of pro lems is—why should one get attracted to it at all ? One has to b

persuaded, led step by step toward it, and that can be done in two ways :

(a) Through fanning up man's natural, and by no means unjustified, proclavity to accepting what other knowledgeable persons say, specially when it concerns matters trans-natural.

(b) By offering, as far as possible, and as correctly and convincingly as possible, extrinsic intellectual (logical) clarification and justfication of the truths claimed by transcendentalists as thier direct experiences. And, this latter can be done in three ways :

(i) By clarifying the very notion of transcendence and justifying its need, all intellectually, as far as possible ;

(ii) By clarifying particular transcendental truths and justifying them, all intellectually, as far as possible.

(iii) By refuting, in either case, the contrary views, all intellectually again, as far as possible.

These are all, of course, extrinsic aids, meant just for persuading and winning over others on to side of transcendental experiences ; and once they are brought to the portals of transcendence and convinced of treasures amassed on the other side, they will practise transcendental reflection which is *yoga* proper.

But even when one is brought up to the portals of transcendence it does not mean that the intellectual method of logic and construction is no more needed. For a long part of the journey onward even from now, i.e. for the entire period the seeker remains any the least *involved* in Nature, which he had been fully before, he will need such intellectual clarification and justification for being kept steady on the path.

The intellectual method has still another positive function which is of enormous importance even for those who are adepts in transcendental reflection. When they write out their transcendental experiences, for others or even for themselves, they have to be quite sure not merely that they are correctly presenting what they have experienced but also that they have experienced what truly ought to have been experienced ; and if the main method for being so assured is constant awakeness, the subsidiary method is undoubtedly constant logical (intellectual) examination. True, more logical examination will never yield the required conviction in the tran cendental field, much as is the case with logical (intellectual) corr tion of a perceptual error. Yet much as intellectual correction o a perceptual error often makes the mind alert for detecting wha other perceptual content might replace it (where, of course, ther is the possibility of replacement), so is the case with intellectu exercise in the transcendental field. Intellect, in the transcendent field, is often indeed efficacious that way, but one must not over estimate its importance. It works there in the way of *arundhati nyāya* only, i.e. more or less persuasively in the way of offerin strong suggestions, never as logic.

Of the two ways, (a) and (b), stated before, of persuasion we have so far explained only one part of the way (b), viz. (bii) As for (biii), after (bi) is explained it requires no further explana tion. The consideration of the way '(a)' we deliberately omit here What remains over is the way (bi) which, to repeat what we hav already said, is as follows :

"By clarifynig the very notion of transcendence and justifying its needs, all intellectually, as far as practicable."

To this cousideration we now turn.

B

Bi

The transcendental is admitted on different grounds.

First, people have been admitting it untutored, in some form or other, since the earliest days. Some people, claiming monopoly of culture, have, indeed, been rejecting it from time to time as prejudice, illusory anthropomorphism, illusion born of misuse of lgnguage, horatory statements misunderstood as assertory, sheer nonsense and what not ? But it is a fact too that in spite of such condemnation, every time stronger than what it had been earlier, transcendentalism has been reasserting itself, which proves, as Kant so strongly claims, that there is something behind it—something, indeed, of cognitive import. If Kant himself has refused to call it *knowledge*, though unlike any modern empiricist or linguistic philosopher he takes it yet as some exercise of theoretic reason, we have seen where precisely he strayed.

Lest this is too easily waived as a historical accident we add the following more solid reasons :

(i) If we have any reasonable occasions to account for the world *as a whole* and if such holistic talks are, logically, not inadmissible, we have to admit something that is somehow beyond the world, i.e. transcendent. We do have such occasions, as when we seek the way out from *all* suffering, all sorts of suffering, suffering as a whole. That we seek such way out is a fact : everyone seeks it. Ask any one and he will say he does not like to have *any* suffering. This looks even like following straight from the *definition* of suffering ; it is (almost) an analytic proposition. In cases we seem to *court* some suffering—say, for the sake of reaping substantial pleasure through some smaller suffering, or, say, when a mother courts suffering for the pleasure of her child, or a lover for the beloved—it is still true that could the same amount of pleasure be derived *without* this pain everybody, including the mother and the lover[1], would favour that. It is only in two cases that some doubt arises as to whether suffering is required to be got rid of. One is the case where suffering chastens a pleasure that without it would have remained rugged and course ; and the other where it is an inevitable ingredient of the spirit in a certain mode, like the suffering that Christ, for example, courted for the sinning mankind. The first of these two cases, however, is not very different from these already disposed of. If those rugged pleasures could be chastened by other means, that alternative would certainly be preferred[2]. Only in so far as such alternatives do not present themselves we have perforce to tolerate these sufferings, as in the case of a mother suffering for the child. More difficult is the case of pathos or tragedy in art where, apparently, it is the suffering that lends beauty to the whole situation. But even there we may say that in so far as it lends that beauty it does not remain there any longer as suffering, except retrospectively as what *was* a suffering. In the context of art it has been su limated ; only a shadow of suffering, continuing, lends the distin ive colouring to that particular art.

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[1] Except, for the lover, in the case stated in the next line in the text.

[2] Sometimes, indeed, a suffering, like that of separation or one derived from contradiction, lends a special weight to the joy that involves it. But this, in quality, is not very different from Christ's suffering discussed a little later in the text.

It is a different case altogether, we admit, with Christ's suffering It continues as suffering—even intenser than other sufferings becau at least quantitatively it is greater than any particular man's whol life suffering. Christ took up—one may say, even anticipated—th sufferings of *all men,* and these continue *as suffering* in the spi tual body of Christ which, otherwise, is divine bliss incarnate. Th way, suffering is certainly courted (by Christ). But it is by no mea any welcome accorded at the naturalistic level. It is suffering grant quarter at a *trans-natural* level, which means that transcenden stands already admitted. Our task was to prove transcendence on t basis of man's undeniable tendency to avoid, or get rid of, sufferings, the whole 'open class' of sufferings ; and if in order counter this the opponent puts forward Christ's case, this he can only if he admits that where sufferings is at all genuinely court it must be at a transcendent level. That way, the opponent's arg ment rather proves what he was out to refute. Integral perfectionist too, in all ages and climes, have incorporated suffering, though a digested and transmuted, in ultimate bliss which, according to them is concretely absolute. This is possible solely because perfectio ultimate bliss, etc. are all matters at the transcendent level.

The premise we started from was that man wants to avoid or rid of the entire 'open class' of sufferings. But is it not precis here that modern empiricists, and even Kant in a sense, have tak exception ? How possibly, they argue, can the members of an op class be comprehended all together at one end the same time ? reply : what, empirically, is an open class is, transcendentally, closed one. This, evidently. is a reply in the Kantian line. On while Kant would not take such transcendent closed classes *knowable*, i.e. *real*, we have already seen why we need not be apologetic.

It is difficult, indeed, to understand how man, decidedly an it of Nature, can question, and talk about, this very Nature as a whol Can a part ever comprehend the whole ? But our reply is strai

and simple : it is fact that man does raise such questions and talks about the world as a whole, which means that somehow—whether we understand it or not—he is as much a part of Nature as beyond it too. This ambivalence we shall discuss in detail in the next section and make it intelligible there.

We are seriously concerned with the world as a whole not only in our attempt—instinctive or calculating—to be away from all[1] suffering but also in our attempt—equally as much calculative as instinctive—to find a cause of this world as a whole. It has almost always been a moot point with the empiricists to deny the admissibility, on whatever ground, of such first cause, the cause of the whole world. Formerly they used to criticise the details of the cosmological Argument in whatever form it was formulated whether in the West or in India. Some of them talked indeed of the inadmissibility of the problem itself on the ground that the very notion of transcendence was, for them, inadmissible. But that was mostly a lesser ssue in those earlier days. What most they advanced in this line was a denial, as, for example, by the Suśikṣita Cārvākas of our country, of the validity of any *inference* from empirical data to anything that could be trans-empirical. It is only in recent days that he very cencept of the trans-empirical has come to be challenged on he basis of self-contradiction and/or linguistic misuse. In the present ontext it has come in a form like this :

If there be a cause of the world it must, like every other cause, be an event and, that for, obtain within this world ; and yet it co nnot so that, because, as a cause of the world *as a whole*, it has to be placed outside of it, as is the lot of every cause in relation to its effect.

Our reply to this challenge is exactly in the Kantian line, except hat while for Kant the world to have a cause or not, though intelligible from the transcendental point of view, is nothing that could be

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There is no sharp distinction here between 'all' as transcendentally a closed class of individuals which are otherwise indefinite in number and 'any', i.e. self-instantiation of the corresponding universal, for here we are either at the transcendent level or on the bordering line between transcendence and Nature. Where normally we speak of 'open' class, i.e., indefinitely, of 'any' member of the class, it is all from the naturalistic, empirical, point of view.

called real or unreal—i.e. a matter of knowledge—for us, as we h claimed several times earlier, it is real, knowable. Our reply, brief, is that, normally satisfied with causation within the world, among natural phenomena, we could at all raise the question ab the cause of the world itself if only we were already aware someho and in whatever measure, direct or distant, of transcendence. T we are already so aware we have shown in connexion with attempt at getting away from all sufferings. 'All sufferings' natur involves all causes (objects) of all sufferings, i.e. the whole wor for there is nothing in this phenomenal world, both physical mental, that does not cause some suffering in some conte Another name of *all objects* is 'the world as a whole'.

One may raise an objection here. One may argue that wha here meant by 'first cause' is not the cause of the *whole world* only the first in the series of causes behind causes in the phenome world. The objection, in other words, is that the first cause nothing to do with the transcendental level, that it is in Nature its quite as much as every other cause. But, so formulated, the ar ment is equally, if not more, vulnerable. If that first cause is Nature—wholly in Nature—it, in its turn, must need a cause, for that is wholly in Nature has a cause ; and in that case it cannot the first cause, which means that all phenomena as causes form 'open class'. This, of course, could be a clear alternative if not the disturbing consideration that some entities like space, time, general law of causality, etc.—in short, all entities that are conside to be basic, i.e. metaphysical—are as much in the world itself as transcendent. To be in the world is not necessarily to be *wholl* better, merely—in it : it may be transcendent at the same time. 'first cause' of the famous Cosmological Argument is exactly of status. As *in the series* it is in the world, i.e. a phenomenon ; at the same time, it is transcendent too, meaning that the very tr cendent First Cause chose to behave also as a worldly phenomen though because of its transcendent nature it possibly could not h another phenomenal event preceding it as cause. This is the

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1. This last also is as much a transcendental truth, though initially only understood, as that we have to get away from all sufferings.

character of all genuine transcendents—God, Self, space, time, etc. Continuing in their transcendent status they appear too in the phenomenal world and behave like other phenomena there except that they evince their transcendence too throughout, their autonomy, their in-itselfness in each case. One may say that here—and only here—transcendence and the phenomenal world alternate ; for which some pin their faith entirely on the transcendent, some on the phenomenal and some, robustly enough, on the transcendent that, evincing transcendence, shares seat, at the same time, with other phenomena (but with this difference that is always a special seat, a royal seat). The phenomenal world is, in this third alternative, a democracy where "all are equal but some more equal than others". In each of these alternatives the penultimate phenomenon is, in this sense, the cause of the world as whole.

The state of affairs, thus, is not as simple as we find it in text books dealing with the Cosmological Argument. The Naiyāyikas, aware of such complication, have formulated the Causal Argument in a different manner altogether. They would not, as we have seen earlier, permit any transcendence and would, therefore, understand the cause of the world as much as possible in the language of ordinary causation—a conscious agent, like the maker of a table but of supernormal powers, though by no means qualitatively different, i.e. transcendental, meaning all the time that he, himself uncaused, belongs after all to this very world—one among its various items, though of immense dimension almost in every respect. That he is the cause of the world does not mean, the Naiyāyikas hold, that he is beyond it. The world here does not mean the *totality*, a *whole* of items ; it means *any* item—every item that anybody chances to come across—and not a whit more than that. 'Any', according to them, does not mean a *transcendent viewed from the empirical standpoint*. It rather means the corresponding *universal* as so viewed, and universals are, according to them, all empirical, belonging to Nature as some of its items. The Naiyāyika's Nature = world does not consist merely of events that happen at definite instants of time (and very often continue too, however briefly) and then cease to be, it consists equally of eternals which are either non-temporal altogether or, unborn and never ceasin continue for all times.

The Naiyāyikas have tried desperately to remain empiricis from the beginning to the end, and this is why even though th have admitted reals which others have mostly recognised as tran cendent (metaphysical) they have struggled hard to interpret the empirically all through.

It is because of this empiricistic predilection that the Nyā argument for the existence of God has perforce been half Cosm logical and half Teleological. The Teleological Argument of t Western thinkers is, by more than three fourths, empiricistic, an the little transcendence that one is forced, say, by Kant, to rec gnise in it is but the transcendence which necessarily characteriz God whichever way it is argued to and which, as we have ju seen, the Naiyāyikas tried desperately to get rid of.

The Teleological Argument, as an argument, is thus whol in the empiricistic attitude. In contrast, the Ontological Argume is, *even as argument*, and certainly in the concept of God i arrives at, wholly in the transcendental attitude. It starts wit the notion of perfection, the ideal, the maximum (*kāṣṭhā*) as Yog in Indian philosophy has it, and each such notion is patent transcendental, something which not only the empirical proce of continued betterment approaches to unceasingly, never attainin it, but also constitutes the main driving force behind this neve ceasing-approach—never-ceasing approach from the empirical vie point but ever touching, ever itself, from the point of view (transcendence.

Bii

There are other grounds too for admitting transcendenc Only one of them we propose to discuss here, and that becaus it concerns a very important department of transcendental philo sophy. We propose to show that every man's authentic awarene of himself as free posits transcendence in the most evident an convincing form.

Qualitatively, man's acts differ as much from the movements of physical things as from the behaviours of sub-human creatures, which latter differ from physical things in being *living*. Movements of physical things are all fully determined, every bit calculable. If sub-atomic micro movements are largely indeterminate, the corresponding macro movements, even as computed statistically, are completely determined, perfectly calculable, there being no exception at the macro-level. Smaller or larger deviations are all at the micro level. It is precisely here that the movements of living beings, called organic behaviour, differ from physical movements. It organic behaviours are indeterminate and unpredictable, it is so at the very macro level at which their average behaviours are uniform and predictable. There is no level-gap between their macro and so-called micro behaviours. Though there are evident deviations from their normal behaviour, the deviations that are major are not frequent and those that are frequent are always minor, i.e. not of much significance. This meens that organic behaviours are almost as determined and calculable as physical movements but contain, nonetheless, some rudiments of freedom. As distinct at the macro level from mere physical movements, they are, even at that level, partly *sui generis* i.e. free, but that is only to an insignificant extent. Freedom just emerging, the behaviours yet remain almost fully under the control of physical matter that largely constitutes them.

Some of these creatures, at higher and higher levels of evolution, develop even sorts of mind—we mean, better forms of freedom. But even there these minds are only rudimentarily free. At lower levels that just feel their surroundings and at higher and higher levels may even *know* them, and in either case respond fittingly, but except at very high levels—say, where man proper first emerges and, may be, at some high-grade animal levels too—there is no attempt at getting away from Nature's clutches. Things are taken in exactly as they are presented and any original response, whether cognitive or emotive or conotative, is at its minimum, practically nil. There is no self-consciousness anywhere, no self-conscious remembering of the past or anticipation of the future and no use of means as means anywhere. At the intermediate levels we are speaking of, practically the entire orga and mental life is in the same old iron grip of Nature.

It is in the case of man—man unambiguously understo as man—that we find for the first time a sort of resistan against Nature, a refusal to sacrifice one's originality, refusal be bulldosed into stale uniformity with others. Here for the fi time emerges the 'freedom' of man. It emerges equally in positive form, not merely in the negative form of refusal. the positive form it is, first, assertion of man's original statu his essential humanity that, in refusing to sudmit animal-like Nature, has, in effect, asserted itself as self-contained *sui generi* Obviously, as any such self-awareness of originality is again bondage to Nature—against, in other words, his naturality—and this Nature includes as much his mind as his living body and t dead matter that belongs to it, this free man, this freedom, this h in-itself, is somethig beyond these, something that, in this assertio self-consciously dissociates itself from the natural body and mind and what could this self-dissociate entity be if not consciousness-i itself, consciousness conscious of itself, as what, though so lon referring to objects without being aware that it was so referring, now aware of *itself* as so referring. This *itself* as referring is th *subject*—subjectivity, self-evidently aware of itself even though it referring ((in Husserl's language, 'intending'). Whatever that b this consciousness or subjectivity, in its capacity as what is referrin is transcendent in relation to whatever is referred to—in relatio in other words, to *all* that is object ; for whatever is referred to i for that very reason, an object. This consciousness is transcende not merely because as referring to objects it is categorially differe from those objects, but, more primarily, because in that capacity refers to *all* objects, objects as a whole, object-in-general. Con ciousness to refer to a *particular object* is at all possible only be cause intrinsically it refers to *all objects*, object-in-general. Thi referring (intending), thus, is not to be understood in terms of wha is referred to, not in any manner as hyphenated with it—in th phenomenologist's language, in terms of the 'essences', far less, there fore, in terms of the objects that are items of Nature. It is to b

nderstood in terms of itself, whether as mere referring act or simply is that which so refers ; in the latter case, even the act of referring s sought to be withdrawn from. These are the two alternative ways f understanding subjectivity—either as *that* (understood in itself) which had been referring or only as that referring act without any alk of what it is that is referring. And, just in this context, there is third alternative too, viz. the--subject (in itself)-*as-referring*. The Vedāntists of the Saṁkarite school have opted for the first alternative, the Mahāyāna Buddhists and Kant largely and the Husserian phenomenologists for the second alternative and all other transendental subjectivists for the third.

Whichever of these alternatives one chooses, one has to admit hat there is a sharp categorial difference between subjectivity (consciousness) and object, meaning that consciousness, i.e. pure consciousness, consciousness as the quintessence of freedom, transcends *ll* objects, the entire world of objects, Nature. If according to many transcendental subjectivists free consciousness somehow *omprehends* objects—whether essences or natural objects—, that oo is intelligible only from the transcendental point of view.

If negative freedom consists in resisting, withdrawing from Nature, positive freedom is, first, this consciousness itself in its bsolute purity. According to Kant (in his first *Critique*) and many phenomenologists this freedom = pure consciousness is nothing *real*. But they could hold this view only because, according to them, the eal consisted of objects of Nature, Kant insisting as much on objects' as on 'Nature' and the phenomenologists solely on 'Nature'. But there is no reason why 'reality' should be confined to these. Kant's and Husserl's choice has here, at the very basis of their philosophies, been obviously arbitrary. If in search of the ultimate we have to transcend Nature, that is no reason why we should refuse the name 'reality' of it (the ultimate). Rather, it is the very search for the real which has pushed some philosophers, this way, beyond Nature and made them find it eventually in the transcendent ultimate, called Absolute[1].

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[1] We discussed this problem more fully earlier. See p. 8ff. This problem has been tackled again in Chapter II.

Positive freedom is, first, consciousness in its absolute purit But this is not the only positive form of freedom. To many, th far, it is only a truncated form of positive freedom, mere 'freedo from' not the more concrete 'freedom to'. This freedom-to is least a second *alternative* form, if not the only ultimate form, positive freedom. It is *free manipulation* of natural entities and i in its turn, again, either cognitive or emotive or conative, bringin that way, *another set of fundamental attitudes*.

If freedom transcends and is, therefore, more than mechanic submission to Nature, cognition would no longer, from that point o view, be mere recording of presentation (or, better, presentations ju got recorded) and their getting mechanically combined into un wholes through mechanical revival of unconscious and subconscio traces, to develop, and that too mechanically, into animal dispo tions. The field of feeling would no longer get exhausted in bas creaturely comforts and discomforts, developing mechanically, more or more complicated natural circumstances, at most into so of disposition like fear, anger, attraction, repulsion, etc. ; and th field of conation would contain much more than mere instincti and physiological responses, sometimes even supplanting them Cognition, emotion and conation would, from now on, take o quite different forms, mostly initiated and developed from withi and all self-conscious (except where they had turned into habits)

In the case of man proper, cognition turns into viewi Nature—and, therefore, things of Nature—anew from the transce dental point of view. In a previous section we have noted th there are sub-levels in the sphere of transcendence and we sh see later that there is a wide enough region where Nature an transcendence more or less border upon each other, higher an higher regions of Nature being more or more consciously impre nated by, more and more evidencing the role of, transcende consciousness. Cognition, from this point of view, more and mo transcends animal cognition, developing, at the first few sub-stage

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1. If man often knows, feels and exercises his conative faculty unconscious (i.e. not self-consciously), this is because man is largely an item of Natu also, an animal.

lassical natural sciences of different grades of development and hen the modern science that seems to form a world of its own—a world consisting mostly of theory-constructions and yet retaining ome last lingering link with the old world as it was presented o animals. Higher than that there is metaphysics *as such a cons- ruction*[1], still higher the metaphysics that reveals itself and yet n deference to the Nature that we have been transcending, goes n constructing itself speculatively ; etc. etc. At still higher levels here are subtler and subtler phenomenological self-revelations of he truths (essences) of pure consciousness and, at the highest level —let us presume—pure consciousness itself, the unadulterated subject, n all the self-contained and self-expansive ('intentional') grandeur.

Emotion, similarly, passes through stages, evincing transcen- ence more and more. These are the different ascending stages f art and emotional religious approaches. Details we need not inter into in this essay. Conation too passes through similar ifferent stages. At the lowest stage where it first transcends Nature it comes out, initially, in the form of defending a commu- ity against aggression and doing it internal good ; then, through ifferent sub-stages, as social norms rendered more and more elf-conscious and then retionalized more and more into more nd more systematized and convincing moral norms, and finally s sorts of intuited, self-explanatory, norms or body of norms, alled categorical imperatives (*niṣkāma, nirabhimāna, lokasaṁgrahārtha* nd *Iśvarārpitaphala karma*) as we find these developed, say, in ant's second *Critique* (and *Metaphysics of Morals*), Hartmann's *thics* and *Srīmadbhagavadgītā*.

If the three ways toward transcendence—cognitive, emotive nd conative—be alternative to one another, transcendence at its ighest stage of self-evidence may also be understood as of three lternative forms, viz. as the absolute of cognition, that of emotion nd that of conation. These three alternative absolutes may, again, e understood either as one and the same absolute (indeterminate

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Generally called speculative metaphysics, with its last link with Nature either snapped or on the point of disappearance.

in itself) appearing as of three alternative forms, or as three ultim absolutes, with nothing that is even indeterminately common to th Neither of these, however, necessarily implies that at least the w to the absolute, if not the absolutes themselves—whether (absolute in three alternative forms or three alternative absolutes are independent of, at least indifferent to, one another·. As *the way to* the absolute, cognition, emotion and conation do together—this is obvious enough ; and, not only that, each depe too, to whatever extent on the other two. But, first, on each these ways to the absolute, only one attitude remains domin engulfing the other two which, one may say, remain only invol in it and never assert themselves. May be, at the start they merily together, hand in hand, but, sooner than expected, (of them gets the upper hand—which one to get it depending the path to follow, whether it is cognitive or emotive or conativ and then the other two, in each case, remain as only subordin losing their dominance more and more at every step forward. this gradual loss of dominance has sometimes been underst as gradual ceasing to be—the idea being that ultimately ther either *pure* cognition or *pure* emotion or pure conation—this been an over-simplification.

There is never any simple togetherness of cognition and thing said to be cognized, nor any mere causal relation like thing—whether simple items or ever-expanding gestalts—produc some 'change in consciousness', which change precisely is cognition, or, contrarily, as these 'causal theorists' equally cognition producing change in the world of things 1. There never any simple togetherness or mere causal connexion. Fr the side of cognition, it refers *sui generis* and when it is fou

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1. As a matter of fact, cognition never changes the world of things ; it is that does that. What cognition does is only adding something, ei arranging things in some order—system or hierarchy—that order being all own contribution in the sense that logic is nothing but pure cognition (s jectivity) itself moving among things and that way clasping them toge or projecting something anew on them, and that too in the form of pre tation, the projects being derived from unconscious or semi-conscious tra and dispositions stored in every individual mind.

eferring to any particular thing this is because that particular hing has chanced to be there. This, again, is not the whole tory. As referred to, i.e. *qua* taken up by cognition—phenomeno- ogically speaking, *intended* by (cognitive) consciousness—, *it stands* here as content, i.e., phenomenologically speaking, *within the* oetic field itself, as *noema*, precisely from which the *realist* naturalist) seeks to distinguish the 'thing'. The thing taken that way as within the noetic field may also be called 'object' (the Naiyāika's *viṣaya* as distinct from *padārtha*), provided this object s not, contrary to what is very usual, misidentified with the ealist's *thing*. This is why we prefer here the term '*noema*' or content'. From the side of cognition we may say that we start with *content* and at the same time inevitably *believe* it to be a hing as having an autonomous status of its own, absolutely independent of the cognition in question. This, however, only so ar as we, *humans*, are in contact with Nature.

As sub-human animals, on the other hand, unaware of ourselves, unaware of our freedom unaware that we ourselves are not just things among things of Nature, our standpoint would be entirely that of *things*. All causal theory is valid from that standpoint only. What we, as animals, are said to be aware of are all the realist's *things*, though as animals we have no awareness of that awareness. It is fundamentally in contrast with this that *human* cognition is said to be *free*. The fundamental standpoint in an animal's cognition is that of *things* that constitute Nature, animals themselves be- longing wholly to that Nature. One may develop a whole theory of cognition from this realistic point of view, but then he would fail to explain the typically *human* forms of cognition like *thought* that involves logic, constructive imagination, communication through a whole system called language, and, above all, self-consciousness or introspection, all of which, directly or indirectly, involve trans- cendence that is trans-thingly, trans-natural, i.e. freedom.

So long as there is no dawning of this sense of freedom which constitutes the man proper in creatures known as men there is, decidedly, no scope for any idealistic theory of knowledge such as what naturally suggests itself to one who speaks fr the side of cognition, not from that of things. That does n however, mean immediately that from the side of things all the of knowledge would be realistic. From that point of view th is, as a matter of fact, no scope at all for any theory, any s conscious awareness of the situation one is in. All realism but a retrospective account from an actual idealistic point of vi an account, viz. as to what that situation was from both the s of the body—mind being understood as only subtle body o sort—and the side of what that body responded to. The wh idea of the realist is obviously this : (self-) consciousness, s jectivity, freedom is *either* a useful epi-phenomenon which is u but cast off as soon as the use is over or, as in the world nature, a genuine development but nothing of any intrinsic sta or value, all its status consisting in handling thingly situations best as possible but in an animal way, after all. The idea, other words, is that between man and animal there is no *fundamen* difference, no gap that cannot be bridged over in terms of ani *efficiency*. Man, according to all genuine realism, is the m efficient animal conceivable and, therefore, more complicated constitution. One may go even further and hold that accord to these realists—sometimes in their extreme forms they are cal materialists—even animals are but complicated units of matt combination, units that are just as much more complicated th dead matter as man is in relation to animals. In a way, th realism and materialism coincide, and this materialism in obviou as strong an alternative as idealism (transcendental subjectivis developed from the side of cognition as autonomous subjectivit

Mutatis mutandis, we have the same story with feeling (emotio and conation. The difference between feeling-emotion and conatio on the one hand, and cognition, on the other, is that where with progressive self-consciousness in the former the content, t *noema*, at each advanced stage stands more and more dissociate even as objects, from the things of nature, this, as we have see is not the story of cognition. What stands dissociated more an more in cognition is primarily the consciousness, the parall progressive dissociation of *contents* from things of nature bei

only consequent on this. In feeling-emotion and conation, on the other hand, it is the *contents* that primarily get dissociated from things and the progressive dissociation of consciousness is only consequential : even from the side of consciousness what we are immediately and primarily concerned with, interested in, are the contents, the *noemata* in their progressive purity or transcendence, dissociation of consciousness as such being always a secondary affair, either so secondary that it only happens without our being interested in it at all, as in the case of purer and purer, i.e. more and more transcendent, feeling or emotion, or we get interested in it but just so far as it is directed toward purer and purer contents.

In all the three cases of cognition, feeling-emotion and conation there is, at each sub-level of transcendence, a *content*, *noema* or *essence*—purer, more in itself, more distant from things of nature. In all the three cases, this *content* is never a realist's thing, indifferent to the consciousness that is *of it*. The very concept of *content* is unintelligible except in reference to the consciousness we have of it much as, like what many phenomenologists have held, and much as what is true up to—one may say—the penultimate level of transcendence, consciousness too is unintelligible except as consciousness of, i.e. directed to, some content. The difference between cognition, feeling-emotion and conation lies in the fact that while in cognition the content is secondarily consequent upon the consciousness that has dissociated itself, in feeling-emotion it is rather the content that first distinguishes itself, distinguishment of consciousness only following upon it ; and in conation consciousness and content, simultaneously distinguishing themselves from the world of things, stand hand in hand to the end even in the region of transcendence and at all its levels. The phenomenologists have almost as a rule confused cognitive, feeling-emotive and conative transcendences with one another.

There are still other considerations for admitting the tr
cendental. One of these is the common ambition of man to k
that by knowing which a large number of other things can be kn
and often, ultimately, to know that by knowing which everyt
else may be known. 'Knowledge' here primarily means d
cognitive grasp, though in intellectual philosophic systems it
often been understood vicariously as intellectual awareness,
thought. Another consideration for admitting the transcendent
the paradoxes that, on a little consideration, emerge in diffe
kinds of 'natural' cognition (and also feelings and conations) wh
every time one attempts at a genuine solution, lands him in s
level of transcendece ; and we shall have occasion to see that t
are different such levels each progressively higher or deeper ac
ding as some paradox appearing at a just lower lnvel is solved at
higher level, though at this higher level there may arise still ano
paradox to be solved at the level next higher.

P.3 Introduct

That which being known everything covered by it is known
be called 'essence' of these things. Such, for example, are the
versals each of which covers au infinite number of particulars,
if there could be a higher universal it would that way cover *all* p
ticulars of the world, 'all' being understood distributively. S
universals can be known *either* after one has experien
several such particulars, and therefore through some process of c
parison and abstraction, *or* immediately as the first particula
experienced, and along with that. In the former case, where t
not known before some such particulars are known, it is obviou
abstract *(amūrta)*—an object of *thought* or, if one likes, a piece
thinking (referring to those and similar other particulars). In
latter case, i.e. where it is known immediately as the first partic
is known, and along with that, it is some concrete direct awarene
or direct awareness of something concrete, viz. the awareness of
concrete *(mūrta)* as perceptual awareness, of some essence of c
thing perceived—an essence that *qua* essence is, in the same c
crete manner, immediately known as the essence all similar thin
i.e. of all the *innumerable* number of things that could be clas

ith the thing actually perceived. Conceptualists, often called no-
inalists, in the West and all Buddhists holdt he former view, and
thers, called realists, in the West and all Indian thinkers except the
uddhists and the Cārvākas hold the second view.

Things, however, are not so easy and simple. Consider, first, the
ormer view. One cannot say that the universal comes to be known
fter some particulars are known. For, immediately, the question
ould arise—After how many? One will have to say, like the candid
aiyāyikas, 'After—better immediately as—the very first particular
perceived'. And that is not contrary to facts. If a child is shown
r the first time an elephant, whether as pictured in a text book or
s actually there, and told that it is an elephant, the very second
lephant he comes across is immediately recognised by him as an
lephant. This could not have happened if the child had not precei-
ed the corresponding universal immediately as he perceived the first
lephant. This, indeed, is a fact, but it has to be properly under-
tood. It means that, whatever be the particular one experiences,
ne constitutionally anticipates—in our language, anticipates *a priori*
—similar other particulars. The universal, so far, is an *a priori, sui
eneris*, anticipation, coloured on different occasions by particular
mpirical features. Let us clarify the whole thing by means of an
nalogy :

Hume holds that if smoke is known to be caused by fire, it is
ecause we have actually experienced cases of smoke having so far
een invariably preceded by fire, so that the knowledge that fire is
he cause of smoke is all empirically associational. Kant corrected
Hume by showing that though the expectation of *fire* as having
receded a particular column of smoke I come across is all associa-
ional, i.e. empirical, the idea that it is preceded by *some* phenomenon
s *necessary*, i.e. *a priori* : it is a *sui generis* expectation on the part
f pure consciousness and thus *transcendental*, as we have defined the
erm. However, in spite of the expectation being *a priori*, i.e. trans-
endental, thus far, what precisely is expected to have preceded the
moke is determined empirically. This is what we meant when in
he last paragraph we said that the *a priori* anticipation is coloured,
n different actual, (empirical) occasions, by particular empirical

features. To clarify our point let us consider another similar c That an articulate word, like 'elephant', means such and such crea of such and such characters is undoubtedly learnt through empi association, but that the word 'elephant' means *something* is a *priori*—all a transcendental expectation *sui generis*—though here loured by some empirical feature.

We have all along held that whatever is *a priori* is, by that fact, transcendental. '*A priori*' means what is prior to all experie and yet obtains in the empirical world, called Nature. It obtains the form of necessary, unavoidable, connexion—as necessary, una dable anticipation of *something* in Nature, though that something in Nature, stands coloured by some empirical feature. That way, necessity is not merely analytical, arbitrarily definitional or just borative of some convention, or the like. It is constantly refer to the empirical world, i.e. Nature, that reference being a par moment, of its own being. The aprioritics are no dead, mechan presuppositions, weaving mere logical subtleties and applying t *ab extra* to empirical data purposely to weave out useful constru They are living pre-visions of the general, categorial features of Nat i.e. viewing Nature from some trans-natural, transcendental p of view, meaning that there is some transcendent reality which ete lly posits the empirical world in its broadest categorial features.

The Naiyāyikas have not, of course, meant all this when have held that we perceive the universal in every single partic perceived for the first time. But unless they had meant somet near it their doctrine would not be intelligible. Consider, for ex ple, their favourite doctrine which others would never so easily ad viz. that immediately as a universal is perceived *all* the partic covered by it stand perceived. On the face of it, this is a bla impossibility. If 'all' means *all* the particulars collected exhausti there can never be any such complete collection when the partic concerned, belonging to the beginningless past, endless future immeasurable infinite space, are infinite in number. If yet people have, in modern times, toyed with the idea of 'open class is all an arbitrary construct meant only for easy and useful com tion. When, therefore, the Naiyāyikas speak of perceiving all

infinite number of particulars of a group, i.e. all that are similar in certain features, either they ara in baltant self—contradiction or what they mean has to be properly understood. They mean by 'all x-s' all x-s *qua* X. 'All men' does not, for them, mean Ram, Shyam, John, Rahim, etc. etc. each in his special features too, but only these Ram, Shyam, etc. each, as a mere instance of man, i.e. *qua* man (manuṣyatvāvacchinna). And this exactly is what is ordinarily intended by the English term 'any man' as distinct from 'all men'. 'Any man' means every man—one may even say, 'all men'—but each taken as just an instantiation of the class Man. But what precisely is this class Man? Obviously, there cannot be a closed class of an indefinite number of particulars, and 'open class', we have just seen, is a jargon, unless it means that somehow in the first particular that is perceived we have directly experienced its essence; and an essence is that which being known everything covered by it comes to be known. What, in effect, it means is that though the first particular, in all its unique exhaustive particularity, is known as an item there in Nature, its essence—by definition the essence of everything that could be labelled by their same (class-) name—is somehow known in quite a different attitude, viz. from the beginning as anticipating *sui generis* (practically *a priori*) all the particulars bearing the same name, and, therefore, as just instantiations of that essence. It is like anticipating the whole Rāmāyaṇa before Rama was born, i.e. preparing anticipatively an account of whatever a Rama—like absolute votary of Truth would do—all an *a priori* epic so far, but with the activities colourable by contingent naturalistic circumstances. Is this not exactly what we have so long been calling transcendental experience? So, in spite of all that the Naiyāyikas might say to the contrary, they have, in their notion of the universal, recognised transcendence, though vicariously. Had they not done that how possibly could they hold that in the very first perceived particular one experiences the universal directly—a universal which, by definition, covers a whole group of an indefinite, unending number of particulars?

Then, again, if the first particular experienced is an elephant, because of which fact one is said to perceive in it the elephant univer-

sal and, through that, all elephants *qua* elephant, is not that
particular equally also *living, non-thinking, guided by instincts,*
subtance and *real* and, on the other side, an *elephant of a partic*
brand, particular colour, etc.? So, in that first particular we exp
ence not only the elephant universal but so many other univer
too corresponding to these other features and, through each of th
an infinite number of corresponding particulars. Empirically co
dered, such experience of even a first particular would be too full
pull on with, what to speak of so many first particulars
experiences in a whole life—time? All the difficulty disapp
however, as soon as we take them as only *possible* objects: my
of possibilities can peacefully crowd in a tiniest locus at one and
same time. And possible objects are exactly those which are
cipated *a priori*, i.e. transcendentally, however otherwise they ma
coloured by the empirical features of the corresponding first par
lars. That the categorial features (possible objects) anticipat
priori include even empirical universals we have already seen.
shall see it more fully in Chapter II in connexion with our stud
madhyamā vāk.

Furthermore, if a relevant universal is experienced, as
Naiyāyikas hold, with-and-in the very first particular perceive
there or is there not any further contribution to this experience w
we perceive a second, a third, a fourth (etc.) empirical case of
particular? There appears to be some contribution, and a
significant one, at least toward correcting and/or precisifying
universal, meaning, in effect, progressive correction and/or pr
fication of the naturalistic empirical colouring of that *a priori*
cipation or—quasi-objectively—of what is so anticipated.
otherwise, i.e. if no such *a priori* anticipation was presupp
there would be no knowing as to what it is that gets corrected a
precisified through the experience of further particulars, and
'correction and/or precisification' would be a misnomer.

If, now, the universal is nothing other than *a priori*, trans
dental, categorial anticipation, though every time, to wha

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1. We need not consider here the distinction that the Naiyāyikas have
between *akhanda-jāti* and *sakhanda-upādhi*.

heasure, coloured empirically—more and more thinly as it has
ider and wider sweeps—there remains no relevant distinction
etween a universal, a corresponding undefined integral generic
nage (*saṁsthāna* = *ākṛti*) and the stuff (as understood in English by
aterial noun)—the stuff like wood, iron, etc., often in Western
hilosophy called substance, of which the particulars are but modes,
e. modifications. That way, obviously, there would be little dis-
inction between the Naiyāyika's *jāti*, the Mīmāṁsaka's *saṁsthāna*
ākāra) and the Sāṁkhya and the Vedāntist's *upādāna*. This explains
oo whatever distinction there is between how all these thinkers
nderstand the relation between the *jāti*, *saṁsthāna* (*ākāra*) and
pādāna, on the one hand, and the corresponding particulars on the
ther. For the Naiyāyikas, it is *samavāya* : the particular and the
niversal are not each dependent on the other, it is only the parti-
ular which is dependent on the universal, not *vice versa*. The
Mīmāṁsakas understand the relation as thorough reciprocal depen-
ence, the constituents being as much one in stuff as different in
unction, one and the same stuff behaving differently as it were ; so
hat here, for the first time, the universal has come to be understood
s the constitutive stuff, though the particulars are not yet understood
s forming its modes. There is, in other words, still a sort of see-
aw between the Naiyāyika's abstract (*amūrta*) universal and the
oncept of concrete (*mūrta*) stuff. For the Vedāntins, however, it is
wholly that concrete stuff. In none of the three cases is the univer-
al, whether as abstract or as concrete, whether as what is commonly
alled 'universal' or as the constitutive stuff, fully intelligible from
he empirical naturalistic point of view. That the abstract universal
s not so intelligible we have already seen. That the constitutive
tuff—wood, stone, metal or the like—is equally unintelligible from
he empirical point of view is clear from the fact that while parti-
ular chairs, tables, this or that piece of stone and ornaments are
uite definite things of Nature, not so are wood, stone and gold as
tuff named by 'material nouns' of English Grammar. These latter
an never be pinpointed, though everybody somehow experiences
hem—and, in a way, directly too—as he perceives particular things.
n perceiving a chair we certainly experience the stuff wood that

it is made of. But, clearly too, that stuff is not exhausted in th chair, nor even in any chair, or any wooden thing however large may be imagined to be. However mysteriously, the same stuff wo is present in every definite wooden particular and yet runs out of spills over to every other wooden thing—all wooden things in past, present and future.[1] Wholly unintelligible in naturalistic ter it is yet experienced that way, and experienced directly. Netura tically indefinite, it demands to be experienced as definite—defi and yet simultaneously present, as constitutive, in all wooden thi past, present and future; and that other experience is transcend tal, an experience which, precisely, is the anticipation of all woo things, i.e. all things of Nature under the category of woodenn Awareness of the stuff wood is nothing but the awareness of wooden thing, which, as we have already seen, is precisely transcendental (direct) experience of Nature in so far as it is wood We repeat, apriorities are not merely the Kantian ones—the wi forms of Nature-anticipation—they include all sorts of anticipat of Nature in any of its general character, beginning from the wid down to the narrowest feature, provided every such feature general one. In all such cases, something (some feature) be known (experienced), all particular things *comprehended under* it, as *featured that way*, are known. This is the only intelligible (dir knowledge we can have of all the infinite number of particu covered by a class-name, precisely what we have been calling tra cendental knowledge, transcendental anticipation, of Nature in t feature.

Biv

There is, as we suggested on p. 37, still another ground[2] f admitting transcendence. It is that in our experience of Nat there often emerge paradoxes which—however much we ignore th

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[1] This point has again been discussed in another light later in connexion w our clarification of the concept of '*tattva*'.

[2] There may be other grounds too. But we need not consider them. grounds that we have considered already and shall consider in this sec may be taken as enough.

our day-to-day life or, when pressed, offer only some tentative alf-working explanations—demand wholly satisfactory solutions s soon as we turn seriously to them; and, as we shall show later,[1] ie solution demanded in every case can only be found in a higher vel, though there for us only to be bogged in another riddle which o cannot be got over except in a still higher, i.e. relatively more anscendental, level, and so on, till, when all riddles are got over, ll paradoxes solved, we are at the highest level of transcendence.

As just said, we shall seriously take it up later. Only to lustrate our point, however, we take up one such paradox here and how how necessarily, in trying to solve it, we get transported to a igher region.[2]

The paradox we take up here concerns the status of form and atter and the relation between them. At the unreflective naturlistic level of our day-to-day life we do not distinguish between rm and matter. We have a wooden table and we just use it withut caring in the least that *it is made of some matter* (stuff), called ood, *and has a certain form*, viz. that of a table.

There is, of course, a sort of *naturalistic* reflection, i.e. eflection which neither transports us to any trans-natural, transcenental, level nor even presupposes any such level. It is our normal itellectual life which, passing through growing stages of excellence, of the status of science at its highest. At every such stage we o indeed distinguish form from matter, manipulate what we call matter y means of forms and, that way, we either feel we have undertood Nature better or construct newer things yielding increasing ractical benefit. But *either* this distinguishing of form from matter s half-hearted, nobody caring for what exactly these forms are as matter of fact and whether there could at all be naked matter

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[1] As noted in the Preface, (P.3) we have not shown this anywhere later. This however, has been shown in a masterly way by K. C. Bhattacharya in the chapter 'The subject as freedom' in his *Studies in Philosophy*. The reader is referred to that chapter.

[2] This paradox I have discussed thoroughly in my *Philosophy, Logic and Language*, chapter named 'The Nature of Reflection'. Here, in the present text, I am presenting only a general outline.

(relatively so or stark naked) to be manipulated through these fo
or whatever forms are spoken of in this attitude are only mach
cally conventional and at worst wholly artificial, being unders
as just working postulates, no items of reality, naturalistic or tr
cendental.

If there could be no other approach to the distinction bet
form and matter, we had indeed to be satisfied with these acco
But there is, as a matter of fact, another approach—and deci
one which is more living and authentic—where, as we shall pres
see, any distinguishing of form and matter gets immediatelly invo
in such paradoxes as necessarily demand to be solved but ca
be solved except from a trans-natural point of view.

In this approach what first comes to be distinguished f
out of the homogeneous form-matter complex is form, not ma
for there is never any distinguishing of (mere) matter. What
'matter' we experience, whether before or after a form is di
guished, is always some formed matter, either the same ho
geneous form-matter complex we started with or the so-ca
distinguished matter but inevitably dressed in another form—if
a rectangular table-top, at least some planks of smaller sizes,
if even not that, at least an irregular-shaped log of wood. Now
is mere wood as naked matter to be found.

This is only the first paradox that develops as soon as
seeks to distinguish form and matter. It is the form that is di
guished, never the matter as such, and yet we speak of form
matter as though the two things are there each as much in its a
nomy as also embracing the other. The situation is not that simp

The second paradox—which, in a sense, is but the first par
stated in a better way—is that while form is always a *living* abs
tion matter is never such. Once a form is distinguished it st
in an autonomous region, related, in that region, necessarily
kindred forms there or even with forms of kindred regions. Im
diately as the rectangular shape of a table is distinguished it,
geometrical figure, evinces properties necessarily related—al
wholly deducible one from another—to all other (possible) geom
cal figures, precisely on account of which a whole autonom

cience called geometry can be constructed wholly in the air, apart
rom all consideration of matter ; and, obviously, there is no possi-
ility whatsoever of any such autonomous self-development of
natter. Similarly with all forms *qua* form. Even optics which
eems to be a self-complete science of *colours* is, as science proper,
nly the systematic study of certain types of space-form in correla-
ion with time and motion as kindred forms. One may go further
nd understand optics and like sciences to be these forms-in-mutual-
elation as even anticipating, i.e. pre-figuring, the contents of the
world, though that pre-figuring, considered that way, is obviously
formal procedure, viz. formally looking forward to Nature and
ecessarily developing various modes—in Kantian language, aprio-
ities that are synthetic, not simply analytic. As a matter of fact,
ll the recognised theoretical sciences are such formal anticipations
f Nature and, therefore, synthetic, though *a priori*. This applies
equally to mathematics and (living) logic, for these two are, equally,
anticipations of Nature in its most general features. Mathematics
and logic can indeed be, as they are largely in modern days, under-
stood as made of propositions that are all analytic, not in any
way anticipating any feature of Nature—not even its most general
features—but simply weaving out instruments of intellectual proce-
dure. That sort of *dead* formal mathematics and logic is, certainly,
no absurdity and may even be extraordinarily helpful in construc-
ting brilliant, but all merely intellectual, systems. But that 'formal'
mathematics or logic does not necessarily deny the possibility of a
living sort of mathematics and logic, called 'intuitive.'

So, the second paradox involved in splitting up anything into
form and matter is that while form is a living apriority, developing
infinite complexity, all autonomously and as necessarily anticipating
Nature in its general features, matter as such is all dead, a naked
corpse, it being impossible even to look at it. And yet in common
parlance—and, by implication, even by the elites in modern analyti-
cal philosophy—we so easily speak of form and matter as equally
autonomous and equally dependent partners.

And there is a third paradox, more intriguing and, therefore, of
crucial importance in determining the nature of form and its relation

to the so-called matter. In unreflective life, what we are concern with is a homogeneous form-matter complex where neither fo nor matter is distinghished except in a cold mechanical manner, in attitude, that is to say, which is chillingly intellectual. Form co to be properly distinguished only by reflective consciousness. B then, this distinguishing is of the form, and it is known, in that ve act of distinguishing, as what was already there, not created for first time it comes to be distinguished, and not certainly created that distinguishing consciousness. This brings us face to face w a third paradox : if the form was already there why was it not expe enced before that act of distinguishing? Not certainly because any defect *on my part*; for nothing like this can now be pointed except as an *ad hoc* hypothesis. If only somehow, i.e. howe indistinctly, that form could be (directly) experienced, before no *as form*, only then could we be on the look out for what it is t was standing in the way of its *clear* perception as form. But that out of question: before now I had no idea whatsoever of that fo in that context. There has indeed been some defect somewhere, b not necessarily one on my part; it could well be a defect on the s of the thing known, it could even be something standing midw between me and that thing, obstructing my perception. Subjecti defect could be admitted either if these two other possibilities we definitely excluded, or, alternatively, as just said, if it was actual i.e. directly, experienced, however indistinctly. The philosophers f whom *māyā* (*ajñāna*) is some such subjective defect have procee both the ways: they have refuted other possibilities and have ev claimed that at least in the case of a *śuddha-sattva* being alrea there in the *aśuddha triguṇa* world, though not experienced as *śud* at the unreflective naturalistic level, this *māyā* is *experienced* operative—may be, retrospectively[1] but through every detail of ev stage and sub-stage passed through while on the *yogic* ascent to the *śuddha* region[2].

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1. It is retrospective *experience* (i. e. somehow still direct), no mere inferen
2. Many of them have claimed too that the other alternatives need not rejected, for, according to them, this *māyā* is as much a subjective defect one in the object too and equally something that obstructs the subje communication with the thing that was to be the object of his experience.

So, immediately, i.e. without further evidence, there is no ques- n of any defect on the subject-side. Absence of attention cannot taken as such subjective defect, for there is no knowing as to w much attention is required for forms to be distinguished. Dif- rent people have to expend different amounts of attention for stinguishing forms, and even the same subject different amounts r distinguishing different forms. So, till a full mathematics of tention has been worked out, or at least its possibility demons- ated, there is no question of any defect on the subjective side.

Obviously, too, there stands nothing midway between the subject d the thing to be experienced, obstructing vision.[1] So, the only ternative left is that the defect is on the side of the object, meaning at the object, called form, somehow mainfests itself as form at a rtain stage, called reflection of a type, and does not so manifest self but remains fused, at any prior stage called (at least relatively) nreflective. This, again, is no mechanical inference unbacked at any age by actual experience. It is not merely at a reflective stage that e unquestioningly feel that the form we come across was already ere, though as unrecognised, i.e. in a fused state of homogeneity; is a fact also that at every next stage of the ever self-clarifying flection the form, once distinguished, gets more and more clarified the context of, and in explicit relation to, other kindred forms ually coming to be clarified. The fused status at every earlier age is precisely the defect on the *object*-side.

What follows now from this highly complicated phenomenon is f the highest significance for any transcendentalist. It is that the rm as such—the form as form—is, of its very constitution, the rm-as-distinguished, the form-as-experienced. There is no form s form which does not stand experienced : to have been experienced nd, equally, to continue to be experienced) is a necessary require- ent for it to be a form. And yet, at the same time, it has been, ough in a fused manner, already in Nature that, even as experi- nced, is said to be independent of all experience. This is the third aradox.

. Unless, of course, one and the same principle, *māyā*, is understood, as seen in the preceding footnote, as both subjctive, objective and intermediate.

Now to come to our central point. The three form-m paradoxes, viz. (i) that it is the form alone which can be distingui in experience, (ii) that form is a *living* abstraction, meaning spontaneously it develops a whole system, first, with its own forms, and secondly, with other parallel forms and their sub-fo and (iii) that form is intrinsically form-as-experienced—these t knots can be cut asunder at a single stroke by considering the w situation from a transcendental point of view. What we mea that forms are all *a priori* anticipations of Nature in its var general features—many coordinate but all on the whole in a hiera —starting from what are called empirical universals rising up to highest generality which the Indian transcendentals call the great the *paśyantī-vāk* or *mahāmāyā*—or, as the Advaita-Vedāntins p —*māyā*. The Kantians call it 'object-in-general' and even lay 'the World (Nature) as a whole' or, simply, Nature with a capital Such anticipations are, we have seen, all *a priori*, i.e. over-nat trans-natural, awareness. Forms of whatever sweep are, t all *a priori*, transcendental, anticipations, though always of s items (always in the plural) of Nature—may be, in its hig sweep, of *all* items. That explains too why forms alone can distinguished and never matter by itself. That explains again, tho for that one has to be a little more reflective, why and how fo reveal themselves, even apart from all empirical consideration Nature, as systematically connected, at least largely, with one a ther. The third paradox, too, stands explained. Forms are as m purely subjective, i.e. transcendental anticipat*ing*, posit*ing* or c construct*ing*, as equally the anticipat*ed*, posit*ed* and the const They are, each of them, as much subjective as objective, not ind two separate things in the cheap relation of identity-cum-differe or identity-in-difference, but the two absolutely in one, each just much objective as subjective and that in eyery respect. The ob is here only as, and in so far as, it stands distinguished, i.e. exper ced, and the experience, though a form of consciousness and, in widest sweep, consciousness itself, i.e. purest transcendental co ciousness, is fundamentally self-positing too, positing itself, consciously, as itself, as an 'other' in the form of 'It', i.e. obje

neral. This positing is, of course, possible through a more ndamental act of self-negation (*vide* Hegel) which explains in a etter way why this 'It' or 'object in general', though appearing as bject, does not even imagine laying claim to any independence. It at most a sportive type of independence, no better than what a nowing child would describe his imaginary animals to have had.

However, there is a difference, even in this respect, between e 'object-in-general' as *a priori* and other aprorities, and even mong these latter themselves, considered in the order of lesser nd lesser sweeps. In the case of 'object-in-general', the *a priori* nticipation as subjective and the possible object that is anticipated re almost non-distinguishable from each other, each continuously ducing itself to the other. But this difference gets more and more ronounced as the anticipations are of lesser and lesser sweeps, ough, even so, the difference at none of these stages asserts itself ver against their identity. The difference side, however, stands uite pronounced in the cases of (empirical) universals as anti- ipations, though even there we do not find any revolutionary self- ssertion of this difference over against their identity. In Chapter I we shall see that these universals are all in the region called *uddhāśuddha*—a region that belongs as much to the *śuddha* region as lso borders on the *aśuddha*.

So, on various grounds, and in various ways, we have tried to stablish transcendence, explain its varieties and their relation, as uch in general as also in detail. As for the approach through the esolution of paradoxes, we have concentrated on one only of such aradoxes, viz. the form-matter paradox, though in its three sub- orms. There are other such paradoxes too, and all soluble only rom the transcendental point. They are, e.g. paradoxes of negation, llusion, image and even of body, space, time, thought, etc. In ome later chapter we shall have occasion to face many of them.[1]

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[1] But vide fn. 1. page 39.

CHAPTER II

DETAILS OF THE REGION OF TRANSCENDENCE (A ROUGH ACCOUNT)

A

Ai

All the different approaches to the transcendent that we discussed so far go in for showing that there is an ultimate re the perfect, the absolute, of which the empirical reality of our life—Nature, as it is called, including our bodies and (nat minds—always falls short; and that always by a good mea If by saying so we have accorded an ontological status to this tr cendent, we have seen that we need not be sorry for it. We seen why the phenomenologists who deny being of all 'esse fumble yet on the status of the ego and why Kant who de being as much of the categories as of the Ideas of Reason had to place these latter in a class apart. The transcendent is not beyond Nature, it is, we have seen, the source too of that Na at least very largely, if not wholly. The structural, i.e. fo feature of everything in that Nature, beginning from its object in general down to the pettiest (empirical) universal it embo is, we have seen, a *sui generis*, i.e. *a priori*, anticipation by the mate transcendent which, for most of the transcendentalists, is consciousness, though according to some others, as we have n earlier, it is pure object by itself. But, pure consciousness pure object, it is always the pure form, i.e. pure structural antic tion of (empirical) objects of Nature—either anticipat*ing*, construct*ing* those objects so far as such structural features concerned or these structural features (of those objects) themse as constructed. Understood either way, the transcendental si tion is one and the same: it is forms *as distinguished* and, so in inalienable relation with the distinguish*ing* i.e. with refle

consciousness, another name of which is pure transcendental consciousness.

Natural objects—items of Nature—are those in which forms and matter had, before they were distinguished reflectively, stood in undistinguished fusion. What, in effect, it means is that what much of an item of Nature is apart from, other than, a form, is wholly indefinite, never pinpointable as a *this* to which some form has come to be added. Once, therefore, a form is distinguished and in that very act of distinguishing experienced as *a priori* anticipation and, to that extent, construction—once we experience that way, there is not only no question of any pinpointable matter to have been already there but such indefinite matter is equally experienced as the *ever-anticipated residue.* The transcendental *monists* would take this residue anticipation as only another dimension of transcendental anticipation, positing that way *content*-in-general; and transcendental dualists would hold that they experience transcendental *content* as such, over against all transcendental consciousness. But whichever way one moves, the experience is either itself transcendental or *of* something that is transcendental. Thus, for the transcendental dualists too, Nature owes its origin to transcendence. Only, in place of one (kind of) transcendence, viz. transcendental consciousness, they admit two such, but the two in unison, the *froms* as transcendental consciousness operating on the great indefinite transcendental *content.*

Incidentally, this transcendental dualism is widely different from any dualism that is only empirical. One may, we admit, deny all transcendence and hold that this Nature is all that is there and that if much of it is often a construction, an interpretation or projection of the mind, that mind too, they repeatedly warn us, is a part of that Nature itself, so that it would all be only Nature changing itself, Nature being nothing transcendent because over and above it there is nothing else in comparison with which it could be considered lower in level.[1] Whether this view is right or wrong we need not discuss here. Enough of it we have seen in Chapter I. What we are considering here is transcendentalism in its various form The dualists we have just referred to belong to a group of transce dentalists who hold that in the transcendental region itself the must be something real which, as other than the so-called Absolut changes itself into the Nature of our daily life through some infl ence, direct or borrowed or even as merely imagined, of th Absolute. Transcendental monists of all types hold, on the oth hand, that this other principle is not really an other ; it is either power, an intrinsic function (*śakti*), of the Absolute or the Absolu itself self-changed through that power, the 'other' in either cas being non-different also from the Absolute. The relation is like th between fire and its burning power or that between a fire and th fire as actually burning. In a way they are different : at least, th are spoken of as different and until it is shown conclusively that th is all only a way of *speaking* some difference somewhere has to b admitted. Yet, however, they are non-different also, for powe function and the possible as a content can never be pinpointed differentiated either from the powerful—the agent that functions- or from the content that is actual.[1]

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[1] This, however, is admitted here only provisionally, just for elucidating some distinction.

Whichever of these alternatives, dualism and monism[2], b accepted, it all concerns the region of transcendence; and Nature— the empirical world of our daily experince—is understood as real o illusory modification of the ultimate transcendent, the Absolute, effec ted, of course, through other intermediate items which too are i modifications either in the transcendent region itself, though at i lower levels, or in a region bordering on and, to that extent, touchin our Nature.

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[1] If all this sounds odd to a logical mind, we have seen there are still tw other ways of formulating transcendental monism. One may admit only th substantive—the agent (*Śiva*)that is powerful or functioning—and the possi ble content and reject all concepts of power, function and actuality as sor of illusion, originated by language or otherwise. Alternatively, one ma admit the power, the function (*Śakti*) and actualisation (i.e. the actual) a alone real and reject the substantive and the possibility side as all similarl an illusion. The Advaita-Vedāntins generally have opted for the forme alternative and the Buddhists almost invariably for the latter.

[2] And—in the case of monism—substantivism, functionalism, etc.

In the transcendental region, then, either there is one supreme principle, the Absolute, all the other principles there being its progressive self-expressions, real or illusory, or there are two or more fundamental principles—generally two—one alone of which is most often recognised as of the highest status (whatever this 'status' may mean), the other (or, as the case may be, the others) being recognised as somehow of a lesser status, though both are equally necessary for the coming into being of everything else, whether in the transcendent region itself or in the Nature of our everyday experience. This coming into being of everything else is not always a case of *temporal* origination. In the transcendental region, for example, there is no temporal origination; everything there is *ex hypothesi* eternal, no matter whether ontologically existent or only a de-ontological presupposition. There is, however, in that region, what may be called status-sequence, i.e. sequence in office-status, meaning that each lower of these transcendental entities is, even *ratio essendi*, intelligible only in terms of the higher—directly, in terms of what is immediately higher. This is evident from the fact that, whatever the way in which we attain a transeendent entity, it is always a discovery of what stood *presupposed*. Presuppositions here are all logical, as distinct from temporal. It is only in the empirical world of our daily life that temporal sequence is of any relevence, and that too obtains there without jeopardising any logical presuppositional sequence involved. In the transcendental region it is all presuppositional sequence, in Nature it is both presuppositional and temporal. If the modern-day sciences, more or more formalised, appear to lay all the emphasis on presuppositional sequence even in Nature, this is only a new *method* of explanation, viz. theorizing, meaning replacement of the undenied temporal world—in Popper's language World No. 1—by a theory-world, world No. 3.

In the transcendental world there is, among the residents there, non-temporal sequence.[1] Those who insist on calling it mere logical sequence have somehow, in the Kantian line, persuaded themselv that the transcendental is de-ontological, not real or existent. Th could, however, say this if only, as we have seen, they were determi ed to take the phenomenal world—Nature—alone to be given a on that ground, real. But this, we have seen, is unwarrante There might be some reason for the scientist's theory-world to merely logical, i.e. not real, for it is all constructed *ab extra* in t way of exiomatics. But the transcendental world—for one who a mits it—is not *constructed* that way; transcendental presuppositio are all *discovered*—intuited, if you like—precisely in the order which the discoverer describes them. Initially, and, of course, the vast mass of listeners, they have to be argued to, deduced, co puted out, i.e. presented logically, and so far, indeed, they all belo to the theory-world. But that is only the preliminary step suppos to lead one, through the proper method of freeing the mind of predilections, to the immediate awareness, discovery, of those entit in their intrinsic presuppositional order of sequence. May be, ev after they are *discovered* one feels like presenting them once ag in the language of the theory-world. But that too is now in t interest of listeners who are not yet on the way to transcendent discovery.

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[1] Except, of course, for the *Yogins* who, through the power of *Yoga*, pass *in course of time* from one transcendental level to another. Truths, certainly, are so far revealed to, realized by, him in temporal sequence. But this is only so far as he is striving, i.e. moving. The truths themselves do not move that way, they are coexistent. And here, as in many other cases, coexistent entities are higher and lower in status, i.e. involve status-sequence.

If in the transcendental world there is non-temporal sequen and in Nature a sequence that is temporal, the relation between entire transcendental world, on the one hand, and the entire Natu Nature as a whole, on the other, requires a close examination of again. The term 'Nature as a whole' means two different things. an unending series of natural items, integrated only by lingui devices, i.e. merely *spoken of* as one totality, it is non-different fr this unending series and, so far, the same thing as Nature. Yet, the other hand, as we have seen in Chapter I, we do often take it genuine whole too—as when we seek its cause or seek to get rid of altogether, whether in extreme desperation or in spiritual hanker for unalloyed happiness. This Nature as a genuine unity is, so obviously other than—in a way, outside—Nature that is just made items in an unending series. Nature *as a whole* is, thus, as much pirical as transcendental. It is Nature itself, but viewed from

transcendental standpoint or that Nature which itself finds as having for its necessary presupposition the transcendental: it is the world of space and time and crude or subtle matter, i.e. all that is physical and mental, owing its non-temporal, i.e. presuppositional, origin to and deriving itself that way from the transcendental world.

A few words by way of recapitulation before we study the details of the transcendental world. We have just seen why the transcendental is no mere concept and why the transcendental account no mere intellectual theory. We have held that there is solid transcendental experience, crudely called intuition, which immediately certifies the reality of the transcendental. One may err in this immediate experience; but, then, it is not given up till another such immediate experience replaces it, exactly as what happens in the case of perception in our ordinary daily experience. Thought may intervene to train us to be alert from tne beginning, but its main function is either to build a securer *theory-world* and that way to prepare the ground for a correct immediate experience to ensue or, in the least, to bulwark whatever we have immediately experienced.

The trancendental is not a matter of theory only. Those who describe the transcendental world with all interrelations among its items describe it as they experience it directly. This is avowedly the procedure even of Kant and the phenomenologists. Why is it then, one may ask, that they have taken all transcendental items as non-real, as principles concerning which there is no talk either of existence or of non-existence. Obviously, for two reasons.[1] Somehow they have persuaded themselves that Nature alone constitutes all that is real. But this is the cruder of the two reasons. The subtler reason is that the transcendental, according to them, is pure consciousness—intuition or thought—that, as transcendental, always anticipates, i.e. intends Nature *a priori*. It is pure consciousness referring *sui generis* to Nature, i.e. to objects in general. They hold that we never have this pure consciousness by itself: we always have it as referring to, anticipating, intending Nature *a priori*. It follows, they contend, that as not interested in itself, not interested, in other words, in its

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[1] Vide fn-1, p. 8 and fn-1, p. 25.

own status, but only in its looking forward to Nature, it t
that Nature, though only as anticipated, i.e. intended, to be its g
and reality as a value just represents that goal. Were pure con
ousness interested in any way in itself, it itself would have been
goal, the ultimate value, i.e. real, indeed the ultimate reality—pr
sely the way the Indian transcendentalists, barring some Budd
and Tāntrikas, have understood it. Kant and the phenomenolog
on the other hand, though they too have begun introspectively,
in the attitude of detachment from, disconnexion with; Nature,[1] b
understood this consciousness as only forward-looking, referr
anticipating, intending etc.—all of course *sui generis* i.e. *a pri*
Detachment, for them, was never to the extent of consciousness
ing taken as it is in itself; it was only freeing it of its involvement
its adjectivality to, Nature and taking it, in the minimum, as fr
referring to that Nature, never by itself. This why they were so
posed to take it as non-real, meaning that it is real only in so far
it stands directed toward Nature, which in turn, means that it is
ture which alone is real by itself. This Nature is by no means
transcendent entity like what Kant calls 'thing-in-itself.' It is sim
the Nature we experience in our daily empirical (phenomenal)
and consciousness *with all its* a priori *forms* is its transcende
presupposition. The difference between Kant and the phenome
logists is that while Kant admitted another coordinate, apparen
absolutely non-conscious, transcendental presupposition, viz.
thing-in-itself, this latter does not interest the phenomenologists at
the so-called 'thing-in-itself' meaning for them, as for the Hegeli
either nothing but the obverse aspect 'X' of the total situat
'intending X' or the Nature that stands disconnected, i.e. the Nat
of our daily life. Even Kant who, in the first *critique*, admitted
thing-in-itself has not always been sure that it is truly the extre
opposite of pure consciousness, i.e. a coordinate (and, therefo
different) transcendental presupposition; and in the second *Criti*
he has unambiguously identified it with pure consciousness—th
pure practical Reason, i.e. transcendental will. And, strangely e

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[1] This includes empirical psychological life quite as much as physical Natu

ugh, this transcendental will is, for him, Reality itself—Freedom, the quintessence of reality.

Aii

In different Indian systems of philosophy we find all these problems more thoroughly pursued. True, in our country we have generally understood the transcendental to be either pure consciousness only (with or without—mostly with—*its* pure *sub-forms*) or this consciousness and another principle which, though metaphysically another and deserving that way a coordinate status, is yet somehow understood as lesser in status. The ultimate transcendent—Brahman or Śiva—is as much pure consciousness as also *reality* at its quintessence, and, of course, supreme bliss too; but as *that* alone does *not* explain everything else, neither other things—if there are any—in the transcendental world nor the simple fact that there is this Nature of our daily life and all the diverse phenomena there, at least one other principle is needed. This is the great transcendental principle of other*ing*, or the other. Transcendental monists would call it 'othering' whereas transcendental dualits would call it the other. Its traditional names are *mahāmāyā* or *bindu* in Śaivism and Śāktism, *ahiraṅga-śakti* in many forms of Vaiṣṇavism, *māyā* in Advaita-Vadānta, *paśyantī* in Śābdika philosophy, Śaivism and Śāktism, etc. It is either the principle of positing 'This', i.e. object-in-general—exactly what Kant meant by 'transcendental apperception' and Husserl by *'noema'*—or just the transcendental 'This', metaphysically other than Śiva or Brahma but of a lower status i.e. subordinate.

Indian monists, except the traditional Advaita-Vedāntins, on the one hand, and some extreme Śāktas and Buddhists on the other, are as much interested in pure consciousness-as-such as in its function of anticipation. This is why, for them, pure consciousness is both Reality itself—Śiva or Brahman—and pure anticipation in general, called *mahāmāyā*, *śakti*, *bindu*, etc.[1] The Śāktas and the Buddhists, however, interested solely or chiefly in the anticipatory function, either deny, like Kant and the phenomenologists, the *reality* of the transcenden or subordinate that reality to the function of anticipation, taking almost as a secondary function of that primary function of antici tion. This is often symbolized in Śāktism in the form of Śiva as corpse on which stands the Goddess Śakti displaying all her functio The transcendental dualists, on the other hand, whether of the ext me form like the Śaiva Siddhāntins and the Vedāntins of the Mādh School or moderate ones like the Rāmānujists and the like, und stand the 'other' as a genuine other—metaphysically *quite anot* principle—though, even as the monists have held, somehow of subordinate status, submitting to and, at least to that extent, dep dent on the Absolute as consciousness in itself. The *bindu* of th dualists stand on the same footing with Kant's thing-in-itself exc (i) that *bindu* is subordinate to pure consciousness, which Ka thing-in-itself is not and (ii) that pure consciousness plying on bi constructs not merely the phenomenal world of our daily experie —that which is called Nature—but, metaphysically before that whole *śuddha* world, as we shall soon see, and, above all, (iii) wh for Kant neither pure consciousness nor the thing-in-itself is r they, i.e. pure consciousness and *bindu*, are cent per cent real w these dualists.

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[1] Different schools of Vaiṣṇavism have corresponding names for both consciousness-as-such and pure anticipation.

However, as pure consciousness and the anticipatory functio or, as the dualists call this latter, *bindu*—are by themselves enough to account for the world, whether transcendental (*śuddha*) natural (*aśuddha*) several other principles have to be admitted, their right relation of subordination or superordination (as much the monists as by the dualists). Whatever be the transcendental timate, if it be the ultimate source of evrything else, whether with without the aid of another metaphysically different principle, the thing that is required is that it has to be conscious of itself, it m call itself 'I'—'I' that would be responsible for other things to co into being. This second principle—second in order of transcende status—is technically called *vimarśa*, often, in transcendental Ind systems, *citiśakti* or *citśakti*, the first primary Śakti, ca

Ādyā or *Parā*, as distinct from *mahāmāyā*.[1] As much for the transcendental monists as for the dualists this second principle was already latent in the first (the substantive Śiva), absolutely non-different from it, though not for that reason non-existent there : it was there exactly as the burning power was in a flame before it actually burnt a piece of wood, or even as the *function* of burning when that piece is getting burnt. This relation of non-difference of an existent in a locus [and, really, the distinction between the locus and the resident is perpetually retrospective], of *citśakti* in the substantive pure consciousness that is Śiva, is technically known, we have already seen, as *sāmarasya*—not what is normally understood by the term identity-in-difference, but something subtler. It is *living latency*, no dead latency that could only be retrospectively grasped.[2]

One may ask here why the transcendental prime source should at all have to be self-conscious before other things could emerge out of it (with or without the aid of something else). But before we answer this question let us remind us of one fundamental point about such emergence. It is that the emergence in question—emergence, in the transcendental region of anything from anything else, or even of Nature from the world of transcendence—is no tempoaral event. If later we may have occasions to speak of time with regard to some transcendental entities, that would be no temporal emergence; that time would be *eternal* presence, (one may similarly speak even of eternal past and eternal future). This is the Yoga concept of *kṣaṇa* = eternal presence.

In Nature we do not indeed, find any necessity that if B comes out of A, this A has to be self-conscious. But we must not forget that what we are speaking of here are all about the transcendental world. The different ways in which, in Chapter I, we tried to understand and justify the transcendental were all in the field of self-consciousness. Even the approach and justification through proper understanding of the status of forms and their relation to corresponding matter showed that forms could be there only in so far as they are distinguished from matter, that before they were distinguished they were not there *as forms*, in whatever other way they might be there, which shows that forms are forms, i.e. transcendent, only in so far as they are somehow in the field of consciousness—in phenomenological language, *intended* by (pure) consciousness; and consciousness here is self-conscious. Transcendental consciousness, *noesis*, Kant's 'transcedental apperception', are all self-conscious in this sense. One may even say that Kant's 'space and time as forms of intuition' are, *qua* apprehended as pure space and pure time, self-conscious in that sense.

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[1] In Bengal Vaiṣṇavism it is the *antaraṅga-śakti*, understood more concretely in three coordinate forms, though each gliding into another, viz. *sandhinī*, *samvit* and *hlādinī*.

[2] Of this *sāmarasya*, we have spoken earlier. See p. 11

So, whatever is transcendent, and therefore the ultimate transcendent too, is, for the very reason that it is transcendent, self-conscious. Only, at the ultimate stage, i.e. in the ultimate reality this self-consciousness remains, as we have seen, livingly latent only to be livingly patent, i.e. properly active as *vimarśa*, at tne next stage where this intrinsic self-consciousness, called *cit-śakti*, manifests itself for the first time—now, for the first time, explicitly in the relation of identity-in-difference with the ultimate reality, the *substantive cit*—as the ultimate *active* principle, though of the same stuff as that ultimate substance. As such, it is the *Ādyā* or *Parā Śakti*, through which the ultimate substantive consciousness—or, alternatively, which, acting on that substantive consciousness—comes to assert itself explicitly as *I*. This is the pure primary act of *thinking*, and as all thinking is, in essence, but speaking, though not thus far in explicit sound-form, this *Parā Śakti* is also called ultimate speech, *Parā-Vāk*.

As already noted, even this is not enough for 'creation'; something else has to be posited as object-in-general over against this *I*—or, for the dualists, something else must have been already over there—for this *cit-śakti* to play upon. This is the primal matter—better, primal object. For the monists it is precisely what Kant calls object-in-general = transcendental apperception, and for the dualists it is practically Kant's 'thing-in-itself'. Again, exactly as in Kant, the Indian transcendental dualists, particularly of the Śaiva-Śākta group, have held that as *cit-śakti* of the form of the primal

-consciousness comes somehow to get related to the other transcen-
ent principle, *bindu* (= thing-in-itself), we have the start of 'creation'
—in Kant's language, construction. While, however, Kant, as
ve have seen, was never sure about the status of the thing-in-itself
is-a-vis pure consciousness as theoretical Reason, these Indian
lualists have mostly somehow *subordinated* the otherwise transcen-
ent *bindu* to *cit*; and in some cases—most notably in Sāṁkhya and
ātañjala Yoga—it is *cit* (in their philosophy, called *puruṣa*) which
ather is more distant in the picture than *bindu* (in their philosophy)
alled *prakṛti*). While for the Śaiva-Sākta dualists it is *cit-śakti*
hich is directly responsible for the metaphysical emergence of
ature (through, of course, other intermediate stages called *śuddha-*
attvas), *bindu* being only the locus to play upon, Sāṁkhya and
ātañjala Yoga tell us that whatever is done is done directly by
rakṛti, *puruṣa* being intrinsically inactive and uncontaminable, to
e forced, even though in a sort of delirium or as unconcerned, into
ontamination.

This *bindu* i.e. *mahāmāyā* (whether for the dualists or of the
onists) is different, however, from *māyā* which is another principle,
hough only a lower self-concretization of *mahāmāyā*, specifically
eeded for *cit-śakti* to 'create' transcendentally what we have so
ong been calling Nature—we mean, Nature *as a whole*—and different
till further from another lower principle, viz. *prakṛti*, required for
he emergence—this time temporal emergence—of the different
onstitutive principles of the Nature (of our daily life), both physi-
al and mental. These latter—we mean, the *prakṛit* and the cons-
itutive principles of Nature—are the only *tattvas* that Sāṁkhya
nd Pātañjala Yoga have recognised. Neither Sāṁkhya nor Pātañ-
ala Yoga has recognised the *śuddha-tattvas* of Śaivism, Śāktism and
ome forms of Vaiṣṇavism, except as discovered in the advanced
amprajñāta samādhi, i.e. at more and more purified stages of *buddhi*
hich, for these other systems, is still a *aśuddha tattva*.

All this for the dualists. Transcendental monists. on the other
and, would never admit any principle completely other than pure
onsciousness, no matter whether it be subordinate in status or not.
ccording to them, *cit*, established from the beginning on the

substantive ultimate, Śiva or Brahman, modifies verily itself—if o likes, one may say it modifies Śiva or even both Śiva and itself, f the two are ultimately in the relation of *sāmarasyc*—through stag into different metaphysical principles of more and more subordin status. The first such subordinate principle, from now, is *bin* or *mahāmāyā*—called, from the point of view of pure speec *paśyantī vāk*—positing tbe great 'It', the object-in-general. Phen menologically speaking, it is the first pure, and therefore mo general, anticipation of Nature, followed step by step by other mo and more subordinate principles that are more and more specific an cipations, through successive transcendental stages, of Nature, t at the lowest transcendental stage, which at the same time for the empirical phenomenal level, we have *prakṛiti*, the grossest anti pation of the phenomenal world, not only with all the gene features (*aśuddha-tattvas* as we find them in our experience of t phenomenal world (of course, with practice in *sādhana*) but al with the infinite diverse (wholly) empirical details.[1]

The *a priori* principles right from *bindu* downward till *māyā* a called *śuddha-tattvas*, and the whole transcendental region comp sing them *cidākāśa*. The region to which *prakṛti*, along with so other principles,[2] belongs is called *śuddhāśuddha*, meaning tha constitutes the dividing region between what is wholly transcende

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1. None of these empirical details are *tattvas*. Every *tattva* is a metaphysic principle, a categorial feature (of Nature), always a one *truth* holding t gether (if you like, anticipating) an infinite number of corresponding par culars in a class, and yet no mere Nyāya universal which by definition *amūrta* (abstract) but always a concrete (*mūrta*) unity, the immanent st (*upādāna*) necessarily understood in each case as *one*, though not excludi its many instances called by the same name. The same water, for examp is present as the one constitutive stuff in many waters, like all gold bloc being instances of one gold-matter, though that one gold-matter is not self a huge gold block. *Tattva* is very much what, in English Grammar, named by a material noun, as distinct from what is named by an abstr noun. Not all stuff, again, is a *tattva*. It is a *tattva* only in case it is n explicable in terms of *tattva*-s already recognised. Every *tattva*, in oth words, must be irreducible to any other *tattva*.
2. What these are we shall soon see.

tal[3] and what is wholly empirical,[4] meaning in effect that it is as much transcendental (*śuddha*) as empirical (*aśuddha*), much as in the case of two two-dimensional squares coinciding on one side of each the side of coincidence belongs as much to one of these squares as to the other. Similar is the case of *bindu* too: it belongs as much to this *śuddha* region as to the primal informing region which consists only of *Śiva*, *Parā-śakti* and *bindu*. This primal region is *tattvātīta*; none of the three residents there, viz. *Śiva*, *parā-śakti* and *bindu*, in so far as they are in this region, are *tattva-s*, *tattva* meaning[5] not what is simply real—for *Śiva*, *Śakti* and *bindu* are all, as we have seen real, not just deontological presuppositions—but what, in the least, as categories, are anticipations of Nature, i.e. forward-looking. Obviously, Śiva and Śakti are neither of them anticipative of Nature; so far they remain self-contained, and if *bindu* is such anticipation it stands ever realised as pure consciousness too and, to that extent *tattvātīta*. As intrinsically anticipative of object-in-general, the same *bindu* is equally the highest, the first, of the *śuddha-tattvas*—pure consciousness as itself the purest object, i.e. the highest *reality*. This is the *sadāśiva-tattva*, largely corresponding to the Advaita-Vedāntin's Brahma-*tattva*, if not identical with that.

The second in order in this region of *śuddha-tattvas* is *Iśvara* which is as much *sadāśiva* (the Advaita-Vedāntin's Brahma) as also the whole world, including everything down to the grossest empirical, that he creates (posits), superintendents and manages in diverse manners. Īśvara is the highest *tattva-sadāśiva* = Brahman as the supreme reality—which, at the same time creates, sustains and manages Nature in its entirety. But he does all this in a most general way, almost as a general manager manages a big business. Just as the general manager manages the business with the help of subordinates who are all assigned specific duties so is the case with Īśvara. Under Īśvara, and, of course, as creatively posited, i.e. transcendentally an-

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3. Technically, *sāttvika*, i.e. merely *sāttvika*.
4. Technically, a fusion of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.
5. This does not clash with but only forms a part of the definition we have given in fn. 1.

cipated and, that way, constructed by him, there are lesser deities thoroughly spiritual beings (*suddhasattvas*)—who do all the work f him. These are technically called *mantras*—as much specific forms pure consciousness as also *specific a priori objects*, corresponding, or might say, to all sorts of Kantian and neo-Kantian categories. the grand object corresponding to Īśvara—the object which he cre tes (phenomenologically, constructs) and manages transcendentally is the object-in-general as transcendentally real, the correspondi objects for the *mantras* as subjects are the different *a priori* categori the *mantras* and the categories being in fact the two sides, in eac case, of the same transcendental reality, much as God and the objec in-general (= world, *brahmāṇḍa*, understood *a priori*) are of the sa *Isvara-tattva*. Form *Isvara cum* object-in-general down to the ma *tras cum* specific *a priori* categories—all belong to the same transce dental region, called *cidākāśa*, in a descending order of subordinatio At the topmost there is, of course, the *sadāśiva* which is subject a object in absolute unison, amounting to identity—the purest co ciousness as itself the quintessence of reality.

The common characteristic of whatever is in *cidākāśa*—rig form Īśvara down to the lowest *mantra*—is that in every case th subject and the object sides stand related in the closest possib manner: the same thing, in every case, is understood to be as mu subjective as an object. This may be understood as much in th Kantian fashion as in the Hegelian. Both Kant and Hegel unde stood the categories to be each as much a way of thinking as object, though, of course, a categorial object, i.e. an object in gener If it is held that for Kant the categories are only transcendental p suppositions, not realities, while for Hegel they are all realities, have seen that the Indian transcendentalists—almost all of the except some Mahāyāna Buddhists and Śāktas—would side unhesi tingly with Hegel; and we have also seen why.

Aiii

See p 50 ff

Several important characteristics of these *śuddha-tattvas* may noted before we proceed further. They are :

(i) 'Categories' here include not only those which Kant speci cally meant by the term, they, for our present discussion, include also what Kant called 'forms (of intuition)' and 'Ideas of Reason'.

(ii) They cover not merely what Kant called *a priori* bul many other specific general features which are normally not taken (except some of them by the neo-Kantians) as *a priori*. *Right*, *left*, *north*, *south*, *greater than*, *smaller than* etc., indeed all *transitive* features on the basis of which we pass logically from one situation to another, belong to this group. And once we grant all this, it emboldens us to go further and include all universals too which are otherwise branded 'empirical'. The Kantian and neo-Kantian apriorities are indeed all universal features. What, however, we are here emboldened to add is that even such universals as are normally taken to be empirical belong equally to this group. For, if the undisputed *a priori* universals, viz. the categories, are anticipations *sui generis* of empirical items of Nature, though on very wide scales, ordinary universals too are similar anticipations, the only distinction in their case being (i) that they anticipate items of narrower and narrower extension—narrower in the sense that they all refer to items of particular groups like animals, dogs, Alsatians and the like—and (ii) that at least one particular of each such group has to be given empirically to our sense in order that we may have whatever idea we have of the corresponding universal, which is never the case with undisputed *a priori* categories. Why, however, in the face of this distinction which does not appear to be quite insignificant we feel emboldened to rank them equally with *a priori* categories is simply the fact that they too involve some undeniable *sui generis* anticipation of particulars[1]. How, otherwise, on seeing one particular cow and knowing its name a second cow, experienced for the first time by a child, is recognised as belonging to the same species and called by the same name? This is normally how we experience universals. Theoretical construction of a universal through perception of a number of particulars, extracting their common features and continuously testing them and that way continuously correcting our notion of that universal, is only an abstract intellectual process relevant only to what Popper calls scientists'

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[1] This we have demonstrated in detail in Chap. I.

World No. 3. Genuine universals, on the other hand, are antici
tions *sui generis* of empirical particulars and to that extent *a pri*
But if every universal, no matter whether an *a priori* category or
empirical universal, could thus be *sui generis*, i.e. transcendent,
so far as it anticipates—one may even say, *intends*—objec
particulars, it is, so far, definitely, though only partly, subjective
For it to anticipate or intend means that it is, so far, the form
anticipat*ing* or intend*ing*, i.e. subjective. In short, it is as m
subjective as objective. It is *noesis* positing a *noema* or, alternati
a *noema* posited by a *noesis*[1].

(iii) This entire region of *cidākāśa*, comprising all the *tat*
from *Īśvara* (or even *sadāśiva*) down to the *mantras* of the low
stratum is precisely the region of *madhyamā vāk*, as distinct fr
parā vāk. It is the region of *a priori* concepts of so many ty
including empirical universals which, ordinarily are sought to
kept apart. What is common to all the *tattvas* of this regio
that none of them gets exhausted in Nature. They are ei
solely trancendental or, as in the case of the lowest type of *man*
viz. empirical universals, bordering also on Nature, belonging
way to an intermediate region, called *śuddhāśuddha*, the regio
māyā as distinct from that of *mahāmāyā*. The entire Vedas sp
of such *a priori* truths of various orders. If in the case of *parā*
there was only self-assertion, self-awareness, of Śiva in the form
the great *I*, and if in the case of *paśyantī vāk* there was jnst
subjective positing of object-in-General which, because it is ob
in-general, never even pretends to be an *other* over there—if th
are the stories of *parā* and *paśyantī vāk*, in the case of *madhy*
vāk, on the other hand, beginning with its highest sub-stage d
to the lowest one, the object-side at least *appears* to be a
other, though immediately as it so appears this apparent inde
dence stands annulled too, which means that there is a sor
see-saw here between subjective thinking and the object thou
Another feature of *madhyamā-vāk*, common with *parā* and *paś*

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[1] It is because of this inherent paradoxical nature of universals that we
in philosophical literature, both Indian and western, so many theories a
the reality, objectivity and subjectivity of universals.

but distinguishing all the three from *vaikharī vāk*, is that it is speech as mere thinking, requiring no obvert names (constituted by gross sounds) for the objects thought (or spoken); and it is so because till now its entire concern has been for the basic structure of language—which structure is no more than the principles and categories of thought—and, as such, it has not required to be spoken out in obvert language (execpt, of course, intellectually, i.e. in a world of theories, not livingly). This *madhyamā-vāk* is not also covert speech, no silent soliloquy. Such covert speech is only secondary to, repetition of, just a copy of, obvert speech which has to precede it.

(iv) Every *śuddha-tattva* is a permanent eternal verity. True, when through the practice of sustained *yoga* one crosses the world of temporal sequences and comes up to this eternal *śuddha* world, the eternity obtained that way appears to have emerged in time and may not on that ground be called true eternity. But this would only make too much of an otherwise innocent situation. What really happens is only that the scales fall off the eye and the first moment, in our mundane life, we experience the eternal *śuddha* world we feel that this was all along the real world, our real life, although we had not tasted it before now. Time smoothly glides off it.

This eternity of the *śuddha* world is to be distinguished not only from the sequence-involving time of our day-to-day world but, more characteristically, from what transcendental philosophers have often called absolute non-temporality. The transcendentals are at least of two broad types : some are eternal, i.e. at all times, and some non-temporal, i.e. absolutely beyond the pale of time. For the systems we are considering here, *Śiva*, *Śakti* and *mahāmāyā*—the three *ultimates*—are beyond all time, as much beyond sequence-involving time as beyond eternity. This is one of the reasons why, as such, they are not recognised as *tattvas* (though not, for that reason, as mere deontological presuppositions either). Earlier we have said that *tattvas* are such unitary transcendental presuppositions as are also anticipative (*a priori*) of Nature, Here we add another alternative criterion, viz., to be in all times, distinct as much from being in sequence-involving time (the time that we find in Nat as from absolute non-temporality. *Śiva, Śakti* and *mahāmāyā* real, though of another sort, different from both *śuddha* and *aśu tattvas*. *Aśuddha-tattvas* are real as in sequence-involving ti *śuddha-tattvas* are real eternally and the *tattvātītas* are non-tempo

The three types of reality differ in another respect too. W the *tattavātītas* are all pure consciousness itself, wholly subjec (innermost) and beyond all subject-object distinction, the *śud tattvas* as *a priori* forms of pure consciousness definitely p objects but are aware, at the same time, that these objects, undo tedly there as objects, are yet not there on their own right: t are there only as they are posited, constructed, intended—one mi even say, created, provided that after creation they do not st separate from the act of creation. *Aśuddha-tattvas*, on the o hand, are precisely those which, in the eonverse way, declare t independence, either denying altogether that they have been cre or boldly asserting that once created, they do not, for their conti ance and all subsequent behaviours, depend in any manner u that creation. As for the *śuddhāśuddha-tattva*s, they partake, tho alternatively, as we have already seen, of the characteristics of b the *śuddha* and *aśuddha tattvas*.

(v) At the stage of *mahāmāyā* (*bindu*) pure consciousness only posits the great *It*—the object-in-general—it also multifurc itself, at that very stage, into many unit selves (*aṇus*). That ultimate pure consciousness, at that stage, has to multifurcate it that way will be clear from the following considerations :

Mahāmāyā as the ultimate *Śakti* in her first creative mood is the *śakti* of *Śiva*, and, therefore, unitary, i.e. cosmic. If just bef the stage of *mahāmāyā* the great *Śiva* had only awoke into self-con ousness, the was *Śiva* arouslng his *Śakti* in one way. At the n stage, however, *Śakti* is further aroused in a forward-looking, ant pating, intending manner and, that way, object-in-general posited. But it is not merely *Śakti* that posits object-in-gene The full situation here is that *Śiva* as the substantive self posits

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1. Obviously, this is a non-temporal (i.e. non-sequential) order, the order 'A just presupposing B'.

object-in-general through his *Śakti*[1]. At the just earlier stage it was the substantive *Śiva* who had become self-conscious through the activization of his functional consciousness, his primary *Śakti*. At the present stage the same substantive consciousness, *Śiva* as Self, arouses his *śakti*—or, if one likes, Consciousness as function (*Śakti*) comes to actualize itself on the locus *Śiva*—in a new manner, viz. in the mode of creativity. If that way there comes to be posited the great object, object-in-general, it has to be an object *in the fullest sense*. An object is not merely what is posited (referred to *a priori*, i.e. *sui generis*[2]) over there but is believed at the same time to be the same object by other selves also[3], each such positing, *a priori* referring, being a numerically different act (function) of consciousness of a numerically different self. [A self is but consciousness as substantive; and positing, referring and even self-consciousness are but the same consciousness as functions or acts.] Obviously, these two together—this positing and, jointly with that, the positing by all at one and the same time—constitute the defining characters of an object. For, if one self refers to something (takes this something as an object), this by itself is no guarantee that it is a genuine object, i.e. one of any genuine worth, i.e. real. In order to be a genuine object it has to be one that is equally referred to by others. But even this addition is not sufficient, for there may well be a collective error, a whole people somehow misguided. If an individual's error could somehow be corrected by collective verdict what could be the way out when a collective verdict comes to be doubted? The only way is to show that the object in question is really an item of

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1. Most of the Buddhists and many Śāktas would, however, disagree on this point.
2. Even where an object, already over there, i.e. as a thing of Nature, comes later to be referred to, even there it is presupposed that I have an *a priori* capacity of referring. The causal theory is not enough to account for knowledge (or even for will). Knowledge is not merely a picture of the thing coming to be mechanically imprinted on the self. That may or may not be true. But the important point is that we are originally in the mood of anticipating or referring to . . . ., and this blank is successively filled by whatever thing comes in the way.
3. This point will be clarified presently in the text.

Nature, a thing. But how possibly could this be shown? That som thing is really an item of Nature has after all to be *known*, and th we have to face the same difficulties over and over again. Cou there be an approach to this difficulty from the point of view unadulterated realism we might have had a way out. But that t is not to be. There is no satisfactory theory of error from this poi of view. All the current realistic theories of error—even the old-d theories of *anyathākhyāti*, *satkhyāti* and *akhyāti*—are, on their fac artificial. Not that by saying all this we are denying realism as suc our concern here is how exactly to *know* that an object is a real ite of Nature, and we hold that normally as we understand the situatio there is no escape from the difficulty just mentioned.

Unless, of course, the self whose consciousness as referring pos the object is one Universal Self, a grand unitary Self with a gra unitary act of Consciousness! For such a Self all knowledge is, inde almost by definition, true. But it is a truth against which there is scope at all for, no possibility whatsoever of, any error. This sup truth that has not to fight even against a possibility of error cann obviously, assert itself as truth. It is never known as truth—there no self-consciousness involved. A truth, a true knowledge—in m dern terminology, a true proposition—has to be known as true. Th is why the Śaivas have held that the ultimate transcendent has first be self-conscious in order that he could posit object-in-general, whi means, in effect, that his reference to, his consciousness of, object-i general has to be assertively true. But how, possibly, can it be asse tively true unless other selves as other unitary seats of consciousne are consulted, even though playfully, by the ultimate Transcenden This precisely is the reason why we have to hold that the ultima Transcendent has necessarily—though, in the over-all context, pla fully—to multifurcate itself into many selves, called *aṇus*,—ma unitary seats of consciousness. So it is that at the very stage of *bin* where object-in-general is posited the self-conscious Śiva—or, if o likes, self-consciousness as an act necessarily and inextricably seat in, and forming the very active nature of, the substantive *Śiva*—als

mltifurcates itself into many *aṇu* selves, many unitary centres of consciousness[1].

(vi) The subject-side of each of the *śuddha-tattvas*, including *Īśvara*, is such an *aṇu* self. *Sadāśiva* is the first *aṇu*-ized *Śiva* (and, therefore, as much *aṇu*-ized as not), understood as wholly self-contained. Next in order is the *aṇu*-self *Īśvara* that intends and manages, through an infinite number of other *aṇu*-selves called *mantras*, all the *śuddhāśuddha* and the *aśuddha tattvas*. In the *śuddhāśuddha* and the *aśuddha* regions also, the subject-side is always an *aṇu* self. The relations among these *aṇu* selves of different orders deserve special mention here. Some of the *aṇu* selves—and, of course, quite a good number of them, because *mantras* are almost infinite in number—ever remain in the *śuddha* world, never slipping down to either the *śuddhāśuddha* or the *aśuddha* world. They are supposed to be the permanent office-holders there. But there are others too in that *śuddha* region who through sustained practice of *yoga* have succeeded in entering that region, often directly from the *aśuddha* world but sometimes also through the *śuddhāśuddha* world. Such *aṇu* selves behave exactly like the permanent residents there, but only for the time they require to pass through the successive stages of that region, until ultimately, having traversed this entire *śuddha* world, they pass on to the world that is *tattvātīta*.[2] These selves are all only passing occupants of the different offices in the *śuddha* world, doing exactly what their permanent occupants are supposed to do. At the highest level, for example, of this *śuddha* region the office is of *Sadāśiva*, the parmanent officer-in-charge there, and the *yogin* who has come up to that level and performs the manager's duty, though for a while (unless he fails to proceed further beyond), is the *Mantra-maheśvara*. (The object-side at this level is 'object-in-general'.) At the next lower stage the office is that of Īśvara, the permanent offic in-charge there, and the *yogin* coming there and working, thou generally for some time, as a manager is called *Mantreśvara*; and t object-side comprises, as we have already seen, *a priori* categories different orders. Similarly also in the lower regions called *śuddh* *śuddha* and *aśuddha*. The parmanent office-holders at all the differe levels are called *ājānika*.

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[1] The transcendental dualists would differ only in one point, viz. that *bindu*, with them, is no intrinsic *śakti*, though of the second order, of *Śiva*. It is quite a new reality, though dependent on *Śiva*. For the Bengal School of Vaiṣṇavism, the *aṇus* constitute the *antaraṅga* and the object-in-general the *vahiraṅga śakti* of the Absolute Self, both as distinct from *svarūpa-śaktī* of three types, viz. *sandhinī*, *samvit* and *hlādinī*, corresponding to the three traditional aspects *sat, cit* and *ānanda*.

[2] Some of them may well fail midway and remain there for ever.

The particular point to be noted here is that in the order ascent a yogin, mostly beginning from a low level in the *aśudd* world, the level, viz. to which we, normal human beings, belon passes through all the higher levels in the *aśuddha*, *śuddhāśuddh* and *śuddha* world, unless he chooses to stop midway. In the order descent, however, no one ever passes through the *śuddha* and th *suddhāśuddha* regions, except when after rising to some such high stage one, through some fault of his own, has a fall. *Aṇus*, hum or even lower, are posited by the grand Self, through the exercise grand Consciousness, directly in the *aśuddha* world and there alo The reason for this is not far to seek.

That there is the level of Nature where human beings are not the least *conscious* of their transcendence, all the freedom they enj there being in the form of self-satisfaction through a sort of manou ing the elements of Nature that lower animals are incapable of, i in the way of mere intellectual manipulation which never transcen Nature but moves wholly within it—that there is such level of Natur whether ultimately real or not, goes without saying. For, it is wh we start with. If, now, there is any ground for holding that man capable of transcending this level and that at every stage of su transcendence he is necessarily conscious (obviously, self-consciou of this transcendence, and any ground too for holding that the fi transcendence, the Ultimate, the Absolute Freedom, is purest Con ciousness, whether substantive or functional or somehow both, th we have to admit that this pure consciousness has to pass at lea through two broad levels (maybe, each with sub-levels). At one su broad level—obviously, the higher one—it retains its purity se

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1. Sometimes they skip this *śuddhāśuddha* world.

consciously, and at the other broad level—the lower one—that purity is not self-consciously retained. This lower broad level is that of Nature where, till there is any consciousness (self-consciousness) of transcendence, one patently is an animal. This level is the level of *aśuddha-tattva*s. The higher level, viz. that of self-consciousness transcendence, is precisely the level of *śuddha-tattva*s. If there is a still higher broad level of transcendence, viz. the *tattvātīta* one, that is quite another consideration.

That there is self-conscious transcendence, of various levels and sub-levels, which man is capable of attaining we have seen in Chapter I and that there is the level of Nature from which such transcendence is to be pursued, if at all, is an obvious fact to start with, it mattering little whether ultimately it has to be rejected as false or not, and, if false, whether partly or wholly. Add to this another truth, viz. that the *tattvātīta* consciousness, as distinguished from the *aṇu* (individual) consciousness at the *śuddha* level, is the unitary Universal Consciousness that multifurcated itself at the *vindu* level—add this and we have the complete story of creation. As soon as the Absolute Universal Consciousness posits the grand 'It', the object-in-general, at the *mahāmāyā* stage it splits itself up, at that very stage, into innumerable individual pure selves, all absolutely pure, though in a hierarchy of dignity, responsibility and subordination. The *śuddha* world, then, passing, as we have seen earlier, through the *śuddhāśuddha* world of *māyā*, degenerates into the *aśuddha* world—how, we shall see later. But this does not mean that the selves which begin with the *śuddha* state and continue throughout as *śuddha* come to degenerate into the *aśuddha* state. That would be a flat self-contradiction. They are *ājānika śuddha* beings, eternal *devatā*s. Human beings and lower animals drop, immediately as they get into being as multifurcations of the Universal Self, into the *śuddhāśuddha*, and from there next into the *aśuddha* world. Be it always borne in mind that none of these 'comings into being', droppings into lower regions, are occurrences in sequence-involving time. Everything in a lower region—indeed the lower region itself—decidedly owes its origin to some higher region and may, that way, be said to be in a sort of time, but that is not sequential time which obtains only in the *aśuddha* world of

Nature. We have already seen how eternity is still time, tho non-sequential, i.e. over-natural. We now find that there may b higher-lower order where the lower even originates from the hig and yet this 'owing origination to X' is no phenomenon in seque time. This, precisely, is what is meant by 'transcendental presupp tion', or in the contrary direction, by '*a priori* anticipation', 'in tion', etc. as long as the attitude is fundamentally subjective, as lo in other words, as the higher and higher transcendent is underst as purer and purer consciousness. The attitude might also be ob tive and even neutral. But, as we have already seen, objec transcendents, like those of Plato, cannot hang in the air : they b to be strung, in whatever way, to pure consciousness. And, when attitude is neutral the transcendent would be of the status Leibnitz's 'possibles' and 'compossibles'—a world of living possi ties, the *tattvātīta* world, developing in its own womb and ever ret ing there, all other *tattvas*, *suddha*, *suddhāśuddha* and *aśuddha*.

Human beings and lower animals owe their origin directly to *bindu* and neither to nor even through the *śuddha-tattvas*. T begin their life in sequence-involving time. True, this *beginning* ambivalent. They find themselves in sequential time, born at a tain point of time—may be, with another life in the same seque time prior to this birth—and continuing in that sequential time til death it explodes either into non-sequentiality (non-phenomenalit *śuddha-tattva* or even *tattvātīta* state) or into quite another life in same sequential time. Those of the human beings who exert th selves for progressive self-consciousness of transcendence—in p language, those who practise *sādhana* and *yoga*—get into the *śud* world, and if they practise *yoga* even there they rise higher and hig till at last—if they are strong enough for that—they attain the *tatt* *tīta* world. Other human beings rot in the *aśuddha* world, merely till death but even after that in the form of another life in same sequential time, as the Indians generally hold, or in ano hidden dimension of it as is believed by the Semitics and many oth Lower animals, we have seen, are never self-conscious enough sense the transcendent. Such self-conscious sensing of the trans dent and its progressive realization is the prerogative of human bei

even though mostly they proceed vicariously in the way of intellectual thinking (reasoning) and rest satisfied at that.

Aiv

The *śuddhāśuddha* world is the world of *māyā*. *Māyā* and *mahāmayā* (bindu) are, after all, the same functional Consciousness, i.e. Consciousness as act ; only while *mahāmāyā* is *Universal* Consciousness that is absolutely pure—Consciousness, in other words, which is non-temporal *(tattvātīta)* or as much non-temporal as also all-temporal (eternal)—*māyā* is always some *individual* unit of consciousness which as much involves sequential time, because sequential time surges forth from it, as it is eternal too. Such is the ambivalent status everywhere of all entities at critical junctures, whether in the line of descent or in that of ascent. It is as much *śuddha* as it is *aśuddha*, '*aśuddha* world' meaning Nature. It is Nature just getting sublimated into transcendence, or transcendence getting soiled into Nature. This soiling is effected, first, through three basic principles of bondage (*pāsa* or *mala)* and then through sequential time *(kāla)*, increasing concretization (*kalā*) rule of law and, therefore, of calculability *(niyati)*, self-relation, i.e. relating things to oneself *(rāga)*, and cognition (*vidyā*) —here consciousness *ab extra* of things in so far as they are independent of it. All these six defining characters of Nature issue forth directly from *māyā*, themselves too as much *aśuddha* as *śuddha* because, as embedded in *māyā* they too stand on the border line. *Māyā* as *śuddha* is the binding principle as such. *Kāla* as *śuddha* is sequential time *as a whole*, not time that appears as never beginning and never ending. *Kalā* is either *nivṛtti-kalā* or *pravṛtti-kalā*, the former being the principle that brings in purer and purer (i.e. increasing measures of purity of) consciousness and the latter its increasing measures of density, *kalā* in either case being the unit increment. With increasing *nivṛtti* consciousness recovers itself more and more in its purity = freedom; and *pravṛtti-kalā* increasing, it yields place more and more to what it has been anticipating as object. Density increasing, the transcendent which is pure consciousness gets more and more dragged toward and ultimately

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bogged in Nature; and purity increasing, it frees itself more an more from naturality, i.e. attains self-conscious transcendence mor and more. Within the field of Nature, it means, respectively, greater and greater involvement and clearer and clearer sense of freedom-transcendence; and once freed of all shackles of Nature, it means tha one attains (realizes) higher and higher stages of transcendence—al self-consciously, of course—till, just the opposite of getting bogged in Nature, he attains, i.e. finds himself as, the ultimate Transcendence. *Nivṛtti-kalā* is *śuddha* while *pravṛtti-kalā* is *aśuddha*.

The most important point to note in connexion with the principl of *kalā*—*śuddha* or *aśuddha*—is that when the increasing *amount* o *nivṛtti* or *pravṛtti kalā* reaches, through unit-additions, its maximum there occurs, at either end, a qualitative change. The parts that added together make up a whole are parts of the whole, and the whole, consequently, though apparently a member of the ascending series of larger and larger parts—to wit, the terminal member—, is really no such member coordinate with those other parts; or, if at all it is a member it is *also not a member*. That way, it transcends the whole series. The Ultimate, thus—and, in effect, the ultimate of every stage and sub-stage—transcends the series as much as it belongs to that series. And, this is true as much in the direction of purity as in that of density. The purest—the *tattvātīta*—as much transcends all stages and sub-stages of purity as it is also one such, viz. the terminal stage; and similarly with the densest—the *pṛthvī-tattva*, stark matter. In either case, if the *kalā*s are broadly sixteen in number, the highest, viz. that of which all others are parts *(kalās)*, may be understood as much to be the seventeenth, i.e. what is beyond all *kalā*s—the *niṣkala*—as also the sixteenth, i.e. the terminal member—*purṇa-kalā*.

Nivṛtti and *pravṛtti kalā*s are not two different types of *kalā*. They are the same principle of *kalā* moving in two opposing directions, one enmeshing man in Nature and the other freeing him of its fetters. The same *māyā*, therefore, which has tied man to Nature, ever offers itself as the freeing agent too. As freeing, it is *māyā* as *anugraha-śakti*; and as binding, it is *tirodhāna-śakti*. Once I realize that I have the freedom to resist Nature and move it in my way, I may first wonder how possibly I had not so long resisted it and behaved as only an item of Nature; but then, once conscious that essentially I am a free agent, I recognise that it is I who somehow prevented myself from exercising this freedom. This is evident in all sense of remorse, in our consciousness 'I ought to have acted otherwise' and is implicitly assumed in all theories of punishment: I am often punished for my not having acted otherwise even though my lapse was indeliberate. So, once I am conscious that I am a free being, my having behaved as a part of Nature has to be accounted for, with the help of the same freedom, as what that freedom made me do by withdrawing itself. All this, of course, once we are conscious of our freedom, not otherwise, not as long as we have behaved like animals, as parts of Nature, without being conscious of our freedom. So, it is the same freedom that takes us as much away from Nature as it involves us wholly within it. The case is the same with *māyā* and with *mahāmāyā* too. Only, while *mahāmāyā* multifurcates itself into many *aṇu* beings and places them in a *śuddha* world of apriorities and thus never, in effect, binds them, *māyā*, through its *pāśa*s *(malas)*, *kalā*, *kāla*, *niyati*, *rāga* and *vidyā*, does bind them.

Rule of law *(niyati)* too is as much *aśuddha* as *śuddha*. As *aśuddha*, law is an imposition from outside and pins the animal man down to Nature, either not allowing him any the slightest deviation or permitting only such deviations as do not jeopardise statistical calculation. As *śuddha*, however, it is still a law—in the form, for example, of a fundamental moral law or a law that is logical—which never compels man from outside but is a sort of freely imposed and freely accepted law emanating from our transcendental character. Such laws, we are sometimes told, account for the orderly life of *jīvanmukta-puruṣa*s.

Rāga and *vidyā* too are equally both *śuddha* and *aśuddha*. *Aśuddha* self-relation is the animal attitude of behaving to others, and to things outside, just commensurately with their importance for me-the-individual or for the group (herd) with which I stand identified through animal instinct. Such self-relation is exactly what is called animal attraction or, its opposite, animal repulsion. In *śuddha* self-relation, on the other hand, the self which relates itself to other beings or things—no matter whether these latter are themselves *śuddha* not—is *śuddha*, i.e. a unit of pure consciousness, and consciousne here, as *icchā*, *jñāna* and *kṛti* and operative in the *śuddha bhāva* wor is, to put it in modern terminology, as much pure cognition as pu emotion and pure will. Pure cognition relates a pure other to it precisely, what we have been calling *a priori* anticipation of an othe pure emotion, similarly, is pure attraction and any sweet estrangeme attendant upon it; and similarly with active manipulation accordi to *a priori* moral laws—exactly what is called *niṣkāma*, *nirabhimā* *phalākāñkhāvarjita karma*.

So with *vidyā*. While *aśuddha vidyā* is empirical knowled cognition *ab extra* of things that are understood as independent that consciousness, *śuddha-vidyā* is, first, pure *(a priori)* theoreti anticipation or, in Husserl's language, intention, and, secondly, it cognition, i.e. theoretical awareness of objects which, though *a prio* are nevertheless, even as anticipated *a priori*, taken, in that very an cipation, as *real*, not merely as transcendental presuppositions.

The central function of *māyā* is to posit the object that is anti pated *a priori* as an independent thing over there standing on its o right. These *aprioritie*s, including the ordinary universals, are all, we have seen, ultimately forms of consciousness, though always loo ing forward in the objective attitude. If men as items of Nature, 'natural' psychological centres called minds, have taken these anti pated objects, including the broad categories and the over-all obje in-general, as independent things over there, divorced from th consciousness of which they are anticipations, intentions or constru tions, this is all that *māyā* has effected. It is the principle of *ajñ* estranging these anticipations from the consciousness that has anti pated them *sui generis* and, as a consequence, positing, for the fi time, not only the anticipations as independent objects as thou they were already there but even this anticipating consciousness one such, though of another sort, called mind, as though the tw natural items of such different qualities get so related to one anoth that one of them, the mind, is said to know the other as an obje

This *māyā*, as distinct form *mahāmāyā*, is called *aśuddha-māy* *Mahāmāyā*, in contrast, is called *śuddha-māyā*. Whatever individu

selves the one Universal Self gets multifurcated into at the *mahāmāyā* stage and whatever object (object-in-general) is posited at that stage are all, in stuff, non-distinct from the pure Universal Consciousness, though apparently posited as 'another', exactly as is the case with all transcendental anticipation. The different unitary centres of consciousness—the individual selves, the *aṇus*,—are, at this stage, none of them conscious of themselves as individual and separate from the Universal Self and, therefore, from the other individual selves also. They live one corporate life—all wholly pure, i.e. divine—though each functioning in its appointed office. There is no self-assertion over against others or against the Universal Self. It is as though one Universal Self conscious, at one and the same time, in diverse ways. It is as though a chief-of-staff working smoothly and peacefully through his many subordinates in different offices. At the stage of *(aśuddha) māyā*, on the other hand, the many selves have learnt to assert themselves, each in its distinctive identity and so far, therefore, over against the Universal Self too. Where they are found to act in unison, that is either an accident or effected through practice or just the fact that they are forced that way by Nature. That way the individual selves, at this level, stand oblivious of their intrinsic non-distinction from the Universal Self = the Absolute.

There are two sub-stages of this oblivion. At the first sub-stage —though, of course, the two sub-stages are simultaneous—each individual is conscious of itself as a separate unit, as an *aṇu*, and at the second sub-stage as asserting itself over against others and the Absolute. Both are forms of bondage, and bondage, as everywhere, is not only the negative *lapse* of the (sense of) freedom but also a positive state of affairs generating newer attitudes and activities, all more or less narrowly self-centred. The two sub-stages—rather, the principles constituting them—are called *āṇava-pāśa (āṇava-mala)* and *māyika-pāśa (māyika-mala)* respectively; and the self-centred activity that follows or, better, the principle that constitutes such activities is called *kārmika-pāśa (kārmika-mala)*. Obviously, as under such *kārmika* shackles no individual self acts out of freedom which otherwise constitutes his *bindava*, i.e. pure, intrinsic, character—in Kant's language, his 'practical Reason'. *Pure karma*s—the categorical imperatives—are under no pressure from outside Nature; they iss forth *sui generis* from one's own transcendent *(baindava)* charact and, as such, do not bind. They are *niṣkāma karma*s which a uncontrolled by Nature (i.e. beyond *niyati*) and so do no unlike natural causes, produce any natural effects *(karm phala)* that we have to enjoy or suffer. Contrasted with sueh pu *karma*s, the *karma*s that are at the *māyā* level bind the agent a produce effects that he will have to enjoy or suffer from. Anoth name of *baindava* stuff is '*śuddha*, i.e. unadulterated, *sattva*'. T stuff at the *māyā* level, in contrast, is *sattva, rajas* and *tamas*—all th three in different measures of intermixture. According as *satt* predominates we, though still at the *māyā* level, come nearer th *baindava*, i.e. *śuddha*, world—the region of *mahāmāyā*. As alrea said, the entire *māyā* region, standing at the juncture of the *śudd* and the *aśuddha* worlds, partake of the characters of both: the high a sub-stage of the *māyā* region the nearer it is to the *śuddha* world- and not merely that, just that far it is in the *śuddha* world, thoug obviously, at the lowest rung.

If the *māyika-pāsa* has, on the one hand, made the individual se forget its true character as Universal Self and assert itself as muc over against this Universal Self as, therefore, against all other suc individual selves, it equally, on the other hand, makes that individu self, first, oblivious of the fact that whatever appears as object to it only pure consciousness positing itself as object there, nothing th is independently there, and, secondly, along with that forgetfulness, also makes that self, that individual unit of consciousness, take positively as such an independent object. And, not only that, the is a third moment too, the individual self comes to view even itself one such independent thing, though of a different sort, viz. as ment (psychological). This is technically known as '*anātmani ātmadarśa nam*', as distinct from '*ātmani anātmadarśanam*' which latter, as th transcendental (Kantian or phenomenological) view of object, is pe fectly all right.[1]

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[1] These two expressions—'*anātmani ātmadarśanam*' and '*ātmani anātmadarśanam* have, of course, been interpreted in different other ways too. But here we a not concerned with that.

Whatever is true of 'object' at this *māyika* or, indeed, at any level—*śuddhāśuddha, śuddha* or *aśuddha*—is true also—one might even say, 'primarily'—of the body. One's body is the only object in Nature that, even at that level of Nature, appears as much to be an object as also *I* and is felt, that way, as *I* somehow *objectifying itself* into an item of Nature or contrarily—if one likes—as Nature in the process of liquidating itself into *I*. In the forward-looking objective attitude it is somehow a *direct* awareness of consciousness positing itself as object—a touchstone for all sorts of transcendentalism, including phenomenology—and in the backward looking subjective attitude, it constitutes an undisputable evidence that through *sādhana*, better yoga, one may return, step by step, from Nature to pure consciousness which had posited that Nature. This is why body has occupied so important a place in all transcendental philosophy in India, as distinct from the western transcendental philosophy where only rarely we come across any systematic study of body *vis-a-vis* items of Nature on the one hand and pure consciousness on the other.

One may, with the Indian transcendentalists, go even further and hold that Nature with all its items is just a constructional extension of one's body. If it is the same identical Nature for all individuals, this is because in all phenomenological construction every individual behaves as basically the one Universal Self. "*Piṇḍe brahmāṇḍadarśanam*" is a common Indian doctrine. 'Body' here means not merely the gross physical body, it comprises whatever is posited as pure consciousness objectified. It includes whatever aspect of an individual can be viewed as object (*noema*), the view*ing* itself being consciousness proper. Much of what normally passes for consciousness is after all an object for introspective consciousness and is not, therefore, consciousness proper. In contrast, the introspective consciousness as unamenable to any further introspection is consciousness proper[1], what we have so long been calling pure (transcendental) consciousness. That being so, the entire psychic apparatus (barring only pure consciousness) constitutes one's body at various stages of fineness and grossness. Pure consciousness that informs it throughout, right up to the gross physical body, is the authentic *I*. Whether it is pure act only, i.e. barely functional (*śakti*), or substantive—and that too whether in addition to or excluding thi act-character—is quite another point which we have studied earlier. There is a further question, too, as to whether this pure consciousnes —substantive and/or functional—can or cannot subsist by itself, apar from the different body-stages. To this we shall have to turn later. For the present it is enough that everything other than pure cons ciousness, on the one hand, and the physical *world*, on the other, i body at different stages and dimensions. Broadly speaking, th physical body is called gross body *(sthūla-śarīra)*, the entire introspec table psychic region of one's own bounded on one side by coanaes thesis (body-feeling) and on the other by what is normally calle thought, though at its last, i.e. thinnest, level of introspectability, i called subtle body *(sūkṣma-śarīra)*. Beyond that there is incohat non-manifest, 'foundational body' *(kāraṇa-śarīra)* constituted merel of *prakṛti* or *māyā* meant for each unit of pure consciousness*(puruṣa)*. The subjects in the *śuddha* world too may be said to have their 'bodie and even their worlds. But these bodies and the worlds are there onl as they are posited, anticipated, constructed, intended—all *a prior* and, therefore, as non-distinct. The *śuddha* world is entirely a regio of *śuddha-sattva* whereas the *māyika śuddhāśuddha* region is constitu ted, we have already seen, of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in variou proportions and degrees of dominance.

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[1] This point we shall have to discuss in detail in the next Section.

The *māyika* world is thus constituted of (three) *pāśa*s *(malas* *kāla*, *kalā*, *niyati*, *rāga* and *vidyā*—all operating on *aṇu* selves th are now only half in purity because its other half tends to be sullie bound, by the object (object-in-general) which has by now declare independence in defiance of consciousness. *Kāla*, *kalā*, *niyati*, *rāg* and *vidyā* are the principles that tend to bind the *aṇu* selves each t its *prakṛti*, '*prakṛti*' meaning the appropriate *śakti* of each such *a* self to get distracted and bogged in Nature, all, of cours through the agency of *māyā*. Just as *māyā* is but *mahāmāyā* on th point of getting *aśuddha*, so is *prakṛti* that *māyā* itself now turne *aśuddha* and dragging down the *aṇu* selves to Nature which, in i turn, has by now learnt to assert itself as independent. The *a* selves themselves, each now with its *prakṛti* and tending to be sulli by it, is called *puruṣa*.

Next in the order of descent is the *aśuddha* region, the region called Nature, including not merely the physical nature—primarily the physical body (*piṇḍa)* and its constructive extension, the physical world *(brahmāṇḍa)*—but also the whole range of mind, form the lowest kinaesthesis right up to the highest called 'abstract thought', and, of course, with that, this individual mind's constructive extension into a total cosmic mind at each stage of mentality,[1] called at different levels by different names like *Hiraṇyagarbha*, *Virāt*, *Sūtrātmā*, etc. All the *tattva*s of this region are *aśuddha*, though *tattva*s nevertheless, '*tattva*' meaning whatever, as real and in stuff one, is anticipated *sui generis* by consciousness, no matter whether this consciousness has or has not, in the meantime, been sullied. The *aśuddha tattva*s in question are the traditional *Sāṁkhya tattva*s from *buddhi* to the grossest *mahābhūta*, viz. *pṛthvī*. The detailed things of the world that we come across in our everyday life are not themselves *tattvas* : they are only particular illustrations of some *tattva* or *tattva*s. The number and description of these *aśuddha tattva*s differ in different schools of *Sāṁkhya* as also in different Śaiva and Śākta philosophies. The Buddhists of various schools too have enumerated and described them in different ways. The enumeration and description as in *Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṁkhya-kārikā*, and that too as interpreted in *Yuktidīpikā*, may, however, serve as the guideline.

B

Bi

[illegible]

In the last sub-section we characterised the *śuddhāśuddha* region as one touching both the *śuddha* and the *aśuddha* regions and, therefore, as partaking of the nature of both. This we did, following the general trend of the Śaiva systems and we pointed out that the *tattvas* from *prakṛti* downward constitute the *aśuddha* region.

There is, however, another alternative approach to the whole situation. One might note that the *śuddhāśuddha tattva*s are all co tained, as sub-*tattva*s at different sub-levels of one of the so-call *aśuddha tattva*, viz. *buddhi*, sometimes also called *mahat*, the fi that manifests itself from out of the incohate base *prakṛti*. This one of the two exact points where the traditional Sāṁkhya (includi Patañjali's Yoga) differs from the general trend of Śaivism. T other point of difference is that Sāṁkhya would never admit level beyond the *śuddha* one, except that at the *śuddha* level its where the subject side is always *aṇu*, i.e. an *individual* self (howe great and sublime it may otherwise be, as in the case of *Īśvara* *Sadāśiva*), the subject steps aside too and remains self-containe Let us explain both the points.

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[1] Often, again, it is held that the individual mind and the cosmic mind—and, equally, the individual physical body and the physical world—are independent of each other, the transmutations in descent in the two cases being only *parallel* developments.

cf. page 60 60 ff

In A3 of the last chapter we have said that *mahāmāyā* and *mā* are fundamentally the same functional consciousness, though in absolute purity, universality, etc. at the *mahāmāyā* stage and in positive Naturewardness, individuality, etc. at the *māyā* stag *Prakṛti*, however, as much for the Śaiva monists as for the dualis among them, though it is the same *mahāmāyā* or *māyā*, is dens still, bifurcating for the first time the subject-object unity (and tran tivity) into two seperate principles, viz. subject or consciousne as self-complete, on the one hand, and object (including objec that are mental) on the other; and not only this, the conscio ness side is always characteristically individual and so gets exhau ted in each of an infinite number of units, called *puruṣa*s. On however, it is admitted that there are many *puruṣa*s it follo automatically that the object-side, i.e. Nature—here *prakṛti*— basically one and the same for all *puruṣa*s, i.e. universal, in t sense in which others, in the case of consciousness, have spok of 'universal self'. This does not, indeed, mean that differe subjects do not have the same world a little differe for each. That is inevitable, being consequent each knower's personal predilection. But that in no way impli that there is no fundamental identity of Nature. Rather, unle there were some such fundamental identity of Nature there cou be no talk whatsoever of personal predilection. For, if for ea knower there were a special unique world and no least comm

factor anywhere, called Nature as such, regarding the objects known, what ground could at all be there for holding that we are differing? We have to admit some such common world, and that common denominator is the foundational Nature. Whether common for us all there is or is not something else too we shall presently see.

This foundational Nature merely acknowledged as something independent and common to all subjects is precisely what is called *prakṛti* (sometimes *pradhāna*) in Sāṁkhya. The monists and dualists are all agreed that as yet it is indefinite, sensed as wholly independent and (if one likes, *therefore*) common to all subjects. The Śaiva monists and dualists are agreed too that it is basically the same *śakti mahāmāyā* which, after concretizing itself into *māyā*, has now further concertised itself into *prakṛti*. The Sāṁkhist, however, differs with them all. Undoubtedly, he is a dualist—the subject and the object are, for him, wholly different from, really independent of, each other, so far, of course, as their being—their metaphysical status—is concerned. But, for him, *prakṛti* alone is the true independent not-self: there being no Universal Consciousness, the principle called *mahāmāyā* that could only correspond to it is out of scope. And so with *māyā* too: *māyā* is but *mahāmāyā consciously* forgoing its purity and universality. So, along with *mahāmāyā māyā* too is gone. If for the Śaivas *māyā* is a falsifying principle in so far as it (largely[1]) misses the truth that it is after all consciousness which posits itself as the object and, equally, in so far as the object is positively taken as autonomous—if for the Śaivas *māyā*, thus, is falsifying, Sāṁkhya transfers this falsifying function to (a particular phase of) a particular *tattva*, viz. *buddhi*, that is first evolved from out of *prakṛti*, how we shall see a little later.

For Sāṁkhya, thus, there are at the highest level the many *puruṣas* on one side and one *prakṛti* on the other. But even then it does not, from now on, proceed in the dualistic Śaiva line. For all Śaivas, even though they are dualists and *śakti* is metaphysically a different, even independent, principle, this *śakti* is still in so far as its office is concerned, subordinate always to Śiva. But, for Sāṁkhya, *prakṛti* is independent of *puruṣa* practically in all respects, i.e. in its office too. True, all the activities of the Sāṁkhya *prakṛti* are aimed at (in deference to) *puruṣa*: they are meant either for dragging down *puruṣa* from its pristine autonomy and fulness, or, once it is so dragged, for bringing it back to that pristine state. All this is true, but Sāṁkhya admits at the same time that *puruṣa* as such ever remains in its pristine autonomy and fulness even when it appears to be managed otherwise by *prakṛti*. One might as well say that it is *puruṣa* which had all along been toying with *prakṛti*. But Sāṁkhya would immediately add that this toying is nothing that *puruṣa does*: *puruṣa* is never conscious in the form 'I am toying......... .' And, *prakṛti* too, even though it is said to be dragging down the *puruṣa* or pulling it up is never doing that *consciously*. Consciousness, according to Sāṁkhya, is cognitive and cognitive only. As, therefore, the Sāṁkhya *puruṣa* is pure consciousness it is a unit centre of cognition *only*, feelings and conations of all types falling entirely outside its jurisdiction. These latter, therefore, are the functions of *prakṛti* and *prakṛti* only. We are speaking here of *pure* cognition, *pure* feeling and pure conation, speaking, in other words, of each as *sui generis*. Pure cognition is originally identical with *puruṣa* and pure feeling and conation with *prakṛti* in its diverse aspects. Impure cognition on the other hand, i.e. cognition that is not *sui generis* but is effected by objects outside—and obviously also impure feeling and impure conation, i.e. feelings and conations determined in particular empirical situations—belongs to *prakṛti*, meaning that it stands on the object side, rather than on the subject side. That such determined cognitions and all feelings and conations, whether determined or *sui generis*, are objects is evident from the fact that they are all introspectable, and whatever is introspectable is an *object* to that introspection. Were this introspection too determined similarly by the cognition that is introspected—or, as some say, by

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[1] 'Largely', because in the line of descent it misses its *Śuddha* character. It can realise, to whatever extent, its *śuddha* character peering through its *aśuddha* denseness as long only as it is in the line of ascent. In Śaivism, *māyā*, as distinct from *prakṛti*, has this double function.

the object of that primary cognition—it too would belong to *prakṛti* only and would, therefore, be the object of another introspection. Whether such determined introspection is permitted or not, one thing is certain, viz. that there is at least one type of cognition which is *sui generis*, i.e. intrinsically on the look out if any determined cognition, feeling or conation has taken place. If there were no such *sui generis* cognition how possibly could we be aware that there is a whole field, called mind (*grahaṇa*) covering what are called in Sāṁkhya *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra* and *manas*, and even *indriyas*, where such determined cognitions, feelings and emotions take place?[1] Further, too, once the original source of 'cognition *sui generis*' is thus traced to pure consciousness which is never an object, it follows that it is other than Nature which in all its levels, modes and other details is *object*: in short, the two regions, the two principles, are immediately distinguished from each other—or, better, Nature (object) is distinguished off from pure consciousness that is cognition *sui generis*. Not only that, once the original source of all cognition is thus wholly identified with pure conscioueness (pure subjectivity) and *vice versa*, it has not been difficult for Sāṁkhya to trace all feelings and conations to the object region (*prakṛti*) as the original source: 'I feel pleasure fox X' is equivalent to 'I am empirically aware of X' as pleasant (pleasing), and 'I want to have X' (*icchā*) or 'I want to bring X into existence' (*kriyā* = *kṛti*) to 'I am (empirically) aware of a possible X as somehow coming into being or somehow in the process of *being brought* into being. In all cases of feeling and conation, again, the *I* concerned and *its* awareness are only the psychological *I* (the mind, as we have called it) and a state (*vṛtti*) generated in it (by something outside—by the pleasant thing or the possible object), and both these, the *I* and the awareness in question, are all *objects*, i.e. on the *prakṛti* side.

Not that this Sāṁkhya view of feeling and conation is unimpeachable. Neither the Śaiva monists nor the Śaiva dualists will admit it. For both of them, original feeling and original conatio are as much *pure* consciousness in two different attitudes as is pur cognition the same pure consciousness in another attitude. Pur consciousness as such is, according to them, *mere* consciousness at most aware of itself as in *vimarśa* and it changes into *icchā* *jñāna* and *kriyā* as soon as it exceeds itself and begins to loo forward to...—in the language of phenomenology, as soon as i starts *intending*. Sāṁkhya differs sharply from them. While fo those others, object is primarily what is only intended, not anythin already over there, for Sāṁkhya it is already over there ontolog cally, confronting pure consciousness and coordinately primal wit that. For Sāṁkhya, object is not what is merely 'intended'. Ontologically, it is *prakṛti*, though so far as cognition is concerned it from the point of view of pure consciousness, is also intende Indeed, if it were not also intended it would have been impossib to distinguish different *a priori* types of objects, beginning fro the most incohate object-in-general (*prakṛti* as such = *pradhāna*) dow at least to the broadest concrete materials like soil, water, hea air and ether (*kṣiti*, *ap*, *tejas*, *marut* and *vyoman*). Apriorities—a much the neo-Kantian ones as those which are unambiguously Kantian[1]—are none of them sheer empirical generalisations o abstractions; they are anticipations *sui generis*.

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[1] Nyāya, Vaiśesika and Mīmāṁsā have, of course, offered other solutions, the Mīmāṁsā solution, particularly as offered by the prābhākaras, coming nearest ours here. But these we need not consider here.

It follows that for Sāṁkhya object = Nature is as much ontologically there as also referred to *sui generis* by pure consciousnes This *sui generis* reference is to what is already there, i.e. to tha to the 'coming into existence' of which there is absolutely no contribution of this pure consciousness or even of its pure referenc This pure reference, intention, gets more and more concertized— one may say, specified—though remaining *a priori* all the whil first into the different levels of objective psyche (*grahaṇa-tattvas*) viz. *buddhi, ahaṁkāra* and *indriyas*, and then into data (*grāhya-tattvas*), which latter, again pass through two distinct level at on

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[1] Barring 'object-in-general', the detailed Kantian categories are, in Sāṁkhya, mostly included in *buddhi* and other *tattvas* as their internal features and some as only modes of *atattvāntara-parinamas*.

of which they remain discrete like visual data, auditory data, etc. and at the other level as combined into solid physical objects of Nature.

Of these different critical concretizations—all, of course, *a priori*—of object-in-general the psyche at its three stages, viz. *buddhi* and *ahaṁkāra* and *indriya*, is most difficult to understand. First, they are not consciousness (*cit*). They are what (in most general terms) this *cit* anticipates *sui generis* at the first three critical levels. They are the three different original groups of *I*-states so anticipated. The lowest of them is the group called sensations (including sensations of bodily movements). They are all experiences as *I*-states, they are experienced primarily as mine and, therefore, also as not yours or his. They all presuppose some bodily movements but they are not necessarily experiences of those movements. Five types of them, called *jñānendriya*, are experiences of things (including the body and its parts) to which these movements are directed. But there are five other types, called *karmendriya*, which precisely are experiences of these movements, though along with fringy experiences of what these movements are directed to. This constitutes the lowest critical level of *I*-state, by itself unreflective experience. Over and above these ten *indriyas* Sāṁkhya admits another, viz. *manas*. *Manas* is an *I*-state that is an integral intake, though at the same level with other *indriyas* as discrete intakes. Immediately as there are discrete intakes there is generally the integral intake too, and all at the same level.

So far with the lowest level of *I*-state—a level which is wholly unreflective. Next higher we have another kind of *I*-state which, though unreflective as all snb-human animal experience is, somehow involves a more discriminating *I*-experience in that the intergal *I*-state at this sub-human level in man's constitution, and therefore also every detailed *I*-state it is made of, is now sought to be incorporated, i.e. in whatever way *specially* noted. This is evidenced by the fact that eveyone, at this still animal level, seeks either to appropriate or to avoid whatever object (situation) in the external physical world is represented by that *I*-state or, in extreme cases, first to brake it and then appropriate. This is not yet reflection in the sense of self-consciousness, not yet either introspection (in the ordinary sense in which the word is used in psychological text-books) or self-illuminating experience. Yet, somehow it has begun to assert itself. This is *ahaṁkāra* or *abhimāna*.

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The next higher stage is that of *buddhi* where, for the first time, an *I*, a sort of subject, is sought to be dissociated, however crudely at its lower sub-stages, from and asserted against the *I-states*, these *I-states* falling that way outside the *I* proper. In short, here, for the first time at the lower sub-stages of *buddhi*, there is an inkling of consciousness—subject—proper (*cit*) in relation to which everything else, including the *I*-states themselves, is, considered by itself, non-conscious, i.e. object (*acit*=*jaḍa*). At the infra-*buddhi* levels, viz. in cases of *ahaṁkāra* and *indriyas*, there was no such inkling of consciousness proper; there was no dissociation—not even an attempted dissociation (as at the lower sub-levels of *buddhi*)—of consciousness and, therefore, also no distinguishing of object (including the psychic states) from it. This is *man's* prerogative and starts at the lowest sub-level of *buddhi*. Not that at these lower sub-stages we experience the subject (consciousness) as such. But, decidedly, we for the first time sense, at even the lowest of those sub-stages, the *possibility* of this dissociation. Had it not been so nobody could ever have any genuine faith in *yoga*. The successive higher sub-stages of *buddhi* are the corresponding stages of the maturity of *yoga*. *Yoga*, at least in its negative aspeet called *sādhana*, is an attempt to transcend Nature, i.e. to get away from our animal status which is controlled entirely by the overbearing laws of Nature—laws that are physical, organic and psychological. For animals, i.e. up till the stage of *ahaṁkāra*, there is no possibility, no question, whatsoever of such transcendence. If man, for the first time, can at least conceive of it, this is because he has come to sense—however vaguely, distantly and confusedly—his true transcendental (spiritual) essence, the pure consciousness.

He may not pursue it further and may even choose to revert to his animality, and transcendence may even be practised vicariously; but, anyway, transcendence—vicarious or genuine—is very definitely considered as a higher value than animal existence. And, not only that; it is taken as leading more to truth than ordinary animal pursuits. The vicarious practice of transcendence is the practice of logico-mathematical theorization about the world: it is what exactly the scientists do. That it is no genuine transcendence is evident from the fact that the very status of logic and/or mathematics, carried on whose wings the scientists have built their theories, has not yet been determined. So long as they are considered to be useful instruments—conventional or not—for the development of theoretical technology they, along with the technologies (i.e. the theories) developed, stand nowhere near transcendence.[1] From the beginning to the end they remain bogged in Naturs. The only transcendence-like feature in them is that people practising them are no longer helpless before Nature with its inexhorable laws. These people do indeed control Nature and can extract from it whatever it can give.[2] But that in no way takes them altogether beyond its clutches. They had indeed the power of transcendence and were even conscious of it. But they laid it at the feet of Nature and permitted Nature to utilise this their special power, rather than they themselves utilize it. The Nature in them was permitted to dominate even this their power of transcendence, their freedom, their spiritual status as pure consciousness, the pure subiect, the real dominator. Instead of going the other way ronnd, themselves dominating Nature, they, with all their freedom, chose to remain animals—only extraordinarily efficient animals, and yet with the growing menace of total extinction. This is vicarious *yoga*, called the practice of *thought*.

Genuine *yoga*, the central function of *buddhi*, consists, first, in dissociating oneself from Nature to get as firmly installed in one's true being, viz. consciousness = spiritually, and *then*—though this

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1. This is the story of *language* too required mainly for communication (whether with oneself or with others) through description.
2. This is equally true of language.

latter is meant for a few—to control, i.e. rearrange, Nature, whether for the purpose of putting it in the proper perspective or for carrying other *jivas* along with oneself in the way of greater and greater spiritual upliftment, or for whatever other superior purpose. The former of these two yogic practices is to be technically called *sādhana*, in contrast with which the latter is called *yoga proper*. More of this distinction later. What is important to know in the present connexion is that being already in Nature—being, after all, an item of Nature, though much more gifted than other items—one cannot possibly get away from Nature altogether. This has been frankly acknowledged in all Indian philosophies of transcendence, and it is precisely for this reason that all such transcendental systems have first recommended extrinsic (*vahiraṅga*) *sādhana* which consists in practising contentment with the minimum possible of Nature. It is obvious that the lesser one depends on Nature the more he is with his true being which is consciousness. And, there is double traffic here. If 'the less one is concerned with Nature the more he is with consciousness' is true, the converse too is equally true; the more one is with consciousness the less he is concerned with Nature, each meaning, one may say, the other. Once, however, one has proceeded long enough on this line and has, in addition, practised *dhāraṇā* and *dhyāna* he gets so independent of Nature that he can not only procure what is needed for his animal existence from anywhere at his sweet will, he can, with yogic powers increasing, continue even without them. This is so far as *sādhana* is concerned. With *yoga proper* he, if he chooses to continue on this line, reverts to this Nature just to reshape it in a way that it ceases to have any sort of supremacy over man and submits, of itself, to the rule of the spirit which is consciousness in its full autonomy (freedom) turning afresh to Nature.

The *I*-state at the *buddhi* level is thus the *I* (subjeet) dissociating itself, and in whatever measure got dissociated from Nature, and Nature here is as much mental as physical and organic. For long, at this level, the *I* is thus as much in Nature, being one of its items, as also beyond it. For the *I* or consciousness to be in Nature is, unless one is in *yoga proper*, to have been dragged down and sullied. This is the *aśuddha* status of *buddhi*. But as the same *I* is struggling

throughout for transcendence it is, thus far, regaining its *śuddha* status; and the two statuses—the *śuddha* and *aśuddha*—go hand in hand that way through all the sub-levels of *buddhi*. The Sāṁkhist has, particularly in his study of *sādhana* as propounded in Pātañjala Yoga, discussed several such critical sub-levels, each with further sub-levels. At each higher sub-level the *śuddha* status gains in prominence, though, still being in Nature, the *aśuddha* status continues in ever diminishing dimension.

Sāṁkhya thus incorporates all that the Śaivas recognise as *śuddhāśuddha tattvas* in its one *tattva*, the *buddhi*. Not only that, the entire *śuddha* region of the Śaivas is equally included in its highest one, two or three sub-levels of that *budddi*.

In Section A4 of this chapter we described *kāla kalā*, *niyati*, *rāga* p.71 ff
and *vidyā*, each in both the *aśuddha* and *śuddha* aspects. That was in connexion with the traditional Śaiva and Sākta philosophies. Sāṁkhya considers them as belonging to *buddhi* as its *bhāvas*, *Vidyā* as *śuddha* it calls *jñāna* and *vidyā* as *aśuddha ajñāna*. *Śuddha rāga* is, for it, *vairāgya* and *aśuddha rāga rāga*. *Śuddha kalā*, similarly, is for Sāṁkhya, *aiśvarya* and *aśuddha kalā anaiśvarya*; and one may not be far wrong to hold that for Sāṁkhya *aśuddha-niyati* is *adharma* inasmuch as one somehow conscious of his autonomy (freedom) submits yet to the rules of Nature, and, contrariwise, *suddha-niyati*—rules of pure consciousness, i.e. categorical imperatives—constitutes the principles of *dharma*. There is nothing, however, parallel to *kāla* in any of the *tattva* regions of Sāṁkhya. True, the *asuddha* aspect of every *tattva* tends to drag one down to Nature that is in (sequential) time; one may even say that its *asuddhatā* consists just in its looking forward (rather downward) to, its anticipating or intending, events in sequential temporarility. But that temporal Nature—the world of our everyday life—is, according to Sāṁkhya, only an *atattvāntara*, i.e. *non-tattva, pariṇāma*. *Tattvas* themselves have nothing to do with time. They are metaphysical principles.

In Śaiva-Śākta philosophies, on the other hand, *asuddha tattvas*, practically all those (except *puruṣa*) which are recognised by Sāṁkhya as *tattvas*, are understood to be in (sequential) time. In those philosophies, in other words, they are not considered as *metaphysical* principles, metaphysics, for them, ending with thc *suddhāsuddh* *tattva*s. They are considered rather as just categorial classes o natural everyday phenomena—classes, in other words, which are n themselves entities, and yet basic enough to be considered as *priori* (in the neo-Kantian sense mentioned above). Sāṁkhya, how ever, has no need of all this. Its *tattva*s are all *suddhāsuddh* *Buddhi*, we have already seen, is so; and we have even seen that a its highest sub-stages it stands on the same footing with the Śaiv Śākta *suddhavidyā* (*mantra* and even *mantresvara*), excluding, o course, *Īśvara* and *Sadāsiva* if these latter two are universal selv absorbing all particular selves (*aṇus*), but not excluding them in s far as they themselves are also *aṇus*.

If at the highest sub-stages *buddhi* is a *śuddha tattva*, what is t be understood by that is that it is what an *aśuddha* man with *bud* at its lowest stratum—and not only that, with darker *tattvas* lik *ahaṁkāra, indriya*s, and even physical bodies constituted of matt (meaning five subtle and five gross material elements)—has attained i.e. discovered himself to be in essence. That way, *aśuddhi* sti pertains to it, though now in its thinnest, vanishing form. Contrar wise, even at the lowest stage where man is merely at the biologic level, i.e. just with a living body, it is not all *aśuddha*. For, in th case of man at least, here too there are, though in their thinnes sleeping form, all the higher *śuddhi*s, including what one could attai at the highest sub-stages of *buddhi* ; how otherwise is *sādhana* or yog possible at all ?

All the Sāṁkhya *tattvas*[1] are thus *śuddhāśuddha*. One may eve say that Sāṁkhya has accommodated the *śuddhāśuddha* and *śudd* regions of the Śaivas inside its twentythree *tattva*s, particularly insid *buddhi*, as constituting its two *inner* dimensions, one within another.

The different sub-levels of *buddhi* require some closer scrutin *Buddhi*, we have said, constitutes such a region of *I*-states as evinc this *I* in greater and greater dissociation from the *I*-states. At th lowest sub-stage of *buddhi*, therefore, *I* stands practically undissociat ed, 'practically' meaning that though as a matter of fact it is sti

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[1] Barring *puruṣa* and *mūlaprakṛti=pradhāna*. Of these we shall speak late

undissociated there is yet an inkling, a vague sense, of possible dissociation. It is this vague sense of dissociability that distinguishes the lowest sub-stage of *buddhi* from *ahaṁkāra*[1] and makes every item (*vṛtti*) at that lowest stage almost conscious, i.e. *noted*. What the animal in man notes at the *ahaṁkāra* level is the *object out there* that has to be responded to, either accepted or avoided or conquered. At the level of *manas* and other *indriya*s there was no *noting* whatsoever, unless, of course, *ahaṁkāra* is, as it has been by many, wholly identified with this *manas*). What, on the other hand, is noted specifically by *buddhi*, in addition to what has already been noted by *manas*, is, however distantly, its relation to *I* as knowing or knower, i.e. as consciousness. Not that with this new peep into consciousness this consciousness comes to be clearly grasped or even grasped, to whatever extent, in itself. At this lowest sub-stage of *buddhi* it comes to be experienced as only adjectival to, distinguished and yet not distinguished from, the object that has already been distinguished by *ahaṁkāra*—in other words, as wholly occupied with that object, leaving nothing of itself behind to cry into except a blazing trail which alone enables us to *note* that something like that blaze *had illuminated* that object. This noting is no form of inference. It is immediate noting—noting, however, of that consciousness, and, of course, along with that, of the object of that consciousness. Evidently too, as it is no case of psychological introspection where consciousness and its object stand separated from each other, this 'noting' is but consciousness itself at its lowest stage of self-illumination, much like the self-exposure of glowing filaments through a ground-glass bulb.

Thus far at the lowest sub-stage of *buddhi* where along with the thing known as an object consciousness too has indicated its own presence, though in complete fusion with a 'natural' psychological *I*-state, some mode (*vṛtti*) of the mind. From now on, however,—at higher and higher sub-stages—consciousness shows itself through

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[1] Some Sāṁkhists, like those of the pātañjala group, do not admit *ahaṁkara*. They too have a good reason for this exclusion. But we need not discuss that here.

*vṛtti*s more and more distinctly, i.e. in greater and greater dissoci tion, though in two different lines. One is vicarious self-distinguishi which, as we have seen, is still in the psychological line whe consciousness presents itself as introspection, constructive imagi tion, thought in its various modes, etc. The other self-distinguishin however, is, as we have already seen, in the line of *sādhana* or *yo* where consciousness progressively and very livingly dissociates its from its fusion with *vṛtti*s, that way regaining itself more and mo in its pristine autonomy. Passing through several such stages self-distinguishment—one may say, several such *critical* stages—t *sādhaka* arrives at last at a stage—the highest in the field gf *buddhi* where consciousness shows itself as completely dissociated from objects, including even the subtlest mental state that *refers directly* it, the state, viz. which constitutes the last dissociating experien (*at the buddhi level*) of this conciousness. Pure consciousness does i deed show itself, at this stage, in its full purity, but shows itself th way *through* the corresponding last *buddhi-vṛtti*, though as disti guished too from it. Obviously, this last *vṛtti* is self-annihilating, a from the point of view of *buddhi* it is only presumed that once co plete annihilation has taken place, pure consciousness as it really finds itself as standing on its own right, no longer through any medi tion of *buddhi*. Sāṁkhya, particularly the yoga system of patañj describes this process of self-annihilation a little differently as *aso parajñāta samādhi*, as though it is still an effort on the part of *budd* Others, however, seek to understand it differently. Some take it a effected by God's grace;[1] and still others, like the Advaita-Vedānti as automatic self-dissipation of the last darkness (inertness = *jaḍatv* on the dawning of pure consciousness, in and through itse Sāṁkhya calls it, particularly in the Pātañjala Yoga system, *satt puruṣānyathākhyāti*, meaning that at the highest sub-stage of *bud* consciousness (*puruṣa*) is experienced (directly) by *buddhi* (this bei none of *puruṣa*'s business) as distinct from, i.e. dissociate from, th *buddhi* itself as at this highest sub-stage. What, on the other han stands still experienced on the object side is the *vṛtti* (evidently th

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[1] Patañjali too has mentioned it as an alternative.

last conceivable *vṛtti*) directed to this *puruṣa*. As this *vṛtti* is all *sattva*, what much on the object-side is experienced at this sub-stage is *sattva* alone, nothing of *rajas* and *tamas*, and nothing, therefore, of incohate *prakṛti* (= *pradhāna*) which is *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* in perfect equipoise. It follows that though there is (direct) experience of pure consciousness (both consciousness as showing itself untarnished in the highest *buddhi-vṛtti* and consciousness in and by itself) there is no experience whatsoever of pure object, the prime principle of objectivity, although such pure object is never denied. What it all amounts to, in Sāṁkhya, is, first, that pure object, object-in-general, is basically what is intended phenomenologically by pure consciousness and yet, secondly, that somehow we cannot deny too that it is there over against this consciousness and on its own right and not even subordinate in status and office.

This is the transcendental dualism of Sāṁkhya—transcendentalism and dualism combined—almost as in Kant who holds that object-in-general and thing-in-itself as much coincide as do not. It follows that *puruṣa* too is as much in-itself (*kūṭastha* or *kevala*) as also in diverse ways, though freely (i.e. detachedly), object-oriented, viz. as *sākṣin*, *madhyastha* and *draṣṭṛ*, the difference among the tast three features being very subtle, all, however, more or less what others, like the Advaita-Vedāntin, mean by '*sākṣin*'.

B3

Prakṛti by itself, i.e. *pradhāna*—in modern language, incohate Nature as the primal object—is thus neither experienceable nor, equally, deniable. Somehow it is there on its own right but experienced only as it is anticipated *a priori* as object-in-general. So is the case with all the lower *tattva*s—from *buddhi* to *mahābhūta*s. They are as much there as also anticipated *a priori*. A notable characteristic of Sāṁkhya that follows from this is that each lower *tattva* is as much an anticipation on the part of the forward-looking (*sākṣin*, *draṣṭṛ* and *madhyastha*) pure consciousness through the *tattva* which is immediately higher as also, realistically, a change of the undenied *pradhāna* through the *tattva* which is immediately higher. Every lower *tattva* is as much a *pariṇāma* of the *tattva* that is immedi higher as it is an anticipation, a phenomenological construction, the forward-looking consciousness. Sāṁkhya, indeed all trans dental dualism, is a strange mixture—and yet a perfectly intellig one—of phenomenology and a sort of transcendental objecti (one may even say, transcental naturalism).[1] We have alr considered the *tattvas* from *pradhāna* down to *indriya*. Other l *tattvas* we shall consider very soon.

But before that, a few words on *puruṣa* and the concept of t itself. In Sāṁkhya, as much as in many forms of Śaivism, *puru* as much in itself, i.e. *kevala*, as also coming out of itself. H the Śaivas understand it as coming out of itself we have already s That it does so in Sāṁkhya also is clear from the fact that there i described equally as *sākṣin*, *madhyastha* and *draṣṭṛ*; and, obvio these latter three are not sheer *kaivalya* stated over again. Sāṁk like Advaita-Vedānta, admits both *videha-mukti* and *jīvanmukti*. its *jīvanmukti* neither contains any lingering (but self-dissipa trace of *ajñāna* nor is dismissable as pertaining merely to the re of *buddhi* at its highest stage. In Sāṁkhya, it is as much genuin the *videha* one, the only distinction between the two forms of m is that in the latter case the *mukta puruṣa* has died; and this death too is wholly unlike that of any other case of death. In e other case of death the subtle body (*sūkṣma-śarīra*) continues after that death, because the dispositions acquired in the just p ous life (along with many of the stored dispositions of still pre lives, which latter dispositions help only to channelize the matur of the former dispositions) have after all to mature into fu actual experiences yielding pleasure or suffering. But the *jīvanm* has no such disposition left and is, therefore, no longer in any of being born. His subtle body simply gets dissolved into its co constituents. In Sāṁkhya there is absolutely no difference bet the *jīvanmukta* and the *videha-mukta* except that the former is living in his subtle and gross body. He has transcended the hi conceivable sub-stage of *buddhi* and yet retains that *buddhi*—

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1. Incidentally, all Indian transcendalism, except a few forms Mahā Buddhism and Hindu Śāktism, is after all a system of *ontology*.

buddhi alone, he retains all the *tattvas* he has been associated with since his birth, but this time, and from now on, he retains them *freely*. This is what is common to his *sākṣitva*, *mādhyasthya*, *draṣṭṛtva* as distinct from what he is as *kevala*, i.e. concentrated wholly in his analytic moment, in his *kauṭasthya*.[1]

About the concept of *tattva*. Twice before we have disscussed it, but that was centrally from the transcendental point of view. To that we add now the following characters.

Every *tattva*, as it is understood in Sāṁkhya, is a numerically single entity, like what is named by a material noun in English grammar, concrete (and that distinguishes it from universals which are named by abstract nouns), simple, i.e. irreducible to any other *tattva* and by itself unpinpointable as exhaustively this and here. Water, for example, is one such *tattva*. There are, indeed, many waters at different places, but somehow we speak of them as all water—they are all *cases of* what is fundamentally one and the same water; and yet it is not the water-*jāti*, the abstraet (*amūrta*) *universal water-ness*, nor just their collection as a jungle is of many plants. As distinct from universals, it is concrete (*mūrta*), and as distinct from other concrete things it is unpinpointable. To illustrate: when a pot is said to be made of earth what is meant is as much that it is made of a particular pinpointable lump of earth as of the *material* that is just earth and so far unpinpointable. If the pot is made of a particular definite lump of earth, this latter too is made of another such definite lump, and so on *ad infinitum*. This is one line of causation. But we can, as well too, say that it is—indeed every such lump is—made of some unpinpointable one stuff, viz., earth. Indeed, this is the notion of *stuff* (matter) everywhere. Whatever is there is made of some stuff, and immediately as you pinpoint it, saying that it is made of this particular stuff—*this* lump of clay—this latter, in its turn, is said to be made of some stuff again, and so on if you go on pinpointing. This means that ultimately it is made of some indefinite, i.e. unpinpointable stuff, viz. earth. Neither tree,

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1. This reminds us instantly of the many parallel distinctions which even the Advaita-Vedāntin Vidyāraṇya has drawn in his *Pancadaśī*.

nor abstract cowness (*gotva*) is stuff in this sense. Different tr are not different modes of one and the same tree : indeed, there is one and the same tree in all the trees, unless it is the abstr universal tree-ness which, however, is never called *stuff* i.e. *ma* Tree-ness is rather called *form* and no one says that this f undergoes different changes (modifications) and that way shapes its into this or that concrete thing. *Pariṇāmavāda* and its cou *vivartavāda* are necessary consequences of the concept of s (matter). Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers too have indeed spoken matter as *upādana-kāraṇa*. But this matter, with them, is alway definite pinpointable lump, and that is why they are under no neces of saying that this matter gets changed or modified into anot thing: their pinpointable definite thing which they call *upādāna* only succeeded by that thing. As for the distinction betw *pariṇāma* and *vivarta*, it all depends on whether what is phenome logically intended (constructed) either by pure consciousness by its or by that pure consciousness *through its different intentions* is or not considered as itself also real over against that consciousne Those who, like Sāṁkhya philosophers, believe that it is wo naturally opt for *pariṇāma*, and those who, like the Advai Vedāntins, would not in any way admit this independent existe would naturally advocate *vivartavāda*. Some, again, like the Śa monists, would pursue a third intermediate course, holding t except at the *aśuddha* level dominated by falsifying *ajñāna* 'intentio everywhere are only semi-independent, i.e. both dependent a independent—better, that much independent as is granted by t consciousness on which those 'intentions' constitutionally depe These Śaiva monists hold that as soon as the intentions, r presenting themselves as intentions, declare their complete indep dence there must be some basic error involved, and that is d to the principle called *ajñāna*. We have already discussed t concepts of *mahāmāyā*, *māyā*, *ajñāna* (*aśuddhi*), *prakṛti*, etc.

Every *tattva*, again, is irreducible to any other *tattva*. E when it is a *pariṇāma* of another *tattva* it is alwaws something mo not wholly reducible to that of which it is a *pariṇāma*. This true, of course, of all *pariṇāma*s, not merely of the *pariṇām*

that are themselves also *tattva*s. Even in cases of *atattvāntara pariṇāma* there is always some novelty in whatever is brought forth. The only difference between *tattvāntara praiṇāma* and *atattvāntara pariṇāma* is that in the former what is brought forth is again a *tattva*, i.e. something that is numerically one and the same, forming the stuff of all the pinpointable things that too are called by the same name and as only cases of the *tattva* in question. Different earthen things like stones, trees, etc. are all *atattvāntara pariṇāma*s of earth (*kṣiti*), and, of course, of other *tattva*s too present there in different quantities like water, heat, air (motion) and ether.

One more concept and we pass on to the next Section. It is the concept of *adhyavasāya* or, as it is called in other Indian systems of philosophy, *vyavasāya*. '*Adhyavasāya*' means cognitive assurance, the assurance that something has been known. It is sought to be distinguished from what happens at the stage of *ahaṁkāra*. *Manas* has already integrated the different types of sensations (about a particular thing). But even as the integration is completed and the thing is identified what happens at the most at the *ahaṁkāra* level is that wholly in the interest of my *animal* response that thing has been distinguished from other things. It is not yet any cognitive approach to, no knowledge of, the thing. There is only the primitive animal approach and the thing is distinguished only so far as that animal approach can be satisfied. Neither the *saṁkalpa* and *vikalpa* of the *manas* nor the *abhimāna* of *ahaṁkāra* stand for anything that is cognitive, cognition, by definition, being, as distinct from any merely animal approach, an impartial approach, i.e. approach in an attitude that I keep away from my 'natural' mind infested with all sorts of biological, ontogenetic and cultural prepossessions and have the thing exactly as it is. In other words, at this level for the first time I begin to distinguish—rather dissociate—the proper unadulterated *I* from the 'natural' animal *I*. Once I look to things in this attitude my approach, as distinct from being merely creaturely, is cognitive proper. This is called *adhyavasāya* or *niścaya*, meaning that from now on begins the

assured experience of Nature, including my mental nature, 'assure
experience' meaning, in its turn, experience from the point of view o
unadulterated *I*, however vaguely, though nonetheless actuall
this *I* is actually felt. Not that this cognition is spotless fro
the start. Yet, at the lowest level there is the first genui
hint of unadulterated consciousness and the first genuine attem
at getting at it, *and, through it, at the items of Nature.* It
realized in greater and greater purity as we rise higher an
higher through sub-stages, till at the highest sub-stage, call
parama prasaṁkhyāna we have the subtlest *vṛtti*-presentation o
pure consciousness. Yet, however, even at this last sub-sta
we are still in the *buddhi* region, though at its farthest upp
end. What at this last sub-stage is demanded is that the bou
dary be corssed and pure consciousness shine by itself, not
presented through a *vṛtti*. And this, in Sāṁkhya, is acco
plished through another effort of *sādhana*: this time it is
practice of self-annihilation, corresponding to the practice,
other systems, of self-surrender, a practice of *śūnyatā*. Once y
succeed in this practice, *buddhi* disappears and what is left behi
is the pure consciousness which had been peering all throu
the *buddhi* field. In the fields of *ahaṁkāra* and *indriyas* it h
indeed been there all along, and so even in the lower fields
the *bhūtas*. But in none of these other fields it had sho
itself *as it is*, even distantly. The only way it had made
presence felt is by some very vague *I*-sense, never yet experien
ed even remotestly as *I* but somehow making the animal abso
avoid or in whatever manner respond to things outside; in oth
words, consciousness works here in the gross form of *body-sen*
it being understood that body is not just some inert mat
among other inert matters of Nature but is somehow, howev
distantly and in a wholly creature manner, sensed as *I*.
means what instrinsically seeks to distinguish itself from oth
things. Bodies of living beings do that way distinguish the
selves. This much is the role of consciousness here—the dista
est possible. Further below, in the case of a corpse, for exam
it is as farthest from consciousness as any other inert item

Nature. If consciousness is there—and, phenomenologically we have to associate it with consciousness[1]—it is in its densest form there. A corpse is called *annamaya śarīra*, i.e. just physical body, not even physiological. The living physiological body, consisting, in addition, of *karmendriyas*, and some *jñānendriya* in some rudimentary form, is called *prāṇāmaya śarīra*. The next higher *śarīra* consisting of *jñānendriyas*, *manas* and *ahaṁkāra* is *manomaya śarīra*. Above that, and necessarily tending to transcend all these *śarīras* we have at the *buddhi* level, except at its highest sub-stage, a *śarīra* which is called *vijñānamaya*. It is only at the highest sub-stage of *buddhi* that we have what others call *ānandamaya śarīra*. It is not known whether, in Sāṁkhya, it or the next sub-stage, called *asamprajñāta*, is to be called *ānandamaya śarīra* or whether Sāṁkhya would altogether deny it. Anyway, we may call any one or both of these sub-stages *duḥkhābhāva-śarīra*.

Jīvanmukti, both in Sāṁkhya and Vedānta, has sometimes been understood as only the self with the *vijñānamaya kośa* at its sublest and purest, on its path of ascent. Undoubtedly, the self at this stage is free of all wordly weals and woes. The *sañcita karmas* have all been burnt up and the *prārabdha* matures only mechanically to be only observed dispassionately by one at this high level. Yet, however, the so-called self here stands still fused with *buddhi*, though at its purest (i.e. *sāttvikī buddhi*). Such a state cannot be called *mokṣa* except figuratively. The Vedāntists might still call it *jīvanmukti* because that, in their considered opinion, still contains a modicum of *ajñāna*, though at its minimum and fast disappearing. But Sāṁkhya can never subscribe to such a view. For it, even the minimum, and even self-dissipating, fusion with *buddhi* is *bandha*, however subtle, no form of *mukti*; tt does not indeed produce any pain, the *buddhi* at the *parama prasaṁkhyāna* sub-stage being all-*sattva* and, therefore, producing unadulterated joy and, at the next sub-stage, *asamprajñāta* (in other systems *nirvikalpaka-samādhi*), causing indeed neither suffering nor even joy but certainly no peace eithe because it still involves *struggle* to get away from the region o *buddhi*—in effect, of *prakṛti*[1] altogether. Positively understood *mokṣa* is but consciousness, *puruṣa*, as it is in itself, and if i had to be freed from the various degrees of its confusion wit the *buddhi*-states and stages, that was all a business of *prakṛ* itself much as it was all a business of the same *prakṛti* to dra down cansciousness to the various layers of dirty objects.

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[1]. This we shall develop in the next sub-sectien.

Puruṣa's fusion with *prakṛti* has quite unnecessarily bee sought to be understood in three different ways. Not that th three ways are not different, but they have made too much o that difference, forgetting that after all, except in one extrem case, they are one and the same way presented in differen languages. The three ways are said to be those of *avacched* *pratibimba* and *ābhāsa*. '*Avaccheda*' means that one and the sam consciousness (of course, in Sāṁkhya one and the same indiv dual unit of consciousness), being *bodily present* in every *buddh* *vṛtti*, not only appears (falsely though) to be so many bits o consciousness—so many different cognition events—it, in ever such case, appears also to be caused, i.e. brought into being fo the first time, by objects outside *buddhi* (or by traces and di positions within it). What, however, is more illuding is that th distinction between consciousness as pure subjectivity and th *vṛtti*s as psychological objects comes to be clean overlooked an as suits our convenience, we take this subjective consciousnes as the objective (natural) psychological states and even and those states and events as subjective. As a resul we confuse psychological introspection as much with the refle tive self-luminosity of pure consciousness as with subjectivit proper, subjectivity as dissociated from all types of objects- even from those that are psychological—and therefore experien ed as in itself. The moral of *avacchedavāda* is that it is th

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[1] We have already seen that even in *parama prasaṁkhyāna*, where *puruṣ* stands in maximum direct evidence to *buddhi*, i.e. in the purest *buddhivṛtt* there is no experience whatsoever of *pradhāna*, neither as in itself nor a represented in *buddhi*.

pure subjective consciousness which constitutes knowledge peoper, however much it remains fused with *vṛtti*s. '*Avaccheda*' does, indeed, mean here *circumscribed*, but it is circumscribed exactly as fire is circumscribed by a redhot iron ball. Not only it is one and the same fire that is circumscribed by different such balls and that way appears different, even in each such case the fire stands in a way as circumscribed by, as only in the context of, as non-distinguished from and, therefore, only in the shape of, the ball. This is *avacchedavāda*.

Pratibimbavāda is, again, the same thing, unless the *pratibimba*, the reflexion-image, is, as by Śureśvara, taken as numerically different from that of which it is the image, called *bimba* in contrast with *pratibimba*. Unless so understood, *pratibimba* is abundantly the same thing as the corresponding *bimba*; only, it is found in a different locus and that constitutes all its weaknesses—one may even say, its being an illusion. The original locus of my face, for example, is my body; but when found in a mirror it is the much maligned *image* of my face. Its primary weakness lies in its being present in an *unauthorized* locus—my face should, almost by definition, be present in my body, not elsewhere. This primary defect then leads to other more serious incomprehensibilities, viz. how at all my face could be a foot inside the mirror—a place where, as a matter of fact, there are other things like a chair or a wall. So is the case with pure consciousness. It is properly in itself, as dissociated from everything that is object[1] even in the remotest sense, 'object' here meaning Nature. Hence for it to be in an objective *I*-state, i.e. in fusion with a *buddhi-vṛtti*, is a misplacement, though it is never denied that *it* verily has, however mysteriously or unintelligibly, been dragged there. *Pratibimbavāda* thus, unless it is understood in Sureśvara's sense, is not substantially different from *avacchedavāda*.

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[1] In *parama prasaṁkhyāna* it does indeed stand as an object to that *prasaṁkhyāna* exactly as other *vṛtti*s represent objects outside. But if it appears there as an object it is precisely known in that very state as what in itself is no object, as what appearing so long as an object, because in fusion with a *vṛtti* which itself is an object to psychological introspection, is now not only showing itself as not an object but demands to be *experienced* that way even though at a level transcending *buddhi* altogether and not yet coming over to *pradhāna*, because *pradhāna*, as we have already seen, can never be experienced.

Unfortunately, however, Sureśvara's notion of *pratibimba* is extremely popular with most of the later-day Sāṁkhya scholars (interpreters). Even Vācaspati Miśra, it appears, has often succumbed to it. Whatever may be the value of Sureśvara's notion of *pratibimba* for Advaita-Vedānta, it, clearly, is at least not needed for understanding Sāṁkhya. For, with Sāṁkhya, object is not necessarily an illusion. From *pradhāna* down to the *mahābhūtas* —and even below that, to the discrete items of Nature—everything is a real evolute of *pradhāna*, whether *tattvāntara* or *atattvāntara*. At least for the sake of parsimony, then, we should understand *pratibimbavāda* in the former sense rather than as it has been understood by the Advaita-Vedāntic philosopher Sureśvara.

As for *ābhāsavāda*, there is no one theory, at least one that is largely accepted. There are at least two formulations. In one it is said that it is pure consciousness (subjectivity proper) which alone manifests, exposes, illuminates, things (objects); according to the other interpretation, our experience, i.e. 'natural experience' —and this, even at its lowest stage—indicates, i.e. points out, however dimly, the never-lapsing presence of this pure consciousness. As formulated in the second manner, it clearly is the same thing as *avacchadavāda* or the *pratibimbavāda* as we have understood the latter: as in both these theories, here too pure consciousness *shows* its presence in every case of our experience —only more and more dimly as our experience is at lower and lower levels.

B4

Corresponding to each type of sensation, i.e. to every *jñānendriya* as a *tattva*, there is a type of primary datum, primary because unintegrated so far with any other such datum. Such primitive sense-datum (as a *tattva*) is called *tanmātra*. Corresponding to the five *jñānendriyas* there are five *tanmātras*-*rūpatanmātra*, i.e. colour, *rasatanmātra*, i.e. taste, *gandhatanmātra*, i.e. smell, *sparśatanmātra*, i.e. tactile quality and *śabdatanmātra*, i.e. sound. So far they do not unite with one another. They do so according as *manas*, the supreme *jñānendriya*, integrates different types of sensations into one integral presentation, normally called sensuous awareness (perception)[1] *of* a thing. As everywhere in Sāṁkhya, here too the discrete *data*, as *tattvas*, are as much (phenomenologically, i.e. *sui generis*) intended by the corresponding sensings as also independent in themselves. They descend as much from (i.e. are concretions as much of) the *pradhāna*, *via* its intermeditate stages, viz. *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra* and the five *jñānendriyas* (which are all psychological objects—*I-states*) as also hang necessarily on to *puruṣa* (pure consciousness) as its construction, intention, and this time too *via* the intermediate stages, viz. *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra* and the five *jñānendriyas*, but these now understood as pure consciousness wrongly passing under these names. But if in cases of these intermediate agencies their objectivity and *per se* subjectivity almost alternate, in the case of *tanmātras* the subjectivity side is on the vanishing point, leaving these primary data as elements of dense matter all over there, as wholly over against even the sensings. (Remember, Sāṁkhya here does not speak of *sensations* as against data: it speaks rather, and more correctly of *sensings* on the subject-side and data on the object-side). Pure consciousness has started growing more and more objective, and that way denser and denser, with its first fusion with *buddhi*. Since then it has been growing continuously denser with lower and lower sub-stages of *buddhi*; then, further down, denser still and more and more mixed up with what is called living animal body till at the lowest stage there is only sense-experience like seeing, hearing, touching, tasting and smelling. But it gets denser still and becomes just material, and then more and more material successively through sound, touch-quality, colour, taste and smell.[1]

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[1] Meaning perception as presentative-representative, not presentative-interpretative. And even the representative elements are not remembered in the strict sense of the term. There is a sense of 'whole' from the beginning and the different discrete elements only fit this whole.

However, this whole story, this phenomenological construction of every *tattva*, from *buddhi* to the *tanmātras*, by pure consciousness and, simultaneously with that, the independent objectivity of these, are evident only at the sub-stages of *buddhi* itself where alone can consciousness show itself even through its different grades of fusion with what is intrinsically non-conscious, i.e. object = 'natural', even though sort of phosphorescent (*sāttvika*). *Sādhana*, i.e. exercise in dissociating consciousness, through various grades, from object = Nature, is possible, for the first time, only at the lowest sub-stage of *buddhi* and can be practised more and more efficiently through all the higher sub-stages. It is only through this practice of dissociating consciousness from object = Nature that we come to realize that (and also how presisely) the subjects, beginning from *buddhi* (the highest level, with its sub-levels, of psychological *I*-states) down to the primitive natural qualities, i.e. the *tanmātras*, are only 'intentions', projections, constructions, of consciousness, each through its just higher. Hussel's *apoche* is largely this *sādhana*, process of dissociating consciousness from object = Nature, primarily from *I*-states as such objects—more specifically, from *I*-states through which this consciousness, however fused with them, is peering out. In common English these are called *conscious* mental states as different from those which are only creaturely, i.e. of the animal mind—states, viz. of which the animal is not conscious in any proper sense of that English term.

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[1] All this is, strangely enough, on a par with the four stages of *vāk*—*parā*, *paśyantī*, *madhyamā* and *vaikharī*. *Cit* corresponds to *parā*, *buddhi* to *paśyantī*, the sub-stages of *madhyamā* to *ahaṁkāra* and *indriyas* and *vaikharī* to *tanmātras* and *sthūlabhūtas*. In the *paśyantī* and *madhyamā* stages, in either case, consciousness and the *jada* side assert themselves in various degrees of alternation while in the first and last stages consciousness and the *jada* respectively assert themselves fully. And all this, in spite of the loud Sāṁkhya denial of *vāk* as a *tāttva*.

It is only at this *buddhi* level that, through this increasing exercise of dissociating consciousness, we come to realize all the *tattvas* (except consciousness itself and its exact coordinate—*pradhāna*) as progressively constructcd, intended, by that consciousness, each second time through what it had just constructed. *Pradhāna* too could also be realized as so constructed if only the Sāṁkhya thinker had not alternated all such canstructions with their independent status in every case.

If consciousness is to be progressively dissociated, the first fusion from which it has to be extricated, to whatever extent, is my living body. This first exercise in extrication we have not yet discussed. To it we shall shortly turn. The lowest of the *tattvas* we have till now discussed are the *tanmātras* which as primal physical elements constitute this my physical body as it is felt from within. If this body itself is already to an extent dissociated from all other physical things of Nature—in a way, therefore, from the physical Nature itself, though it continues nevertheless to be an item too of that Nature—that we shall soon discuss. For the time being we concentrate on dissociating from 'it as a whole' the colours, tastes, sounds, tactual qualities and smells that constitute it; and, obviously, these are distinguished only as they are sensed, dissociation here too meaning that they are as much 'intended' by the corresponding sensings as also independent objects there. It must always be borne in mind that in no such case of construction the phrase 'already independent over there' means that it was there before it came to be sensed, nor, therefore, that it is like the 'object of perceptual *error*' which subsists over there only as it is constructed, neither before nor after. What it means, in Sāṁkhya, is that it had always been there as *incohately (avyakta)* that object, the incohate stuff which, immediately as there is my sensing (here sensing, but in other cases other functions), shapes itself into *this definite (vyakta)* object; and not only that, it continues too to be that incohate object even after the first definite manifestation—and, indeed, for the whole period it remains in that definite form. Only, this its indefinitude, its incohateness, can be experienced by none except one who has learnt the art of dissociation ; and the beauty of the whole thing is th this indefinitude, as soon as it comes to be actually experienced is experienced as a definite of another sort, though relativel to the earlier experience it continues to be indefinite. *The indefinit as such is never experienced*: it is what is at most postulated fro the lower level. When through *sādhana* we come to dissociate i i.e. experience it as dissociate, it is experienced in some ne definite character.[1]

Through *sādahna*, *tanmātras* thus come to be dissociated an *experienced* for the first time as what had been constituting m physical living body. But immediately with this experience- and coordinately with that, i.e. at the same level—I come to exper ence the sensings *(pañca jñānendriyas)* on to which the *tanmātr* are found to be necessarily hanging.

So far with the five *jñānendriyas* and five *tanmātras*. But wh about the physical living body itself? A little reflection shows- in our language, the first *sādhana* concentrated on it reveals—th it is made of the five *tanmātras*, the five primal qualities. But i is not made of these in any ordinary sense of the term 'make' Normally when I am aware of my physical living body I am n necessarily aware of these five elemental qualities as constituting i far less as alone (i.e. all by themselves) constituting it. M living body, for example, is extended and occupies a position; is born at a certain moment of time, then grows, decays and tur wholly into dead matter—a corpse—at another moment of tim It, again, has hard matter-particles (*pṛthvī*) constituting it an similarly liquid humours *(ap)*, heating agencics (*tejas*), movin agencies—not only themselves moving but moving other constituen

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[1] The Buddhists—particularly of the Mahāyāna schools—have indeed bank on the ultimate experience of the Indefinite as indefinite, and the Hindu have never spared them for that. But, certainly, the better of them, vi the Mādhyamikas, have clearly held that this ultimate experience of th Indefinite is verily the experience of all that has been definite till then, bu experience now in a new light—in the light, viz. of this transcendental ult mate Indefinitude.

of the body (*marut*) ; and the expansive vacuum (*vyoman*) it occupies is, in so far as that is positively understood, the stuff that carries sound as its specific quality.[1] *Tanmātras*, though material, are only material qualities, they are not themselves matter *(pṛthvī, ap, tejas, marut* or *vyoman)*. What, now, is the relation between the *tanmātras*, on the one hand, and these gross matters on the other ?

The Sāṁkhya reply is the same : concentrate, through *sādhana*, on these matters—of course, as they have formed your body—and you will find them as they have been its immediate incohate prins and, equally too, as in themselves, i.e. definitely as *tanmātras*. How, let us see.

My living body is not merely a conglomeration of some gross matters (*pṛthvī*, *ap*, etc.). It is a fine, strong and sufficiently durable *unity* of these, so much so that in proportion as this unity loses this its integrity it loses its value, its importance, till when the unity is snapped it loses all its special status and dies. This its special status is constituted by a principle called life (*prāṇa*). It is life which keeps those gross matters in that exquisite unity. This life, however, is, very evidently to any discerning mind, nothing but (i) the five original efferent motions felt from within (*karmendriyas*), viz. movements that are communicatively expressive (*vāk* : in higher animals and man this expression is dominantly in the form of uttering sounds), collection (*pāṇi*), locomotion and getting to things—specially to bodies outside (*pāda*), excretion (*pāyu*) and acquirement of original bodily pleasure which is primarily sexual[2] *(upastha)* ; (ii) the five *jñānendriyas* (types of sensing) and (iii) *manas* as the function, at the sense (i.e. feeling) level, of coordinating as much the different types of sensing with one another into the for of one integral sensing (of a whole unitary thing or situation) also the different types of efferent motions into the form of t physical body remaining active and, equally too, coordinating t former coordination with the latter—all these activities and coor nations proceeding simultaneously. This is the general Indi account of 'life', and it has been developed in detail in the classic Indian treatises on Medicine.

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[1] The Indian theory of sound is, first, that it originates in some matter that is in space and moves along matters as they, and as far as they, occupy space (meaning that it neither arises in nor moves along mere empty space). And, secondly, its peculiar character is that once originated it gets weakened and weakened till it almost ceases, i.e. gets beyond the reach of our ears.

[2] And, of course, its contrary, i.e. pain ; and similarly the contraries of the other four, too, are meant. These contraries indicate failing life.

What is to be particularly borne in mind here, as everywh else in Sāṁkhya, and indeed in all kinds of Indian transcendentalis is that the functions of all these *karmendriyas* and *jñānendriyas* an of course, of *manas* too which is the common coordinator, a *sui genesis*, always anticipating, of themselves, though in m general terms, i.e. as *a priori*, what have to be taken in, work out outside and coordinated.

Of these three functions, it is the coordination, rather integr tion, which turns the *tanmātras*, the discrete primal qualities, in gross matter (*sthūla*, i.e. *mahā*, *bhūtas*) of five types, imparting them space in which—or, better, *as* which (i.e. as spatial)—th stand in the form of gross matter. Space, so far, is only anoth name of the principle of the interpenetratation of the primal qua ties. In any particular type of *mahābhūta* there are all the *tanmātr* though in particular quantitative relations to one another. Gro physical space, for example, is constitued 50% of *śabda-tanmātr* with the remaining 50% shared equally by the other *tanmātr* and so with every other *mahābhūta*, its 50% being constituted b the particular relevant *tanmātra* and the remaining 50% shar equally by the remaining *tanmātras*. Why a particular quali (*tanmātra*) is relevant for a particular type of gross matter (*sthū* *bhūta*) is a very interesting study which, however, need not deta us here. The relevance of sound for physical space we have alread seen (vide fn. 1. p. 107). Other relevances may be deciphered o similar lines.

The five *sthūlabhūtas* and their being constituted of *tanmātr* in determined proportions are best experienced in one's own livi

physical body. And similarly with *ahaṁkāra* too : *ahaṁkāra* is but the living physical body dissociated inwardly, i.e. in organic feeling—one may say, in coanaesthesis—from all other things in the physical world called gross Nature. It is but the body un-self-consciously felt as *Ī*, and, therefore, also, the sensings and the coordinating too equally felt as the same *I* though now functioning in different manners, and the *tanmātras* and the *sthūlabhūtas* as both *I* and mine in a still lower grade of un-self-consciousness, even the un-self-conscious *I*-ness slipping that way still lower into the least felt (and, therefore, most un-self-conscious) *I*-ness, called *mine-ness*. Perhaps, what is really least experienced as *I* or *mine* and is yet experienced subjectively, i.e. somehow as dissociated (though least dissociated), is the living body that is not yet felt but only perceived from outside. Primarily, this is just *another* living body—one may say, a grossest *you*—though it is still *my* body as *perceived from outside*, showing the *I-you* reciprocity at the lowest metaphysical level. My body perceived from outside is, in this very perception, somehow dissociated from other items of gross Nature. It is not just a thing among things, though that is never denied too. It is most *un-self-consciously* experienced as *I*, as *I* at its lowest level of dissociation. It is only at this stage of one's own body perceived from outside that one perceives it as made of the five *sthūlabhūtas*. Otherwise, when this body is merely felt from within, the constituting *sthūalbhūtas* tend to be experienced more as gliding into one another than as in themselves ; and the experience of the *bhūtas* as so gliding into one another is only the half-way point to the experience of the *tanmātras*.

Two important points need be noted in this connexion. One is that one further step below the body perceived from outside—below, therefore, the immediate experience of another's body—and we experience dead items of Nature, items none of which are themselves experience in any form, not even the most un-self-conscious experience that a creature has of its own body, whether perceived from outside or felt from within. These dead items of Nature are, by themselves, no new *tattvas*: they are constituted of the same *sthūlabhūta*s as had constituted the living body. The only distinc between dead items of Nature and the living body is that wh the former are dead *sthūlabhūta*s, i.e. absolutely inert matter, latter is a *sthūlabhūta* or a *sthūlabhūta*-combine that in whate measure—in the least, as perceived from outside—is sought to dissociated from other items of Nature. The passage from liv bodies to non-living items is thus *atattvāntara pariṇāma*.

The second important point to note in this connexion is t life that distinguishes a living body from items that are n living is constituted of *ahṁakāra*, *manas*, five *karmendriyas*, f *jñānendriya*s, *tanmātra*s and, if one likes, of the feeling of the bo from within in addition. And, of course, in the case of a hum living body there is that high-level *tattva* called *buddhi*, thou as we have seen, this *buddhi* remains dormant in sub-hum creatures and in man too till he has learnt to reflect. T entire gamut comprising *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, eleven *indriyas* a five *tanmātras*—and, along with that, the felt body using its as the sack as it were—is called subtle body *(sūkṣma* or *liṅga śarīr* as opposed to which the gross living body is called *sth* *śarīra*. The great non-experienceable primal Nature, cal *pradhāna*, from out of which all such subtle—and then gros bodies have emerged is often called *kārana-śarira*,[1] and, subtle and gross bodies emerge corresponding to the *pur* concerned and in accordance with the traces and dispositi (*karma* = *adṛṣṭa*) acquired in the just preceding life-cycle of t *puruṣa* in bondage. It was the same story with that previ life-cycle too, and so on *ad infinitum* backwards. This story transmigration is no feat of groundless imaginatian. It is least a *theory* doing justice to many facets of our life wh normally, in the name of the present-day science, we feign ignore, though, as a matter of fact, we remain very mu concerned with them. And, what is more, it is a matter direct intuition through yogic exercise. It is sort of intui a whole stretch of time in one moment—an extension, one m

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[1] *Kāraṇa-śarīra* in other systems of transcendental Indian philosophy constituted of *māyā* or *mahāmāyā* as the case may be.

say, of what is normally permitted as 'enduring (spatious) present.' Normal enduring (spatious) present consists only of a small stretch of time given all at once. But there are cases—though few and far between—where we, in a flash as it were, see all the (major) occurrences covering a much wider stretch of time and we are told that often just at the moment of death the dying person perceives his whole life in a twinkle. If this much is permitted, it is not at least impossible for a yogin to perceive at one instant of time (*kṣaṇa*) the entire sequential time that constitutes the phenomenal world—called Nature—including the whole history of our life and mind. It is but perceiving the entire time, and that perceiving, though apparently occurring at a particular moment of this very time, is itself *really* non-temporal. It is *transcendental* experience of time itself, and, as we showed long ago (in Chapter I) this experience is, first, as much in time (i.e. occurring at a particular moment of this time) as also not in time (in so far as this experience is transcental i.e. trans-natural, trans-temporal); and, secondly, what is more important, this experience is basically transcendental, though also obtaining in Nature, meaning that this experience had all along been there though till now unnoticed because *fused* so long with sequentially temporal (natural) experience. It is because the yogin succeeds in freeing his experience from this fusion that his experience, from now on, is explicitly of all time. Transmigration, if it is anything more than a theory, anything that is directly experienced, is relevant only to such yogin.

Anyway, once transmigration is allowed it has to be maintained that what transmigrates, leaving the corpse behind, is the *puruṣa* fused with *sūkṣmaśarīra*, the fusion, of course, understood through the agency of *kāraṇaśarīra*. What we have shown incidentally is that neither time nor space—unless this latter is just the gross *bhūta* corresponding to *śabda-tanmātra*—in other words, neither sequential time nor space as the vacuum, and therefore too, as the principle of interpenetration of subtle *bhūtas*, is a *tattva*.

Two more points, and we close this section—in effect, t Chapter II.

(i) *Jñānendriyas* we have so long understood as types of su jective sensing as distinct from the objects (*tanmātras*) sensed. Th sensing, however, though it is sensing some datum (*tanmātr* is not posterior to it. That would be the story of empirical, i naturalistic, sensing which is always an event in sequential ti Sāṁkhya's 'sensing' is a *sui generis* act of intending, anticipati intrinsically referring to, *some* datum—and, *a priori* too—the dat so far being appropriate to the sensing. It means that if the sens is visual the datum is automatically anticipated as colour, if audit then sound, etc. etc. This explains the Sāṁkhya doctrine that t five *jñānendriyas*[1] and the five *tanmātras* are co-levelled evolu of *ahaṁkāra*.

(ii) Although this Sāṁkhya account of lower and lo *tattvas* coming out of higher *tattvas*, as described above, is large accepted by the Śaivas, many Vedāntins—particularly the Advai Vedāntins—hold, on the other hand, that out of *mahat* there direc come into being the *sthūlabhūtas* and from the *sthūlabhūtas* everythi else in a particular order. The *mahat* of the Vedāntins is cosm *buddhi*, meaning that just as there are limited *buddhis* with which t many *puruṣas* get fused, so is there a great cosmic *buddhi*—*mahat*—w which stands fused a corresponding great *puruṣa* that comprehen all other *puruṣas*, we mean the ultimate *puruṣa* which the Vedā tins call Brahman; and if this great *puruṣa* comprehends all oth *puruṣas* then the cosmic *buddhi* too would comprehend all oth *buddhis*, and similarly does the great cosmic living body, Natu comprehend all other living bodies.

The Sāṁkhya attitude in this respect is very pointed. No of the Sāṁkhya schools would admit any cosmic *puruṣa* at all by that is meant a grand *puruṣa* that comprehends all oth *puruṣas*. For them, the cosmic *puruṣa* (God), if at all th

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[1] And also the five *karmendriyas* and *manas*. But we need not consider th separately here.

[2] There are deviations here and there. These deviations, however, we hav not taken into consideration here.

recognise one, would be just one among the many *puruṣas*, though of infinite knowledge and infinite other capacities—and quite a good number of Sāṁkhists would not even admit that. Uudoubtedly, those who admit such cosmic *puruṣa* hold that there cannot be more than one such cosmic *puruṣa*, for that would affect the very infinitude of each which precisely is to constitute their cosmicness; but, assuredly too, the cosmic *puruṣa* could well be one of the many *puruṣas*—one cosmic and all the others of limited capacities, all the capacities being understood phenomenologically in terms of anticipated possible *buddhis*, etc., not in terms of *buddhis*, etc. that are actual, i.e. natural. If there be *such* a cosmic *puruṣa* (say, *Hiraṇyagarbha*), its anticipated body would, of course, be cosmic too but, exactly as before, not in the sense of wholly comprehending the bodies of other *puruṣas*; somehow or other these other bodies, whether comprehended or not, would fall outside that cosmic body, i.e. retain each its autonomy, though that way there would certainly be one-one correspondence (isomorphism) between every non-cosmic body (*piṇḍa*) and that cosmic body (*brahmāṇḍa*) and, therefore, among the non-cosmic bodies themselves.

So far with the so-called theistic schools of Sāṁkhya. For them the *buddhi-tattva* is definitely either the many limited *buddhis* or the one cosmic *buddhi*, called *mahat*. Other Sāṁkhists, however, would not admit this cosmic *puruṣa*. Yet, like the theistic Sāṁkhists, they do speak of *mahat* as the cosmic form of *buddhi*. What they mean is possibly this:

Puruṣa, according to them, is always an individual self, the *I*, and so is the *buddhi* with which this *puruṣa* stands fused. But, whether it is *puruṣa* or *buddhi*, it could not be realized as '*I*' unless it was poised against another such *puruṣa* or *buddhi*, called 'you' or 'he'. The *I* that is not contrasted with *you* or *he* is only in the solitary world of solipsism and is, therefore, neither singular nor cosmic. It is only subjective, i.e. dissociated from whatever else is object, and not also dissociated from other such subjects, i.e. *yous* and *hes*. No *you* or *he* is an objeet from which *I* stands dissociated. *You* and *he* are subjects—and somehow they too are dissociated from their bodies and other objects, not only by themselves but also by me (as dissociating them from their bodies and other objects of their interest).[1]

Once, thus, *you*s and *he*s, i.e. other selves and other *buddhis*, are perforce recognised in Sāṁkhya, it will have to admit a comprehensive *buddhi* over and above, though neither denying nor even subordinating, the individual *buddhi*. There could be such denial or subordination if only a cosmic *puruṣa* (without cosmic *buddhi*) were admitted: such cosmic *puruṣa*, then, in anticipiting and getting fused with some cosmic *buddhi*—and, as a result, that cosmic *buddhi* too—would cover the individual *buddhi*s. But common to, or comprehending, *I*, *you* and *he* there is no cosmic subject. *You* and *he* are subjects *only to them*, not to *I* the speaker. *You* calls himself *I*, I do not call him *I*, and so about *he*. If yet I call them subjects, that is because, even without my calling them *I*, I dissociate them from their bodies and other surroundings and that way take them as *possible* subjects, possible *I*s—I mean that they would call themselves *I*s. *I* in each case is distinct, and the 'possible *I*,' i.e. what appears common to them including myself, is but the *puruṣa* in each case dissociating itself from *buddhi* (and each of the lower *tattvas*), which *buddhi* (and each of the lower *tattvas*) may, as what is dissociated from, be thus far understood as one lump object. *Mahat*, for these Sāṁkhists, is the name of this *buddhi* as the lump object.

This is the first point where the Sāṁkhists differ with Vedāntins—particularly with the Vedāntins of the Advaita brand—regarding the latter's theory that what first evolves out of Brahman (through the agency of *māyā*, of course) is *mahat*.

The second point of their difference, in so far as the Sāṁkhists do not note that what emerge straight from the *mahat* are the five *sthūlabhūtas*, is however more important. The Advaita-Vedāntins hold that if at least in the case of the *jivanmuktas* Brahman as pure *cit* could also be the *sākṣin*, i.e.

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[1] If this is not so much true of *he*, it is true at least of *you*.

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absolutely disinterested spectators of whatever happens, or has happened, in the phenomenal naturalistic world, then there remains no need for such disinterested spectatorship, i.e. for anticipation *sui generis*, phenomenological 'intention', at all the lower levels, viz. at those of *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra* and *indryas*. Phenomenal psychic states could, in that case, be all understood as just natural events *(vṛttis) caused* by other natural items like things outside the psycho-physical organism or inside it. But here precisely Sāṁkhya would differ sharply. Sāṁkhya would never indeed deny the causal theory of psychic events (the *I*-states). But it would, at the same time, hold resolutely that every psycho-somatic event is felt as referring—even for one who has not yet attained *mukti* but is to whatever extent reflective—*sui generis* to, i.e. anticipating *a priori*, appropriate objects.

CHAPTER III

THE ULTIMATE AS PERFECTION (Fulness = Purṇata)

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So far, we have seen (i) that the transcendent in its analytic self-containedness (*kauṭasthya*) is increasingly realized through its progressive self-dissociation from Nature, (ii) that such dissociation, such (negative) act of freedom, is possible on the part of only one thing (agency) in the universe, viz. consciousness—better, self-consciousness and (iii) that exactly for this reason this consciousness is called subject as opposed to everything else called, for the same reason and the context of that subject, object.

The question now is whether when the dissociation is completed, i.e. when there is nothing else to get dissociated from, this consciousness is still to be understood as *subject*, i.e. subjective. The question at all arises because the subject is, almost by definition, what is contradistinguished from things called, though for the very same reason, object. Normally, what is dissociated is by itself just a *thing* (except, of course, with a proviso to be noted shortly) among *things* of the world. It is only when one such thing, or one kind of such things, is dissociated (and, therefore, also understood as dissociate) from other things that it is called subject, i.e. subjective; and in contrast—and, of course, in the same situation—those other things acquire the appellation 'object', 'object' meaning that which is dissociated from. So far, indeed, the position is not different from how it is understood in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. But the philosophies we have through all these pages been studying differ from Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika just from here. While Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds that wherever Y is dissociated from Z this Y too can again, in another situation, be equally dissociated from and stand, that way, in the same status with that Z—while Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika holds this view others would sharply differ. Others would argue, on the other hand, that Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika had, that way, only misused the term 'dissociation' to mean the colourless situation that, of Y and Z, each is just not the other or, at the most, that one is, differentiated from the other, dissociation in either case meaning little more than distinction. Dissociation proper is no mere distinction. It is, first, *invariably* in the context of some *conscious* act of differentiating one thing from another, and, secondly (and that is more important here), there are cases where a thing consciously dissociates *itself* from another thing, meaning that it is as much conscious of itself (as withdrawing) as of this withdrawal (of itself). This exactly is what is called reflective consciousness: it is consciousness experienced in the very act of dissociating itself from something else which, precisely in that context, is called its *subject*, and, therefore, this consciousness *as so dissociating itself*, subject or subjective. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika would never admit any consciousness that could dissociate *itself*; they would at the most admit that *something other* than *Y and Z* (consciousness and object, in the situation consciousness-of-object) dissociates that Y from Z (and this it assuredly does consciously, i.e. reflectively). Such (conscious) dissociation they name introspection (*anuvyavasāya*) which, in its turn a thing exactly on the same footing with Y and Z, i.e. a thing among things, is in no way dissociating *itself*. Undoubtedly, it is reflective, but reflective in the simple sense that it has dissociated the primary, i.e. unreflective, first-stage consciousness from the object of that primary consciousness. For Nyāya-Vaiseṣika, nothing—not even conscionsness—can dissociate *itself*, though consciousness can be dissoci*ated*—and, of course, reflectively in the sense we have just indicated—from things that, on that ground, are called its *objects*. Consciousness, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, could, in this context, be called subjective at most in this sense of being dissoci*ated* by another second-level consciousness, but, first, the object of that consciousness is equally, by the same introspection, dissociated from that primary consciousness, and, secondly, the introspection itself can similarly be distinghished (as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika believes) by a third-level consciousness, and so on *ad infinitum*. As a matter of fact, consciousness at whatever level is understood as subjective, and the thing of which one is conscious as object, for quite another reason noted below. All these many consciousnesses are, according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, each a distinct entity, numerically different from one another; and subjectivity, in that system, is always relative, there being nothing that is subjective for all times and on all occasions.

A few more words on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and we revert to our main topic. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, aware that dissociation and dissociation-from do not adequately account for the distinction between subject and object, has brought in another double criterion, viz. *viṣayitā* and *viṣayatā* i.e. referring-to and being-referred-to. Other systems of philosophy too have admitted these two, but, they—particularly the systems we have been principally concerned with—have, in a way, identified 'referring-to' with reflective dissociation and 'being referred-to' with reflective 'being dissociated from'. Consciousness, according to them, as much dissociates itself from as also refers to other things. While, for the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, object is what is referred to and the subjective that which refers; for our philosophers, referring to .. and reflective dissoctation from... are not so disparate, and so is the case with object being what is referred to and what is dissociated from. Indeed, for our philosphers, (i) consciousness, (ii) reflective dissociation-from and (iii) referring-to (provided it is *sui generis* referring, not merely conventional)—and indeed, in addition, (iv) subject = subjectivity—are all one and the same thing. And, similarly with whatever is (i) inert *(jaḍa)*, (ii) reflectively dissociated from, (iii) referred to *sui generis* and (iv) objects. All these, for these philosophers, are absolutely one and the same, except that neither the consciousness (*cit*) nor the inert *(jaḍa)* is considered *by itself*, i.e. apart from its epistemic relation to the other. To this last consideration we shall soon turn.

The second point to note is the ambiguity of the term 'subject'. Mostly when, till now, we have identified consciousness with subject we have immediately added 'or subjec*tive*'. This we have done deliberately lest the reader, because of his Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika bias—a bias, however, which is very largely shared by the common run of people—understand that the *subject* is a substantive, viz. the self, which *has* consciousness as (at least one of) its character(s). Nothing like this is admitted by our philosophers till now, though this is not denied too in so many words. Some of these philosophers do not recognise both the subtantive self and its character (act or quality or mode) called consciousness, and those who admit both do not, as we shall soon see (and have seen before) demarcate them as sharply as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers and common people do. Most of the Buddhists, for example, have literally done away with the substantive consciousness, called self, and the Advaita-Vedāntins have mostly gone the other way round denying the adjectival consciousness altogether, consciousness, viz. that refers to... These Buddhists and Advaita-Vedāntins reduce either side wholely to the other, which means that like all commoners they start with both but that ultimately they find this or that side to have been wholly gratuitous because transcended and, like all transcended popular admissions, *rejected.* Whichever of the two they ultimately recognise they call consciousness: for the Advaita-Vedāntins it is consciousness as substantive—*ātman* (Brahman) = Self, and for these Buddhists it is consciousness as the ultimate dynamism or act—or, if ultimate dynamism is too hard to digest, just a series of momentary conscious states, 'momentary' meaning each ceasing as soon as it comes into being, not ceasing even a moment after it has been in existence.[1] The upshot of the Advaita-Vedāntic denial would be that the phenomenal world *qua* phenomenal is wholly an illusion and therefore sheer nought, cons-

[1] One wonders, however, how if none of the items in the series of conscious states stops to assert its being even for a moment, this series would differ from *dynamism*.

ciousness-as-such, as substantive, being the only thing that is ultimately real; contrariwise, the upshot of the Buddhist position wodld be that nothing substantive, continuing as static even for a moment, no matter whether it is consciousness or inert *(jaḍa)*, is ultimately real. While the Advaita-Vedāntin thus *asserts* and yet asserts nothing in particular, these Buddists *rise above all assertion* and, therefore, above all particular assertions.[1] While the Advaita-Vedāntin would still just assert, i.e. assert the bare fact of assertion, and absolutely nothing else, for the Buddhists there is no assertion even of this mere fact of assertion. Both the Advaita-Vedāntin and the Buddhist are viewing things from a meta level, but while the former still asserts his being at the meta level as one of the competing beings, though ultimately the only victorious being, the Buddhists would in no way seek to coordinate it with anything else at the lower level. He needs no assertion except what is provisionally needed to silence others, and he feels no urge even to assert this is neutrality, this transcendence.

If this is the story of the Advaita-Vedāntins and the Buddhists, the case of the Śaivas and allied philosophers[2] we have been studying is quite different, even though with them too consciousness is the only basic reality. Consciousness—we mean one and the same consciousness—is, according to them, as much substantive as act, function or power: one and the same ultimate consciousness stands in one phase as substantive self and in another as functional consciousness, i.e. as consciousness-act. It is the great *Ātman (Śiva)* that asserts itself and asserts too that this meta position is the ultimate truth. They draw a further distinction: they hold that though functional consciousness comes to be evident only when it actually functions it does not come out of nothing, which means that even before this its functional character came into evidence it was dormant (latent) in the substantive consciousness. This we studied thoroughly in Chapter II. Everywhere a power

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[1] Whatever in their philosophy they appear to assert has only that much of validity which any day-to-day assertion in the phenomenal world has. See also the last sentence in this paragraph.

[2] Except some extreme Śāktas.

in evidence is but the power as maturing into some actual work in progress, and this implies that before the work started, and even after it is over, the power remained dormant; and where possibly could it remain dormant except in the sbustance—here substantive consciousness—which is said to have that function, power *(śakii)*?

So now let us come back to the main problem that we were tackling. Consciousness, we have said, is subjective just in so far as it reflectively dissociates itself from another thing which latter is, precisely for this reason, i.e. precisely in so far as it is reflectively dissociated from, is called (its) object. What we have earlier[1] called 'referring *sui generis* to' is only another name, or just the obverse side, of this reflective dissociation. They are the two names of the same situation viewed in two different perspectives. It is Y's *withdrawal (dissociation) from Z* just in so far as in that process Y is looking inward, i.e. away from Z. But if in that very process of withdrawal Y had only chosen to look back at what it was withdrawing from, that precisely would be its referring to—and, obviously, this would be reference *sui generis*—what, in other words, is being withdrawn from. Conversely, when Z is being referred to *sui generis* by Y, it is Y's refusal to be forcibly turned toward Z by that Z; and resisting such force and yet referring would amount as much to withdrawing from Z as, at the same time, looking askance at it. The philosophers we are considering here thus speak of negative and positive freedom—freedom from and freedom to—simultaneously and, that way, assess the situation more integrally than either the Advaita-Vedāntins, the Sāṁkhists (as Sāṁkhya is ordinarily interpreted[2]) and the Buddhists on the one hand or Kant and Husserl on the other. While the former of these two groups lay all the emphasis on withdrawl, attaching at most some derivative importance to reference *sui generis*, as in their concept of *sākṣitā*, the latter group is, from the beginning to the end, dominatnly for this reference *sui generis*—in their language, a *priori* anticipation, a *priori* possible objects, intention, essence, etc.— ; and if they have also spoken of withdrawal, a *priori* attitude (as distinct from being affected empirically), *epoche*, reduction, etc., that is all for rendering the concepts of intention, forward-lookingness, anticipation, etc. more intelligible. Simultaneous backward and forward movement was unknown to both these groups of thinkers. In the West, it is generally Hegel and the Hegelians and—among other recent thinkers—Royce, Alexander and existentialists of different brands who have spoken of this double traffic at every step. This double-traffic philosophy is integralism in some form or other. Śaivism is integral philosophy in still another sense[1] we have already discussed. It is that, for it, consciousness is both substantive and function, and also that even before that functional consciousness is evident in its obvert activity—and also after it has ceased to be so evident—it remains non-manifestly imbedded in substantive consciousness.

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[1] *Vide* Chap. I

[2] Many believe that even Advaita-Vedānta, as it was propounded by Śaṅkara and his immediate associates and disciples and even earlier by Gauḍapāda, is not as it is popularly understood to be.

The most interesting point to note in this connexion is that the subject-object distinction is no once-for-all accomplished affair at any particular stage of dissociation. If the subject is what reflectively dissociates itself from another thing and if the object is *that* another thing dissociated from, then this distinction continues through various stages and sub-stages of dissociation—one may even say, as will be shown presently, through all stages and sub-stages except at two opposite extremes. When A dissociates itself from Z, that does not necessarily mean that it stands there *as A*. It often happens that A dissociates itself through various stages, standing at each stage in an appropriate form. As dissociating itself from Z it first stands as Y, then further dissociating itself from that Z—i.e. proximately dissociating itself from Y—it stands as X ; it stands next as W in further withdrawl from that X, next again as V, next U, and so on, to stand as A only at

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[1] We shall show later that Śaivism is for integral philosophy on various other counts too.

the last stage. From Y to B, what stands at each such stage is both subject, i.e. somehow as *I* (in relation to that which is dissociated from) and object, i.e. somehow as *it*, (in so far as it has to dissociate itself further). In the last chapter we have already demonstrated this—and that quite sufficiently—in connexion with (i) the perceived body which somehow, though in its lowest form, is *I* in contrast to dead (inert=*jaḍa*) items of Nature each unambiguously pointed to as *it*, (ii) the felt body which is more subjeetive, i.e. more properly *I*, than the perceived body which latter, in the context of the felt body as *I*, is more of the nature of object, though at the earlier stage it was subject, (iii) sensing *cum* efferent psycho-somatic movements *cum* integration at the animal level, (iv) such integrated presentations as pinpointed, and only that far, dissociated from other things of Nature, and then (v) consciousness as—such dissociating itself, through various sub-stages, from how it had stood fused with natural items—physiological, psycho-somatic and psychic (mental). All these we discussed in connexion with our study of the *aśuddha-tattva*s. Each of these twentythree Sāṁkhya *tattva*s, from *śthūla-bhūta*s to *buddhi*, is subject in relation to the *tattva* that is immediately lower and therefore also to those that are still lower, and yet each is object in relation to the *tattva* that is immediately higher and therefore also to those that are still higher. As for the Śaiva and kindered systems which we dissussed still earlier, all the *tattva*s of the *śuddhāśuddha* region are similarly subjects and objects in relation respectively to the *aśuddha* and the *śuddha* regions, and also among themselves in right relations to one another. And, further, as we noted long back, it is the same story with the *śuddha-tattva*s too ; they are subjects in relation to all the *śuddhāśuddha* and *aśuddha tattva*s, objects in relation to the *tattvātīta* Śiva and Śakti and their interplay, and both subject and object according as they stand to one another.

I have known of only one philosopher, K.C. Bhattacharya, who, in his monograph *Subject As Freedom*[1] has worked out all these details and a few more, all independently and *in modern language*. The few more he has added include, among others at different levels, negations (absences) of various orders, illusions and, conjectured from these last, presentations (contents = perceptual pictures) of independent things that are perceived. Gopinath Kaviraj, with his much wider scholarship in the traditional Indian texts, his infinite intelligence and, what is of greatest importance, his *realization* in the traditional Indian (particularly the Śaiva tantra) line, has, naturally, presented the whole thing as it was sought to be presented in older days by Indian philosophers and *sādhaka*s.

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[1] Vide K.C. Bhattacharya, *Studies in Philosophy*, ed. Gopinath Bhattacharya, published by Progressive Publishers, Calcutta, and the second edition under publication by Motilal Banarsidas, Delhi.

Anyway, the crucial point of the whole study of this progressive self-dissociation from things of Nature—to be precise, from physical, biological, psycho-somatic and psychic affairs—is that when, at the two extreme ends, there is neither any dissociation-of nor any dissociation-from, there is, obviously, no *subject*, and no *object* either. Consciousness, for example, when it has dissociated itself completely from some last sub-stage of *buddhi*—or, better, from *bindu* and stands by itself, i.e. needs no further dissociation, is no longer *subject*: and this follows from the very definition of 'subject'. Neither is it an object any longer to anything else, because there is nothing else to get dissociated from. At this ultimate stage it is sheer consciousness, technically called '*kevala*', no subject (and no object too). It is *cit* (*puruṣa* or Brahman, as the case may be) as *kevala*, not as *sāksin madhyastha*, and *draṣṭṛ*. For it to be *sāksin* is precisely to get itself consciously dissociated from the subtlest object. And if the question of dissociation arises only in the line of ascent, i.e. in one's pilgrimage back to pristine glory, then, corresponding to it in the line of descent, i.e. as itself continuously slipping down through stages of objectivity, there is at every stage the act of reference (the reference that we have called *sui generis*). *Sāksitā* is much this *sui generis* reference as the consciousness of what it is dissociating itself from, and just in so far as that consciousness is dissociated from. *Sāksitā* and the last subjectivity are thus one and the same affair, only viewed as in descent and ascent.

Another name of this process of self-dissociation which pre-

cisely constitutes the subjectivity of consciousness is *śakti* (consciousness as *śakti*). Hence it is because of this *śakti*, and only so far as consciousness has and uses this *śakti*, that it is called also subject = subjcetivity *par excellence*. Because, again, the positive phase, in the line of descent, of this dissociation is reference *sui generis*, this latter too is understood as subjectivity *par excellence*. We have already seen how Kant mostly, and Husserl in a greater measure, understands the subjectivity of consiousness as this intrinsic reference-function, called *a priori* anticipation or intending essences. We have also seen how, on the other hand, the Advaita-Vedāntins have relied more on the self-dissociation of consciousness from everything else. The Śaivas and the philosophers we are studying through these pages hold, however, as against Kant, Husserl and the Advaita-Vedāntins, that the subjectivity of consciousness consists as much in dissociation as in intrinsic foward-looking reference, the only difference btween the two attitudes lying in whether it is in the line of ascent or in that of descent. Not that Kant and Husserl have denied or overlooked dissociation nor the Advaita-Vadāntin the intrinsic reference. They have admitted it—the former dissociation and the latter the reference. But, definitely, they have subordinated these aspects, and subordinated them so much that while Kant and Husserl found themselves in difficulty whenever the question veered round consciousness *by itself*—in effect, consciousness as dissociation, i.e. subjectivity—the Advaita-Vedāntin—has been forced, though evidently with considerable reluctance, to reject the intrinsic-reference side altogether. Our philosophers, on the other hand, recognise both the aspects squarely and call both by the same name *ādi* (*parā*)—*śakti* = *vimarśa*. It is *vimarśa* which renders consciousness-as-such subjective, both as withdrawing itself, in the line of ascent, from everything else and as referring *sui generis* to, i.e. anticipating objects *a priori*, in all *possible* forms, right from object-in-general (the great *Idam*) down to the *mahābhūta*s—and, if one likes, beyond even either, i.e. to consciousness-as-such (*Śiva*) on one side and anticipated ordinary items (i.e. in the form of universals) of Nature on the other. For Śaivism, consciousness-as-such, i.e. Śiva-as-such, is called *anuttra*.

Consciousness, as such, which is thus beyond being even subject, is not therefore *I*. *You* and *he* that I call subject or self is no *actual I* to me. To me the only actual *I* is I myself. Others are only possible *I*s, the consciousness which they, in turn, *would* call *I*. Consciousness as such is thus only *possible I*, one that is ever capable of being actual *I*, i.e. capable of actually appearing as *I*, uniquely to everyone, to every unit of consciousness (every *aṇu*), and equally to the grand comprehensive (*vibhu*) consciousness, called Śiva (or Brahman, in the Vedāntic language). And not only that, for any philosopher who thus draws a line of distinction[1] between consciousness as such and subjectivity = explicit I-ness—for any such philosopher, consciousness as such, i.e. without this explicit *I*-ness, or comprehending it as latent (non-functioning) in its bosom, is perforce to be understood as one, universal and comperhending all possible consciousness-centres, unless, of course, it is the Pātañjala God, i.e. just one among the many consciousness-centres, though of all-round infinite capacities. But even this Pātañjala God is not without explicit subjectivity. This God is, from the beginning, and throughout, conscious of itself as *I*.

So, the main reason why the *anuttara* Śiva is the one ultimate comprehensive consciousness is that it has not yet developed into any form of *I*—in plain language, not yet become a self-conscious *subject*. And, as we have seen in Chapter II, immediately as at the stage of *parā vāk śakti* comes into explicit play as *vimarśa* it posits—of course of its own necessity, i.e. not compelled by anything else, and, therefore, in no way, compromising its absolute freedom—other subjects (they are all *aṇus*) on the one hand and the entire world as object-in-general (*paśyantī vāk*) on the other.

The Śaivas agree with the Advaita-Vedāntins in admitting this *anuttara* mere consciousness, beyond all subject-object distinction and one without a second, as the *ultimate* reality. Even this 'oneness' is largely a misnomer. The *anuttara* (ultimate) is certainly 'one' *in contrast* with the manyness of the things from which it has dissociated itself. But the *anuttara* as such is beyond this relative oneness. It just *is*; and in a way the matter would have ended there had it not, as we have already noted, retained in its bosom the *possibility* of the many coming out of itself. *Mahāmāyā* or *bindu* is only the second spurt of *parā śakti* which when it first emerged in the form of reference *sui generis* referred, in the way of *vimarśa*, to the *anuttara* itself. At its next turn, in the form of *mahāmāyā*, it refers—again, *sui generis*—to the 'object-in-general' (*Idam*) on the one hand and to the *aṇus*, i.e. the many units of consciousness, on the other.

As neither one (nor many) nor subject (nor object), the ultimate is just consciousness. This is one extreme. And, on the other hand, the process of self-dissociation started at the gross level of Nature—the Nature, as we have said, that consists only of dead matter in space and time. This other extreme too, this gross Nature *in itself*, is as much beyond objectivity as consciousness-in-itself is beyond all subjectivity. Exactly, again, as consciousness-in-itself is as much beyond subjectivity as also to be understood in that language so is the case with gross Nature too: it is as much beyond objectivity as also the most primal object. (Might be, its manyness also could be treated in the same way). Both consciousness-in-itself and (gross) Nature-in-itself are just things (realities), though one of them, viz. consciousness, behaves *also* as subject and the other, viz. Nature, behaves also as object. This understanding goes a long way to settle the long-standing dispute between the idealists (subjectivists) and realists (objectivists). At least, it settles one problem, viz. whether Nature-in-itself, on the one hand, and consciousness-in-itself on the other can be known, i.e. directly apprehended as real: if they themselves behave as *subject* and *object* in addtion to their being just themselves, it would follow that they are *known* too in these two ways—consciousness as subject and Nature as object. And, further—and that is more important—if except for this their additional behaviour as subject and object they are otherwise neutral *things*, and still further, if consciousness-in-itself is, as we have already seen, beyond one-many distinction and if the same thing can (most probably) be said of Nature-in-itself too, there appears to be sufficient ground for holding that consciousness and Nature, *considered by themselves*, are one and the same thing[1]—Śiva, by itself a śava (dead, inert), at both the extreme ends, getting enlivened by Śakti, at one end, as subject (i.e. either dissociating itself from or intrinsically referring to) and, at the other end, as object (i.e. either dtssociated from or intrinscially referred to). Only in this way, through the instrumentation of Śakti does *śava* Śiva turn into the living Śiva.

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[1] It is distinction only, no separation, and even then, as noted language, the relation between the substantive self (consciousness as such) and subjectivity is subtler than the Hegelian identity-in-difference.

The most important point to note in this connexion is that consciousness's dissociating itself from Nature (through different stages and sub-stages) is absolutely the same thing as its intrinsic reference to that Nature (through exactly those stages and sub-stages): only the direction is reversed at each stage and sub-stage. And, similarly with Nature being what is dissociated from and referred to. Each is absolutely the same as the other, only moving in two opposite directions. Moving in the direction of 'referring to', it is anticipation, intention, construction or creation (*sṛṣṭi*); on the other hand, as the process of dissociation the same thing is 'taking back into itself,' collecting back, sublimation, destruction or rejection (*upasaṁhāra* or *saṁhāra*). Only, 'destruction' or 'rejection' means nothing more than destorying or rejecting its *autonomy*, not destroying the content itself; the autonomy of the content is rejected through vorious stages and sub-stages, exactly as what happens when *śabda* withdraws itself from the *vaikharī* stage (stage of autonomous object and obvert sound as things over there and *knowable*), through *madhyamā* and *paśyantī* stages and their sub-stages (where objects spoken, anticipated, constructed, etc. alternate in diminishing

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[1] Vide Kant's suggestion that the thing-in-itself might be an Idea of Reason.

prominence with subjective speaking, anticipating, constructing, etc.), to the stage called *parā* (where it is all sheer speak*ing* = subjective awaraness, sheer anticipat*ing*, construct*ing* etc., without there being any explicit content, however thin, that is spoken, anticipated, constructed, etc., the contents having all merged in the subjective act, and, therefore, understood as always capable of developing out of that subjective act). *Saṁhāra* or *upasaṁhāra*, thus, do not mean rejection or annihilation. Annihilation is destruction of what is real, while rejection is throwing away what, not being genuinely real, only appeared to be real before it was thrown away. Whatever, through ascending stages and sub-stages of *sādhana*, is progressively withdrawn from is, at every such stage and sub-stage of withdrawal, understood as what was really (genuinely) intended, constructed, created (out of itself), i.e. referred *sui generis* to, by the same subject before it was sought to be dissociated from. This 'before' is as much a temporal as simply a logical 'before'—temporal, because there was the content present there when the *sādhaka* began dissociation and non-temporal, i.e. logically 'before', because the content is relized, in the same act of dissociation, as what not only was but also is being constructed, intended, referred to *sui generis*, by the very same subjective consciousness.

This is the integral consciousness of the Śaivas as distinct from the non-integral, and to that extent abstract, consciousnsss of the Advaita-Vedāntins. A few lines back, while distinguishing between annihilation and rejection we distinguished between what is and what is not *genuinely* real; annihilation, we said, is doing away with what is genuinely real and rejection with what is not genuinely real. Obviously, by 'ingenuinely real', we meant what is *false*, like the snake in the locus of a rope;[1] to be more explicit, we meant what, though experienced as real before rejection, is, after that rejection, experienced as what was never real, what could never have been real, before that rejection; and that it (viz. what I experienced before rejection) is never real after the rejection is a foregone conclusion. So, the snake in question *was* ingenuinely real—real because before rejection it was experienced as real (and the experience was not *then* contradicted), but ingenuine because we know now that it could not have been real (even) then.

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[1] We have been speaking throughout of *direct* experience (actual or possible) and, therefore, in the case of error, its direct form, usually called illusion, meaning error as direct presentation.

Now, when we were distinguishing between annihilation and rejection our main point was to distinguish from both these quite another state of affairs, viz. 'collecting back as re-absorbed' (*upasaṁhāra*). We contended that it not only is a *possible* state of affairs, it is the only (desirable) state of affairs in the Śaiva (and similar other) spiritual pursuit(s). The Śaivas hold that in dissociation proper which, as we have shown, is the same thing as *sui generis* anticipation (construction or phenomenological intention), whatever is dissociated from continues in being, even after that dissociation, as phenomenologically intended, i.e. wound up in a latent form within that consciousness; and it was so even before that dissociation. What lends strength to this Śaiva view is that otherwise dissociation and *sui generis* reference (i.e. phenomenological intention = *sṛṣṭi*) could not have been one and the same thing.

Here precisely lies the central distinction between integral spiritual thinkers like the Śaivas on the one hand and the Advaita-Vedāntins on the other. These latter too, in their genuine spiritual pursuit, have indeed understood dissociation differently from annihilation and, of cource, also from merely standing aside (an alternative which, being sheer escapism, we have not cared to consider). But they have never cared to consider the Śaiva alternative of reabsorption (which is as good as eternal transcendental creation). They have rather opted for the only alternative left, viz. rejection, and accordingly cosidered not only gross Nature (the last *object*) but everything beginning from that right up to the highest (sublest) *subject* as all illusion—as what never was, nor now is nor ever will be real. For them, the only reality is consciousness-by-itself which, because it is beyond all subject-object and one-many distinction, is neutral, that way. The absolute is, for them, thus, both *sat* and *cit*. Again, once it has transcended the last subjectivity it has, because it had long ago transcended gross Nature too as the terminal *object*, proved by now to be ubiquitous, as much covering whatever may be called subject as whatever is object too. Add now to this the simple logic that if A rejects an illusion B then for *it* to *assert* that it has rejected B, much like anybody else to assert this—this assertion, this proposition, viz. that B is an illusion—has to be rejected equally, though this time as sheer nonsense from the metalinguistic point of view[1] (*vide* Gauḍapāda)—add this, and we have the Advaita-Vedāntic philosophy in the proper perspective: the ultimate reality is ubiquitous consciousness as such and absolutely neutral about all subject-object and one-many distinctions. This, they contend, is no escapism, nor any truncated form of transcendentalism. For not only before right initiation in Vedāntic pursuit the neophyte has to perform *all* the social duties normally required of any good citizen, but also when, further, his cherished withdrawal process is completed what he gets—rather becomes or, better, discovers himself to have been all along—is, as we have seen, the ubiquitous and, at least that way, the full, perfect (*pūrṇa*) reality, the Absolute. The fact that he rejects the whole world—rejects, in effect, everything except the ultimate reality which he calls Brahman—does not deter him in the least from laying claim to *pūrṇatā*, for he contends that if he has rejected everything else this is because everything else is all illusion and that if it had, or even has, any reality at the core this reality is precisely his 'Brahman'.

That way the Advaita-Vedāntin's stand is not unjustified: But the whole question is: Why should that which is dissociated from be dismissed as *all* an illusion? If what is to be extracted through such dissociation is the *essence* of what was experienced before that dissociation, then, first, why could not the essence be extracted all at once, and, secondly, if it is only progressively extracted through stages and sub-stages, did not then the content extracted at each such stage or sub-stage *appear* at least to be the essence (and, therefore, ultimately real) even though that appearance came forthwhith to be rejected at the next stage (or sub-stage) of dissociation? But, then, how to be assured that the genuine essence has been extracted? Is one assured of this only when no further dissociation is possible? But, then, may not this impossibility of further dissociation be just an appearance to be dismissed later by another dissociation? How, in other words, should one be *assured* that final dissociation is arrived at? Such questions may go on pestering the Advaita-Vedāntins continuously.

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[1] Some Advaita-Vedāntins have unnecessarily complicated the issue by holding that this association is, itself too, as *erroneous* as everything else in the phenomenal world of objects and, therefore, itself an *illusory phenomenon*.

The Śaivas and the like-minded philosophers, on the other hand, have not to face such questions. They do not run after the final *essence*. True, their method of procedure is the same, viz. dissociation, better, reflective dissociation. But if any such Śaiva dissociates himself and goes on dissociating and dissociating, that is not for finding out any *essence* of the situation withdrawn from but just to have a proper view of that situation (from a distance). And what he, that way, discovers at every stage and sub-stage of dissociation is that the situation was not as *autonomous*, as *independent* of him, the conscious agent, i.e. of his consciousness, as it appeared to be. As we have already shown, phenomenologically he had intended—in Kant's language, anticipated *a prior* and, in common language, constructed, created—everything of it, if only we extend Kantianism, beyond even the Neo-Kantian proliferation of categories as possible objects, to *all* features of the items of Nature, 'intending' even the feature called their particularity.[1] What, in effect, he discovers through such reflective dissociation is only that the situation dissociated from is not really—and, therefore, never was—independent of his *consciousness*. What comes to be rejected is only this independence, this auto-

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[1] Vide Chapter I. Dispositions begotten of activities in previous cycles of life do indeed play an important part here, but that is only for the choice, on particular occasions, of such features, not for the features themselves.

nomy, of Nature, not any of its features, including even the particularity of its particular items. The Śaiva is also prepared to admit that even this *apparent independence*, this illusion as illusion, is *intended*, though here in the lone context of a *particular* unit of consciousness viz. of one who is under the illusion,[1] and only through that unit. As regards other features of Nature, they are intended primarily by universal consciousness.

So, if in Śaivism all features of Nature, including even its gross physicality, are phenomenologically constructed, there is no question, so far, of denying any of these features as features. The most— and also the least—that is needed is that none of these features be understood hence-forward as autonomous, i.e. independent of consciousness; and this, in turn, means that if in the forward-looking intention, construction, etc. all these features[2] come forth from consciousness itself, in dissociation they must be bought back into the same consciousness, to remain there as latent, non-manifest. *Pariṇāma* need not give way to *vivarta*, as this latter has normally been understood in later Sanskrit literature. There need be no role of *ajñāna* in the forward-looking behaviour of consciousness, no illusion involved anywhere so far. And, even where that distorting function, *ajñāna*, comes into play, it and all the distortions it works out are recognised as there—*ajñāna* as a real principle of distortion and what it works out as *really* there though as false, not anything that is zero.

As a matter of fact, except the Advaita-Vedāntins no philosopher has ever, anywhere in the world, that way rejected 'everything except consciousness' as absolute naught, unless 'naught' means the vacuum of self-negation (self-stultification) that is needed—say, for a split second, if the process of construction is to be understood as a temporal one—for pushing the latent possibilities out of itself. For these Advaita-Vedāntins,

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[1] This is what lies at the root of Husserl's notion of 'bracketed Nature'. If in spite of that this bracketed Nature is sought to be understood in the Kantian language of thing-in-itself, we have seen how this latter too can be identified with consciousness-in-itself; and Kant would not very much object to that.

[2] And, these features may well be called 'contents'.

ajñāna or *māyā* is itself ultimately naught; whereas for our Śaivas and like-minded philosophers *māyā* is a real *śakti*, though for presenting intentions of consciousness as non-conscious (*jaḍa*). *Māyā* is but *mahāmāyā* or *bindu* itself, only more concretely operative —this time positing what is a function of consciousness as non-conscious. For these Śaivas there is no cover involved even here: what happens here is that consciousness, just concealing its conscious character (*tirodhāna-śakti*), presents *itself* as non-conscious (*jaḍa*), and all this wilfully as it were. For, were it not so, how possibly could the same *māyā* also free one out of the same catastrophe? If you wilfully distort something it is no case of error, unless of course it is intended to deceive *others* for whom, of course, that distortion would certainly be a false presentation. But *māyā*, for these Śaivas, is operating only in the locus of an individual unit centre of consciousness, and for that particular unit centre only. *Māyika-mala* presupposes *āṇava-mala*. This means that there is no question of error till now. Error arises only when this non-conscious (*jaḍa*) presentation is, in the natural non-dissociational attitude (in plain language, without any exercise of *vairāgya*=non-attachment=conscious disinterestedness), is sought to be, and often is, as a matter of fact, identified with consciousness,[1] i.e. when *buddhi*, *ahaṁkāra*, *indriyas* and *bhūtas*—in short, the full living human body and its constituents—are believed to be the conscious self. So far with the Śaiva doctrine of *māyā*. Error proper they connect with *ajñāna* which is just one function of *māyā*—in Sāṁkhya, one of the darker *bhāvas* of *buddhi* and in Śaivism, only one moment of *māyā*, the other moment being just its opposite. In fact, *māyā* is as much a principle of *śuddhatā*, i.e. *sattva*, as one of *aśuddhatā*, i.e. *tamas*.[2] '*Āṇava-mala*' means that the universality—the cosmic oneness—of consciousness has remained concealed, i.e. shrunk into an individual unit centre; and '*māyika-mala*' means that its conscious character, having concealed itself, presents itself as something non-conscious over there and, therefore, as not even seeking to dissociate itself—in short, not even subjective. So far, there is no question of error. It is a sort of Hegelian dialectic in operation downwards (and, as much for the Śaivas as for Hegel, it is the very same process, the same dialectic, that moves upward too). So far there is no question of error. Error occurs, as we have just seen, only when the non-conscious, as unambiguously non-dissociating, is (mis-) taken as consciousness. This, indeed, is all about the basic metaphysical error; and, as in all systems of Indian philosophy, here too all ordinary mundane errors of direct experience are sought to be understood in the image of the basic mataphysical error.

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Not that the Advaita-Vedāntic possibility is totally discounted in the philosophy under consideration. Our philosophers distinguish between *sādhana* and *yoga* and hold that while the Advaita-Vedāntins stop with *sādhana*, leaving everything else happening to God or to chance, our philosophers insist on *yoga* which, according to them, is richer in content, more virile and creative and as comprehensive as anything could be —in short, at least more *Pūrṇa*=perfect, if not wholly so. Of the many distinctions between *sādhana* and *yoga* one that is very important is that *sādhana* is an exercise in reflective dissociation without it being seen that this backward-moving dissociation is equally an appropriate forward-looking projection, intention or construction. That means that it is not even dissociation proper, not deep enough for any genuine spiritual enlightenment, but only a half-way halt. Some stage of consciousness as subjectivity is certainly attained, but that is all. There is not even the necessary urge to dissociate oneself from *this stage*, let alone re-visualising the already-left object, in a forward-looking attitude, as phenomenologically constructed. If there is no spontaneous urge for further dissociation, this is because there is no possibility left of viewing the dissociation (subjectivity) attained as still an object. Unless the subjectivity attained at the first effort to dissociate oneself is viewed again as object, there is no possible urge to get dissociated from it too; but it could be viewed as object if and only if it, i.e. the subjectivity concerned, were itself viewed as a phenomenological object = essence immediately as it was attained. The *sādhaka's* attitude is never forward-looking, it is merely recessive; and yet, as just seen, it cannot go on receding—of itself, it can at the most move one step backward. If, as a matter of fact, it sometimes moves several more steps, this happens either by chance (another way of saying which is that it is due to what much the *sādhaka* in question had regressed in the previous cycle of his life or, may be, to some good deeds done at that cycle) or because some *guru* (or, as we shall presently see, some *yogin*) or, for whatever reason, God himself or some deity presiding over the stages of dissociation the *sādhaka* had reached pushes him on or takes him along further and further stages of dissociation. There is always a danger for the *sādhaka* that (unless helped that way by others) he may get bogged down in whatever stage he has come (better, has been brought) to. And, that danger amounts virtually to death at that stage, absolute immobility at and out of it. Not only that, even at the very first stage of withdrawl he loses himself completely at the particular grade of subjectivity arrived at, unless, of course, he is helped by others: he gets completely identified with it. True, spiritual dissociation—what, in other words, is called self-dissociation, as distinct from dissociating one other thing from another—is almost by definition, reflective, i.e. self-consciousness. Yet, however, for the *sādhaka*, this reflection is no reflective awareness of anything else as object, not even of itself as an *object*. If it is self-conscious, what it all means is that it is incandescent; and if other incandescent things are not called self-conscious, that is because they are not consciousness itself. Self-consciousness means, for them, nothing but *consciousness* as

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[1] The Śaivas hold, indeed, that *anātmani ātmadarśanam* is no error. According to them it is rather the correct phenomenological attitude. But then this is possible only for a spiritual aspirant who is practising *vairāgya* or dissociation.

[2] *Rajas* constitutes only its dynamism in the field of *jaḍa Nature*—dynamism as much of dragging down as of raising up.

incandescent. Thus, for these *sādhaka*s there is at any stage nothing but consciousness at whatever grade of self-dissociation, nothing but subjectivity of some grade; and it is not even known whether that consciousness is an individual unit-centre (*aṇu*). Nor is it ever felt that the *aṇu* unit of consciousness which the *sādhaka* remains in, i.e. stands unified with, consciousness, whether *aṇu* or cosmically universal. There is no awareness of individuality anywhere, which precisely is meant when the Śaivas and the philosophers of kindred attitude complain that the Advaita-Vedāntic *sādhaka* gets *lost* at whatever stage of subjectivity he arrives at or is brought to—at least at the last stage that coincides with the consciousness-by-itself.

The Advaita-Vedāntic consciousness-in-itself, called Brahman, is indeed *pūrṇa* = perfect in the sense that it is *all* that there is. And, indeed, it is all, but it is so only *because there is nothing else*, everything else, even the very otherness itself, being rejected as false and, therefore, being *as such* nothing, not only now but even before the correction and assuredly ever afterwards. It is not even true that when one such particular is so rejected there is and was, and therefore will be, another particular occupying its locus; this cannot be said because whatever is speakable of that particular is, for the Advaita-Vedānta, speakable of every other particular.

In this sense the Advaita-Vedāntin's consciousness-in-itself is assuredly *pūrṇa*. But the *yogin's* consciousness-in-itself is *pūrṇa* in a richer sense. For him, as we have seen, nothing, except what is posited by *ajñāna* which has scope only at the level of *buddhi*, is rejected; and even when this last is rejected, that rejection itself as an affair is, after all, unhesitatingly accepted as real, meaning, in effect, that there being an illusion is, after all, a fact. Error, according to the Śaiva *yogin*, is a diversion permitted to a free agent like man.

This, however, is not the only sense in which the *yogin's* ultimate consciousness is genuinely *pūrṇa* = perfect. For this is admitted equally by the non-Advaitic Vedāntins who yet do not allow the virile type of *yoga* as an actively forward-looking construction in addition to, rather *pari passu* with, dissociation. Again, our *yogin* is ahead of the *sādhaka* not only in this respect but also because—what we have already seen—he is in no need of any *guru* or deity or even God himself for continuous push or guidance forward. He is fully aware from the beginning that reflective dissociation in the backward direction is the same thing as phenomenological construction in the forward direction: and this his own starting realization prompts him, from the beginning till the terminal point of dissociation, to suspect that whatever stage or sub-stage of subjectivity he arrives at through dissociation is itself also object to be again dissociated from. So, from the beginning to the end it is all his own effort. He goes on fighting and conquering. If he has receded, he knows also how to re-create what he has receded from, and at every step of recession he re-creates the object receded from. His recession, thus, is neither cowardly escapism as of false spritualists, nor mere dissociation as of the Advaita-Vedāntic *sādhaka*, nor even continuous dissociation inspired all through by some *guru*, deity or God, nor some *ad hoc* bestowal, by some such external agency, of some advanced stage of dissociation on such *sādhaka*s—may be, because they deserve it. It is all his own struggle, as much withdrawal as, in that very process of withdrawal, re-creation too; and, because of this continuous struggle for progress through conquest—though certainly that involves, to as good a length as conceivable, dissociation too—he is neither in any need of *guru* or deity or God, nor likely to get stuck up at any stage of ascent nor lose his identity anywhere, not even at the *tattvātīta* stage and, what is more, even when he stands identified with *anuttara* Śiva. His *aṇutva*, like whatever else he brings with him, stands retained (*upasaṁhṛta*)—in the latter in double, treble or even higher-potential latency—in the *anuttara*; which, again, in its turn, means that in the very same stage of *upsaṁhāra* these all get re-created too (in philosophical language, re-constructed, phenomenologically intended). This is everywhere the meaning of 'possibility'. A possibility is always as much in that in which it resides latently as also

tending to come out continuously, i.e. always *possibly* brought into being, always in possible creation. Such 'possible creation', another name of which is 'perpetual creation', is exactly what we have meant throughout by 'phenomenological intention', '*a priori* anticipation', 'construction', etc.

The absolute consciousness that the *yogin*, as distinct from what the *sādhaka* attains is in this sense more integral and, therefore, fuller, *pūrṇatara*, more perfect than what even the best of the *sādhaka*s, aided by *yogins*, deities or God, is capable of attaining. If the expressions '*pūrṇatara*' and 'more perfect' are disallowed as self-contradictory—at least grammatically untenable—we shall be compelled to say that the Brahman of the Advaita-Vedāntin is not *pūrṇa*, not perfect.

Let us discuss in brief a few note-worthy points in this connexion:

(i) The Absolute of all other Vedāntins, including even the Mādhvas,[1] ('other' meaning other than the Advaita-Vedāntins) is, we know, fuller, richer, than that of these Advaita-Vedāntins; and yet so few of the former (practically none) introduced *yoga* as distinct from *sādhana*. For them, dissosiation, rather than intention, has been the method of approach. How possibly, then, could their Absolute be fuller in content?

We reply, this has been possible because in very most of these systems God is mataphysically more important than the *sādhaka* and the *sādhaka* is not identified, whether in the Advaita-Vedāntic or in the Śaiva[2] line, with that Absolute which is oftener than not the same thing as God. Conscious that there *sādhana* would not take the spiritual aspirant a single step beyond the first act of dissociation, all these philosophers have held, as we have seen, that the aspirant is guided till the end by one who is a better adept and ultimately by God himself. But this is not the only redeeming feature of these systems. They add that one has to *surrender* to God either at the very start or as soon as possible after that, and this he is required to do not merely to be pushed (or, in milder terms, pulled) continuously along the line of dissociation but equally, if not more importantly, to have continuously a vision of that God as the fullest, the richest, perfect consciousness, whether as retaining within himself everything else in a germinal form or as displaying them more expressedly or a little vicariously as in Mādhva philosophy. And, those who hold that this God is *antaryāmin* have opted for sort of identity with the minimum of difference.

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[1] The Mādhvas are, undoubtedly, dualists. Yet, even with them, as we have already noted, all *tattva*s other than God are, so far as their *offices* are concerned, dependent *wholly* on God.

[2] Obviously, we mean Advaita-Śiva lines.

(ii) Lest some object that in these pages we are using the terms '*sādhana*' and '*yoga*' in quite unusual senses, let us in our defence say, first, that we are not in the least interested in any verbal duel and, secondly, that while the term '*sādhana*'[1] has invariably been used in the sense of reflective dissociation coupled with remaining engrossed in the subjective stage or sub-stage arrived at—at lower stages, of course, with some objective vision intended only to be dissociated from—(while the word '*sādhana*' is always used in this sense) the word '*yoga*' has at least often been used in the sense of some positive approach to some *tattva*, and ultimately to the supreme *tattva*, though somehow, of course, through that negative approach, *sādhana*. This explains the common practice of deriving the term '*yoga*' from the root '*yuj*' meaning *to connect*.

Whatever that may be, even the classical use of term '*yoga*' in Patañjali's *Yogasūtra* and its further explication in several other *sūtras*, confirm our point. '*cittavṛttinirodha*' means the exercise to see that no pinpointed *I*-state at the *buddhi* level

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1. The word '*sādhana*', in quite another context, means of course, scrupulous observance of rituals for the attainment of something—some mundane or spiritual power or even the ultimate object of human life. But when the word is used for any spiritual effort in the form of direct enlightenment on the truth of my life it is used invariably in the sense of reflectively dissociating myself from whatever is presented over against me as object.

arises—meaning, in effect, that we refuse to be acted upon by Nature that confronts us either as objects outside or as traces or dispositions stored in our 'natural' mind; and, according to Patañjali, the purpose of this *cittavṛttinirodha* is *draṣṭuḥ svarūpe' vasthānam*, meaning that the *draṣṭā* gets installed in its own being, *kaivalya*, which is beyond even the last stage of reflective dissociation called *prasaṁkhyāna*, beyond even the last stage of subjectivity. But what, for Patañjali, is this *draṣṭā*? Is it the unsullied *puruṣa*, or the sullied one that operates only as fused with some *vṛtti*s at the *buddhi* stage (and, maybe, even below it)? Were it the sullied *puruṣa* we should not have found Patañjali calling *puruṣa draṣṭā* even in the express context of unsullied *puruṣa*; and lest this be understood, as it has been by many sub-commentators,[1] as Patañjali's loose use of the term '*draṣṭā*', we refer the reader to the famous Sāṁkhya *kārikā* where *puruṣa* has been unequivocally described as *kevala, sākṣin, madhyastha* and *draṣṭā*. Īśvarakṛṣṇa, explicitly set on describing and justifying the Sāṁkhya *tattva*s and allied subjects as briefly and pointedly as possible, could not have added, in that pithy *kārikā*, the words '*sākṣin*', '*madhyastha*' and '*draṣṭā*' carelessly or as a matter of flourish; and what he meant by each of these expressions has been rendered amply clear in the earliest available commentary on *Sāṁkhyakārikā*, known as *Yuktidīpikā*. We need not expatiate on this point any further. We have already discussed it in an earlier chapter.

So, what Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Patañjali mean is that at the end of the *yoga* process, where consciousness is had in itself, i.e. apart even from the last stage of dissociation (dissociation, or the dissociate, as subjectivity being throughout, and till its highest stage, an affair of *buddhi*)—in other words, where it is had as *kevala*—even there it is also had as *drastā*,[2] *madhyastha* and

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1. Never by the *bhāṣyakāra* Vyāsa.
2. Often also called *sākṣin*. While Advaita-Vedānta confines *sākṣitā* to a stage below *kaivalaya* (in its language, *kauṭasthya*), Sāṁkhya-yoga would not do that. The Sāṁkhya distinction between *draṣṭā*, *madhyastha* and *sākṣin* we deliberately leave undiscussed here.

sākṣin. What all these three terms mean is that consciousness-in-itself, continuing to be in-itself, i.e. without in the least prejudicing its *kaivalya*, yet goes on looking forward to, intrinsically referring to, intending phenomenologically, i.e. continually re-creating in the form of *a priori* anticipation. Of course, in Sāṁkhya-Yoga all this happens without forfeiting in the least *pradhāna's* getting changed, simultaneously with the *puruṣa's* anticipative construction, precisely into those *tattvas* which the *puruṣa* is anticipating, the two processes running only parallelly and neither in any way affecting, or changing into, the other.

So, if even at the fag end of the *yogic* practice there could be this forward-lookingness, this richness of content, it is no wonder that at every lower stage of *yoga* there is similar, i.e. commensurate, forward-looking *a priori* richness. *Yoga*, even as Patañjali understands it, is thus integral, tending toward fulness of content, as much posited *a priori*, i.e. phenomenologically intended, as dissociated from. The given content, the object dissociated from is, precisely in the same act of dissociation re-created, though this time ideally—exactly as the phenomenologists understand it.

It is true that Patañjali's *yoga* is a part of a wider process called *sādhana*. *Yoga*, according to him, begins where *sādhana* turns from external (*vahiraṅga*) to internal (*antaraṅga*). It begins with *dhāraṇā*, and through *dhyāna* it passes to different sub-stages of *samādhi*. All this is true. But exactly from the stage of *dhāraṇā* begins an effort of *sui generis* positing of the object concerned. Every higher stage of *yoga* is clearer and clearer, i.e. more and more reflective, positing of the contents required. Hence *yoga* is rlcher in content than *sādhana* which, by itself, as is evident at the *vahiraṅga* stages, is at most only dissociative.

If in the Bhagavadgītā the word '*yoga*' has been used as a method of realization through will, that is because there, as distinct from what it is in Śaivism, the process of positing-intending-objects *sui generis* by conciousness (consciousness, that way, of course, behaving as subjectivity) has been understood

as a natter of will-construction, no cognitive construction. This is parallel to Kant's distinction between Theoretic Reason as constructive and Practical Reason which is pure will; and the actual objective of this pure will in both the philosophies, viz. as much in the Gītā as in Kantianism, is largely the same, viz. categorical imperative = *niṣkāma*, *nirabhimana karma*, its proliferation in both the philosophies proceeding largely in an identical line and even the final outcome = *phala* or *bhoga* being left, in both the poilosophies, to God's instrumentation.

In this respect Śaivism too has not lagged behind, though this attitude is not so evident in other forms of Indian philosophy except Mahāyāna Buddhism. The Śaivas too have understood '*sui generis* positing of objects'—the *a priori* anticipation = phenomenological intention—as *icchā*sakti, *jñānaśakti* having any scope only *after* (*logically* after, not temporally) the object has been so posited, i.e. to have it as somehow *other than* (over against, as it were), though certainly not as independent of, this positing. This is why so many post-Kantians have uuderstood Kant's second *Critique* as forming the basis of his first *Critique*.

Again, corresponding to Kant's third *Critique*, the Śaivas too have worked out their aesthetics, though in a new line altogether. Aesthesis, according to them—and, indeed, according to most of the Indian thinkers on this line—is a sort of spiritualization, sublimation, purification of our normal emotions, including even gross psycho-somatic pleasure and pain. Only, this sublimated attitude is, for our Indian aestheticians, neither non-cognitive nor non-conative. Rather, sublimated emotions can at all amount to ethereal joy only because (and this we shall presently see) from the phenomenological point of view they brim with spilling fulness *sui generis*. All the contents coming out of them indicate phenomenologically that in themselves too they had contained all the contents; and, as a matter fact, the contents come out—of course, all in a way formally, i.e. *a priori*—only because of the joy of fulness. This is why a man of genuine aesthesis feels, of himself, to be anticipating, in idea at least, i.e. phenomenologically, all the relevant contents and movements in a piece of art. This is so far as *icchāśakti* is operative in this field; and when *kriyāśakti*, following closely upon *jñānaśakti*, comes to operate in addition we have the feats of an actual working artist (as distinct from a connoisseur).

Anyway, *ānanda* is only another name of the experience of fulness—not only the experience of having *all* (relevant) contents *qua* having them but equally at the same time, and in one and the same act, though in the opposite, i.e. forward, direction, projecting them outside, projection and retention thus running concurrently. This is the central Śaiva account of *ānanda*, as much buoyant expansion as the peace of quietude—in fact, the two in one or, better, the two as one. This is admitted equally in Śaiva dualism and Śaiva monism. What, in Śaiva dualism, is admitted as metaphysically other than Śaiva—or, as we move lower down, other than each preceding Śakti—is yet, as we have seen earlier, dependent—even wholly dependent—on it so far as their offices are concerned; and in that respect whatever is true of Śaiva monism is true equally of Śaiva dualism.

The Advaita-Vedāntin too has, it is true, called his Brahman not only *sat* and *cit* but also *ānanda*. If this his '*ānanda*' is attributed to the *pūrṇatā* of Brahman, that will be a too swift and, in fact, a worng account, because his Brahman, we have already seen, is never full (*pūrṇa*) in any *additive* sense. If, on the other hand, this *ānanda* is interpreted as because of, or even the same as, *cit* and/= *sat*, it would at most be the peace of quietude. But, then, one may further ask if this peace is in any way other than the quietude; and is the quietude in question anything more than the simple dissociation from all that is Nature=suffering?[1] May not the so-called *ānanda* of the Advaita-Vedāntin, thus, be nothing more than mere cessation of all suffering? There is nothing so far to show that it is anything more.[2] Sāṁkhya has honestly called it mere cessation of all suffering, and so too has Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. If the Buddhists, specially of the Mahāyāna schools, have called it absolute bliss too, that is because, for them, it is as much *speakable* as that cessation as that *ānanda* in addition. Anyone else not agreeing to designate mere cessation of suffering as also *ānanda* will never feel like calling quietude any form of *ānanda*. *Ānanda*, normally, is not mere *śānti*. Factually, it is something more. There is no denial indeed of this peace of quietude; for dissociation is another name of quietude—the more one successfully dissociates oneself the quieter he is, and proportionately his peace increases. But, then, *ānanda* is something more positive; it is a sort of creative overflow, a buoyant self-expansion of being, the fullest *ānanda* that one has when one is fullest in every respect—in one word, perfect.[1]

A4

The *yogin*, thus, is more perfect, fuller and richer in content, than the *sādhaka*; and exceeding the *sādhaka* in being as much forward-looking by constructive as recessively dissociative, he, unlike the latter, proceeds ever fightingly, ever conqueringly, never in need of any real assistance of any *guru*, deity or God and never in any danger of getting bogged in any *tattva*, not even anywhere in the *śuddha* region—neither in any *mantra*, nor even in *Īśvara*, nor even in *Sadāśiva*. A *sādhaka*, we have seen, cannot proceed a single step beyond the first act of dissociation—and often even this first act does not begin—without the help of some *guru*, deity or God. The *yogin*, on the other hand, being constitutionally forward-looking too, goes on dissociating himself till he finds himself as *tattvātīta mahāmāyā*, in a way beyond even *Sadāśiva*; and he does not even stop with *mahāmāyā*. With the help of dissociation-construction process he passes through *parā śakti*—better, *śiva-śakti-sāmarasya*—to find himself identified with *anuttara Śiva*. And even in that *anuttara* stage he does not stop. Because the *śakti*, absorbed beyond

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[1] This is an accepted equation in all systems of Indian philosophy. We have justified it elsewhere.

[2] Reference to Upaniṣadic passages would be of no special help. For these passages are better intelligible from the Śaiva and Vaiṣṇava points of veiw.

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[1] One is reminded here of the medieval Scholastic concept of *perfection* in Europe.

recognition in that *anuttara*, remains there still as *śakti*, though only potential, i.e. not yet in the form of *vimarśa*, even there it tends ever to come out in that form of *vimarśa*—not indeed as yet in any projective mood but only a turning upon that *anuttara* itself and making it, bluntly speaking, self-conscious. But once it finds itself capable of developing into *vimarśa*, the whole process of forward-looking ideal construction begins anew. The perfect *yogin*, thus, is as much in stable equilibrium because of his identity with *anuttara* as in perpetual ideally-creative flux, ever repeating the whole series and ever undoing that. And, this is his virility, his non-dependence on others. If certain *gurus* or deities or even God himself are found to help him, that is a help unsolicited, or fully earned by the *yogin*, in order that his spiritual adventure is accelerated. For the *yogin*, it is always a spiritual adventure, never a tame pilgrimage. This is why he goes on piercing through every stage, not even stopping with *Īśvara*. He does not stop there because he wants to fathom the mysteries of this Īśvarahood itself: he wants to decipher every principle that constitutes Īśvara and rehearse them himself.

In course of his continuous ascent upward—in our language, continuous dissociation—he not only refuses to be detained at any particular stage, he, out of his never-ceasing virility, drags with him, in his upward ascent, any *sādhaka* that he finds bogged down at any stage. The *yogin* is a born teacher, a born *guru*. But even he cannot educate the *sādhaka* in any forward-looking construction ; he cannot take with him the *sādhaka* in his enlightened sojourn downward. That could be done by one conceivably more powerful than the *yogin*—how, we shall see shortly.

The *sādhka* may get bogged at any stage or sub-stage in his upward journey. But, often with the aid of *gurus* or deities or being led by Īśvara to whom he surrenders he may cross the entire region of *aśuddha tattvas*. If not aided, in very rare cases, by an extraordinarily enlighted *guru* or by God himself, he, having crossed this *aśuddha* region, attains only *pralaya-kaivalya*, i.e. gets merged in *prakṛti* (as is the fate of every

non-liberated *jīva* also at the time of every cosmic dissolution, *mahāpralaya*.). However, if such enlightened *guru* or God intervenes in his favour he may be made to veer round toward consciousness again and get merged into the pure *aṇu* consciousness that he is. This is the *jñāna-kaivalya* of Sāṁkhya. From here too he may proceed further in the upward journey with the help of this or that *mantra*-deity or of God who is *mantreśvara*, and with that help even cross the *śuddhāśuddha* region and get lodged in the region of *śuddhavidyā*. But once lodged there, at any of its stage or sub-stage—and that all depends on which deity has been guiding him[1]—he is to remain there ever afterwards with absolutely no chance of moving further up unless some *yogin* passing that way takes him up along with him. And even then he may not have the strength nough to follow him to the end. He may drop anywhere nd get bogged again. The *sādhaka* who has reached any stage r sub-stage of *śuddhavidyā*, having crossed the *śuddhāśuddha* egion of *māyā*, is said to have attained *vijñāna-kaivalya*. The irile *yogin* proceeds further still and having crossed the *uddha* region itself and landing on the *tattvātīta* region attains *iśuddha-kaivalya* and in that region rehearses, backward and orward and ever afterwards, the entire game that Śiva and akti play between them. He has now become one with Śiva and akti in all their sports. This is the ultimate freedom, absolute uth, the only concrete object of our life. None but a *yogin* n attain it. Such a *yogin* is called *akhaṇḍayogin*, '*akhaṇḍa*' eaning integral, perfect (*pūrṇa*), all-comprehensive.[2]

If, fortunately, he is being guided by *Īśvara* himself he may ultimately find himself identical verily with God, but only in his subjective side, i.e. as ultimate pure subjectivity, viz. *sadāśiva*, but neither in his forward-looking creative side nor, therefore, in his being constituted by all potentialities. This is why many of the Vedāntic systems insist so much on the aphorism *Sṛṣṭisaṁhāravaryam.*

Contrasted to *akhaṇḍayoga* there is *khaṇḍayoga* (and also *khaṇḍamahāyoga*) on the one hand and *akhaṇḍamahāyoga* on the other. *Khaṇḍayoga* means that the *yogin* has not yet attained Śivahood but stands at some lower level. *Khaṇḍamahāyoga* need not be disscussed separately. As for *akhaṇḍamahā-yoga*, we shall presently take it up for consideration.

Yoga, as contradistinguished from *sādhana* is *pūrṇa* in another richer sense. Not only does it re-create, in the sense of phenomenologically intending and experiencing whatever the *yogin* dissociates himself from at whatever stage or sub-stage of spiritual ascent and, therefore, re-create in that sense consciousness-in-itself and this 'intending' faculty, he, as *pūrṇatara*, *transmutes* such object to be withdrawn from at whatever stage or sub-stage of ascent. At the lowest stage the prospective *ogin*, as an ordinary man, finds Nature and its items, wrongly though, as *independent of* consciousness, and relatively so at every step in the ascent so far as the object at every such step is to be dissociated from. What the *yogin* has done so far is to have phenomenologized them, i.e. experienced them as only essences intended phenomenologically and that far to have been aticipated or constructed *a priori*. The 'richer' *yogin* that we are now speaking of is not satisfied with that much only. He *transmutes*—at least seeks to transmute—natural items into spiritual ones, admitting all the while that there is some basic Nature by itself (the Nature that Kant calls thing-in-itself and Husserl terms 'bracketed') on which this *yogin* reacts directly. this, again, meaning in turn that consciousness-as-such impinges straight on it, so that it, i.e. the real basic Nature, is bodily *changed* into a kingdom of spirit, much as iron, in alchemy, is changed into gold. It is no mere phenomenological intention just deputizing Nature but actual change of Nature into spirit (consciousness)—of course, through stages and sub-stages as in the phenomenological adventure of the *akhaṇḍayogin* studied till now. Changing Nature into spirit is the way just the opposite of Śiva, i.e. consciousness-as-such, descending step by step to Nature, *replacing* it by—not changing it into—phenomenological construct. That way creation—*sṛṣṭi*—is nothing but phenomenological construction, *either* leaving untouched the question whether there is some Nature-by-itself—some basic Nature or just Nature as bracketed[1]—*or*, as in Kant,

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[1] This is why Śaivism never clashes as violently with Sāṁkhya as with Advaita-Vedānta.

foisting the entire network of construction, though, of course, step by step, on (and thus merely netting) some explicitly admitted Nature-by-itself—this time too some basic Nature or just Nature as bracketed. *Changing* Nature means, on the other hand, that there is no mere foisting of some content from above, nor simply weaving out an elaborate network in empty field, but a much harder-core realistic affair that the Nature which we *as animals* experience as out there in itself and which by the *khaṇḍayogin* is progressively experienced as phenomenologically constructed, and, by the *akhaṇḍayogin* as so constructed once for all, is itself made conscious—not in the sense of consciousness as subjective but as consciousness-in-itself—and made, therefore, an eternal verity too, not subject any longer to temporal change like birth, decay and cessation. A *yogin* who sets out on this new venture, is called *akhaṇḍamahāyogin*—why, it will be evident as we proceed.

In this new venture the *akhaṇḍamahāyogin* starts with his body. Body, we have seen, is a microcosm comprehending, in a concentrated form, all the features—at least all the generic features—of the macrocosm. What, therefore, can be accomplished in the body is, in effect, accomplished in the world outside too, provided what is done in the body is done in the *body-as-a*-tattva. These adventurers on the path of *akhaṇḍamahāyoga* begin their experiments on the body. It is reported that many of the *yogins* of the Vajrayāna school of Buddhism and of the Nātha school in **Hinduism** succeeded in rendering their bodies immune from all changes that any temporal thing is subject to. Now, the body is not merely the *sthūlaśarīra* but the *sūkṣma* one too = consisting of *tanmātras*, *indriyas* (including *manas*), *ahaṁkāra* and *buddhi*—all developing out of *pradhāna* and working in deference to *particular puruṣas*. Hence, as this body, being an evolute of *pradhāna*, is normally subject to incessant change, what its stabilization means is that somehow in the upward spiritual joruney it has been bodily transported beyond the *aśuddha* and *śuddhāśuddha* regions to the regions which is all *śuddha*, viz. the region of *śuddhavidyā*, often called *cidākāśa*, where normally every resident—*sādhaka*, *yogin* or *ājānika devatās*, including *Īśvara*—has only a spiritual body (*bhāva-deha*), precisely that body which for the *yogin* and the *sādhaka* had stood fused with, and that way concealed behind their *bhūtaśarīra*, '*bhūta*' meaning both *sthūla* and *sūkṣma bhūta*. Normally, a *yogin* or a *sādhaka*, when he crosses over to the *śuddha* region, leaves his *sthūla* and *sūkṣma śarīra* behind and enters that world with an appropriate *bhāva-deha*, sometimes also called *baindava-deha*. But the *akhaṇḍamahāyogin*, or, better, the aspirant after *akhaṇḍamahāyoga*, succeeds in entering this world with his erstwhile *aśuddha-deha* kept in tact though inspired through and through with evident consciousness and, that far, in the form of *bhāva-deha* too, much as an iron-ball burnt through and through with fire stands in the form of a red-hot iron-ball. But from the *śuddha* region to the *tattvātīta* one it is still a long way, and equally so are the distances between the entrances and exits of the *śuddha* and the *tattvātīta* regions themselves. There is no record, so far, of any aspirant for *akhaṇḍamhāyoga* carrying his *prākṛta-deha*, however transmuted, over to these more and more distant destinations.

There is another difficulty too. To phenomenologize my *sthūla* and *sūkṣma śarīras* is one thing and to *transmute* these into a spiritual body is quite another thing. Starting from the lowest stratum—the *sthūla* body—upto Īśvara or Sadāśiva, phenomenologization is always an individual's performance, because the agent in every such case is an *aṇu*. It is only one individual's performance at a time; and though it may change a few other individuals—may be, quite good many of them—who may that way join the venture and even succeed, there is no necessity so far that *all* the bodies of the *aśuddha* world begin to change that way and merrily accompany the one original aspirant who started the venture. Even Īśvara who already possesses an eternal *bhāva-deha* of a very high order has not been able till this date to transmute the *sthūla* and *sūkṣma dehas* of *all* men—not to speak of all creatures—into *bhāva-dehas*. This is because *Īśvara* too is, in the philosophies under

consideration, an individual (*aṇu*) though otherwise of infinite dimension in every respect. If *Īśvara* himself has not been able to effect that sort of total cosmic transmutation it goes without saying that none of his incarnations can do that. As a matter of fact, there have been so many incarnations, so many founders of religion, so many reformers, but how many of us, common men, have got transmuted? Total cosmic transmutation is yet a dream—one may even say, a wild dream; and this is a huge stumbling block in understanding *akhaṇḍamahāyoga* as even a possibility. The *akhaṇḍayogin*, not *akhaṇḍamahāyogin*, has through attaining his own perfection, phenomenologized the whole world, including all the *jīvas* there. But the *akhaṇḍamahāyogin*'s activity cannot, that way, cover the entire world and all the *jīvas*, though it may be intended for them all.

We may be told that some of these adventurers have after all changed *their sthūla* and *sūkṣma* bodies into bodies spiritual (*bhāva-dehas*). But now our suspicion advances in that line too. How could they? If the *piṇḍa* is the microcosm representing the whole world (*brahmāṇḍa*), you cannot change the *piṇḍa*—in so far as it is a *tattva*—without changing that much, and *paripassu*, the *brahmāṇḍa* too, including other *piṇḍas*, just as the *akhaṇḍayogin* too could not phenomenologize his *piṇḍa* without, at the same time, phenomenologizing the whole of Nature. He cannot say, "for me only this Nature is phenomenological construction". If it is phenomenological construction, it *is* so, no matter whether every *jīva* actually experiences Nature that way or not. It is a *truth*, and rationally I expect that everybody will have to accept it. You cannot, on the other hand, say that though I have *changed* my body and that way changed the whole of Natures others may not from then on remain directly aware of it. That the bodies of others, like, mine, and, indeed, the whole of Nature, is ultimately consciousness-in-itself kept concealed by *śakti* in one phase or another and that others may, with adequate effort exercised, discover it—this may all be granted. But when it is a *change* done now, how possibly can it remain unnoticed by others, particularly when that change concerns the medium or the means that is required for such noticing ?

In spite of what the Vajrayānins, the Nāthayogins and some modern *yogin*s like Sri Aurobindo and Swāmī Viśuddhānanda have claimed it is difficult for us to understand how this *akhaṇḍamahāyoga* can be worked out. As an idea it may not be unintelligble; and perhaps it is an *ideal* with immense heuristic value. What we do not understand is its feasibility. The ideal, of course, is that this Nature is to be fully divinized not merely in the sense that it, and everything in it, is to be understood as phenomenologically constructed and therefore, implicitly contained from the beginning,[1] but in a more concrete and tangible sense that it as already out there is actually changed into spiritually = consciousness-as-such, by the same *śakti* which, with the earlier *sādhaka*s, worked only in the form of more and more dissociation, i.e. purer and purer subjectivity, and, with the earlier *yogin*s re-posited as phenomenologically constructed—and that in the very same act of dissociation—what was dissociated from. This time, however, the *śakti* operates in a different way: it operates in a cosmic scale, and mostly unnoticed till the result is patently on the scene, as it had been doing in evolving newer and newer and more and more developed species till man emerged on the scene. Only, as the *akhaṇḍamahāyogins* contend, the process henceforward has to be self-conscious every bit, and though an *akhaṇḍamahāyogin* begins it has to be taken up immediately by every man. As in all cases of evolution, the present one too is the evolution of a whole species—here man; the whole class of men, each with his entire *sthūla* and *sūkṣma śarīra*, has to be turned into a species of divinity in the *śuddha* world, and then probably this one too into a more spiritual species, till......(a situation wholly unpicturable at our present stage of evolution).

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[1] Of course, it is only logical or metaphysical beginning, i.e. the most fundamental principle.

If the feasibility of this *akhaṇḍamahāyoga* could be worked out, that would certainly be a richer integral philosophy, and Śiva as the ultimate in that form could then be realized in his concretest possible form—the whole world as much in the world form as in the form of Śiva and Śiva as much in the form of consciousness-in-itself and constructing the world as verily in the form of the world that is there. The independence and self-containedness of the world would, in that case, be neither due to the malevolence of *māyā*, known as *ajñāna*, nor an unapproachable thing-in-itself but verily that thing-in-itself—*śava*—enlivened every bit by *Śakti* and that way turned into Śiva. That way it would be the concretest and, therefore, the most perfect (*pūrṇatama*) Śiva. But—and that is the only snag, and a big snag for that—if only one could know how exactly to perform this *akhaṇḍamahāyoga*. Till then, however, it may well serve as an *ideal*.

B

APPENDIX

This Section B contains some enlightening passages, collected at random, either bodily from Gopinath Kaviraj's writings or in changed forms that I have thought best to put them in—in either case rendered here in English.

(I)

In the perfect *Aham—I* in its fulness (*Pūrṇāham*)—the entire creation stands contained in a condensed form. Herein is found the 'measure of reality (perfection)', i. e. *kalā*, at its maximum: all the measures (*kalā*s) stand realized in it ; and yet this Absolute, this *Pūrṇāham*, is beyond all measure (*niṣkala*). Somehow or other, however, this Absolute, though fullest, feels some lack somewhere, though all in a sportive mood—feels wanting in some 'measure of perfection' (*kalā*—necessitating positment of the great *It*, the world-in-general of *paśyantī vāk*. Then, successively, are posited the world (objects) of *madhyamā* and *vaikharī vāk*. At each such succesive stage, and at each successive sub-stage, of these stages, there is gradual lessening of the 'measure of perfection' (*kalā*). This, so far as the line of descent (*sṛṣṭi*) is concerned. On the line of ascent (*upasaṁhāra*), on the other hand, the measure of perfection increases correspondingly. This is where Śaiva monism differs from Advaita-Vedānta. Here, in Śaivism, everything, from the great *It* of *paśyantī vāk* down to the variegated objective Nature, remains contained in the Absolute, nothing whatsoever is *rejected*. The Absolute of the Advaita-Vedānta, on the other hand, ultimately rejects not merely all stages of objectivity (objective world), it rejects even the *śakti* (which it calls *māyā*), the fundamental function of self-negation, through which alone all objectivity could be posited.

The playful sense of lack on the part of the Absolute—which means that rally there is no such lack—is no genuine sense of lack begotten of some real lack. Another name of this playful sense of lack is wilful self-contraction, wilful self-concealment. Everything here is sportively wilful. But once this function of self-delusion (otherwise called *mahāmāyā* or *yogamāyā*) starts, it, gaining momentum, comes in no time to delude the Absolute into self-forgetfulness and make what in truth is consciousness appear non-conscious, i. e. inert or dense (*jaḍa*). This is *mahāmāyā* as *nigrahaśakti*. Nobody knows why, surprisingly enough, it is the same *mahāmāyā* which acts as *anugrahaśakti* (liberating function) too and puts the deluded Absolute back on the path of self-discovery, the path, one may say, of ascent. As soon as one is on this path of ascent one is aware of the now-transcended inertness or density to have been all illusory. *Wilful* self-delusion, on the other hand, is never, and can never be, rejected as illusory. Not only that, what more is to be noted is that immediately as the density or inertness is rejected as illusory it is, in that very act, experienced to have been wilful—and so far quite real and genuine—self-delusion = self-concealment. Rejcction of inertness is thus the same thing as rehearsal of the erstwhile genuine, wilful, self-concealment.

What it all points to is that playful self-concealment is the same thing as the entire creation being implicitly contained, in a condensed form, in the Absolute which is *Pūrṇāham*. This, in turn, means that in the stage (really it is no stage among stages, though necessarily spoken that way on the line of ascent, precisely as the *niṣkala* is spoken of *pūrṇakala*) of *Pūrṇāhantā* the whole game of creation (necessarily in the line of descent), including even that of forced self-oblivion, is continuously rehearsed, though all playfully.

Not that it *has to be* so rehearsed, for then it would be no play at all. 'Play' means that the Absolute could also remain in itself, ever self-contained in its *kauṭasthya* (analytic self-identity). But that also does not in any way necessitate that *kauṭasthya*. Like *sṛṣti*, and alternating with it, this *kautasthya* too is only a possibility, though equally a perpetual one. To be in this analytic self-identity is called *buddhatva*, and in so far as one remains in that playful forward-looking attitude he is called *bodhisattva*. This *buddatva*, so far, is not the Brahmanhood of Advaita-Vedānta. In the 'analyticunity' of the Śaivas there is no question of *rejecting* the playful forward-looking attitude.

(2)

The intrinsic substantive nature—the in-itselfness (*svarūpa*) of the Absolute (*Parameśvara*) is that he is *Saccidananda*: he is Existence as such, Consciousness as such and Bliss as such. His '*śakti*' means his adjectival, functional, character. His intrinsic *śakti* (*svarūpa-śakti*) is thus the *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*, but each now as adjectivally functional

(3)

According to Śaiva dualism: *yogamāyā* is *ādyā citśakti*, *mahāmāyā* is *ādyā acitśakti*. Below that *acitśakti* there is *māyā*; and below *māyā*, *prakṛti*.

According to Śaiva monism: *mahāmāya* = bindu ; *mahāmāyika jagat* = *baindava jagat*. It is only at the *māyā* stage that *ajñāna* first comes into play; there emerges, for the first time, false (i. e. to-be-ultimately-rejected) independence of Nature (i.e. Nature appearing as altogether independent of consciousness). This is perceiving (mistaking) consciousness (self) as non-conscious (non-self). Below *māyā*, the next *tattva* is *prakṛti* which is the stage of further confusion of the false non-consciousness (*anātmā*) with consciousness already misunderstood to whatever degree, *Prakṛti* is *triguṇa*, i.e. made up of all the three *guṇas*—*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*; whereas *māyā* is either *nirguṇa*, though nevertheless clouded, or, better, made primarily of sattva though soiled to an extent by *tamas*.

(4)

At the apparently last stage of realization the *yogin* meets with two distinct possibilities. One of these is to realize the pure *kaivalya* (*kauṭasthya* = in-itself-ness) of consciousness—the Absolute in its analytic self-containedness—which has nothing to do with *Śakti*. It is the srage of *cit-svarūpa* (i.e. substantive pure conscious-

ness) [may not even be *sat-svarūpa* or *ānanda-svarūpa*]. But—and that is the other possibility—out of infinite grace coming from the Absolute-that-is-God (*Parameśvara*), one may, even after this *svarūpa* stage is realized, have another ulterior stage, called *unmanī*, where, though for a split second as it were, i. e. only to disappear as soon as one has it, the analytic self-containedness stands only as an aspect—a phase—of the concreter *Śiva-Śakti-sāmarasya*, i. e. as much Śiva-as-Śakti as Śakti-as-Śiva. Śiva at this stage is Śiva as a phase of *Paramaśiva*, called *Parameśvara*.

(5)

When *prakāśa* (consciousness) comes to find itself there arises *ānanda* (joy). When, for whatever reason—may be, in a playful mood—this joy turns active (because of a sense of lack, however playfully generated), there arises *icchā* (conation in the form 'let there be such and such'). After *icchā* there comes *jñāna* (theoretic awareness = cognition). Next comes *kriyā* which 'objectifies' that *jñāna* (?). What follows next are that *kriyākalā* gets (re-) absorbed in *jñānakalā*, *jñānakalā* gets (re-)absorbed in *ānandakalā* and *ānandakalā* in *anuttara*.

The letter *a* is *prakāśa* as the final (*anuttara*) consciousness (*cit*) —the all-illuminating of *Ānandamayī Mā* (Mother Bliss). At a corner of that ubiquitous light there occurs some *kalana* (some spurt toward projecting or throwing out oneself), resulting inevitably in the emergence of joy—the joy, to be precise, of perceiving oneself as on the verge of being projected outside. A further spurt in this joy, and there arises *icchā* (decision in the form of 'let there be'). The emergence of this *icchā* leads to the emergence of *jñāñā* (cognition), this latter being called *unmeṣa*. After *jñāna* there emerges *kriyā*.

(6)

Para vāk is the state of *Parameśvarahood*. In *paśyantī* the three things—name, object meant and the awareness of that object —remain non-distinct from one another. One may say, they remain identical with one another. Immediately as the name is uttered the relevant object stands meant and appears on the scene.

Immediately as the word 'fire' is spoken one experiences heat. In *madhyamā vāk* the three things—name, object meant and awareness of that object—remain in the relation of identity-in-difference: immediately as the name is uttered the object meant appears before the cognition's eye (in imagination or as hallucination ?).— In the case of *vaikharī vāk*, on the other hand, the relation between the name, the object meant and the corresponding cognition is one of clear difference (separation): they are each a separate entity.——In *paśyantī*, It-ness, i. e. otherness [in the form of subjectivity negating itself (?)], stands evident——, though this *It* is the same thing whether it is just the word 'It' or the object meant or the corresponding cognition.

(7)

Brahman is self-luminous but not self-conscious. *Bhagavān* is that reality where fullest *Śakti* manifests in activity; in *Paramātman* it is only partially manifest. In *Ātman* there is the sense of *Pūrṇāham*, but not so in Brahman, though it is thare in Para-Brahman.

In *Īśvara* there is *ādi-saṁkalpa*, primaeval decision in act, i. e. decisive action that is all *sui generis*. His *icchā* is self-fructifying. *Īśvara* has *aiśvarya* (excellence), while *Bhagavān* (of the Gauḍiya-Vaiṣnavas) has *mādhurya* (love, i. e. sweet approachability), in addition.

When Consciousness is acted upon by *Śakti* at its third stage of subtlety it is called *Ātman* or *Pūrṇāham*. At this third stage of subtlety Śakti is as much there as not. In the latter aspect Consciousness is *Ātman*, in the former aspect *Pūrnāham*. *Pūrṇāham* floats in (is reflected in ?) *cidākāśa* (*śuddha* region ?).

(8)

Ātman, substantively, i. e. intrinsically, is one single Consciousness as Freedom. In realization one has first to experience it is formless, *nirguna*, but, after that, it has to be experienced as with form, i. e. as *saguṇa*. Intrinsic Consciousness as formless is wholly transcendent and transcendent only, but, as with form, i. e. as

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

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Many spiritual aspirants (*sādhakas* ?) consider this 'Being that is Self' to be their final objective and, in their spiritual pursuit, stop with getting at it. But this is only the self's turn-back from Nature, merely dissociating from it, looking at it at most retrospectively, if not merely remembering it as what has been left behind. This is moving away from Nature-that-is-circumference towards the centre-that-is-self spirally in the clockwise direction. But with God's grace the *yogin*, having once touched the centre

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Would it be possible for
you to come down to
Varanasi on 12th after
I shall leave Varanasi for
Calcutta on 14th,
with warmest wishes,

Yours sincerely
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saguṇa, it is immanent too——the truth-of-Nature that shows itself in and through the form of that Nature. Once we realize Consciousness as both formless and in the form of Nature—of course, one after the other—we realize Consciousness in its final, truest, intrinsic status. It is a stage of realization where we experience both and yet without any the least conflict as much between formlessness and formedness as between *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa*, between *sakala* and *niṣkala* (with and without part-measures of perfection), between *saviseśa* (conditioned) and *nirviseśa* (unconditioned). As this stage is attained the way to *yoga* (as distinct from *sādhana* ?) is opened up and after the solidest *yoga* is passed through, i. e. after *sāyujya* (complete oneness that is yet not 'getting altogether lost') is attained we realize—even above this stage—the final genuine *advaya* (non-duality).

(9)

Sāmarasya = *sāyujya*. The absoluteness (absolute fulness = perfection) of *Ātman* is even beyond this state.

(10)

The world—Nature has universal and particular forms which are perceived in proper succession as one proceeds on spiritual venture. But, for the *yogin* (as distinct from *sādhaka*) who, from the beginning, is much advanced in spiritual perception, the formed Nature, even as formed is perceived as constituted of consciousness that is *jñāna* (self-projection, in other words, of *jñāna*) and ultimately gets reduced to Being that is Self and therefore formless. Many spiritual aspirants (*sādhakas* ?) consider this 'Being that is Self' to be their final objective and, in their spiritual pursuit, stop with getting at it. But this is only the self's turn-back from Nature, merely dissociating from it, looking at it at most retrospectively, if not merely remembering it as what has been left behind. This is moving away from Nature-that-is-circumference towards the centre-that-is-self spirally in the clockwise direction. But with God's grace the *yogin*, having once touched the centre that way, begins now to move again, in a counterclockwise direction, away from that centre, rehabilitating in forward direction the entire Nature from which he had systematically receded, and the Self, comes now to be realized as verily constituting Nature, and constituting it wholly. This is Consciousness self-consciously turning into Nature: Consciousness is now realized as the Truth-of-Nature that shows itself as much in its analytic self-centeredness as also in the form of Nature.

The most important thing to note here is that both these aspects, both these motions, are included, in a transmuted form, in the *integral* Self where both the motions are represented by the radii. i. e., by that Self moving as much down each radius as up it, both at the same time.

✓(II)

Kalā = *mātrā* = part-value, part-measure. Consider, e. g. the measures penny, shilling and pound. Pound has no part-value and is, on this ground, *niṣkala* and consequently integral (*akhaṇḍa*). And yet in that pound are included all the part-values—penny and shilling; so many pence make a shilling and so many shillings make the pound. This makes pound *sakala* too, i.e. *pūrnakala*. *Sakala*, so far, i.e. as *pūrnakala*, is *niṣkala*. This exactly is the relation between Nature and the Absolute. The Absolute as the first cause both is and is not a member of the series of causes, i. e. both is and is not coordinate with the other causes.

✓ Integral standpoint is the standpoint of the Absolute. Individual standpoint is different from it. The individual may be understood as psycho-somatically individual or spiritually individual. The Absolute is not that distant from the spiritual individual as from the psychological and certainly more distant from the merely physiological individual. Another name of the psychological individual is *buddhi*; the Absolute is only *reflected* in it. The spiritual individual = *śuddhavidyā*, *Īśvara* and *Sadāśiva*. In this latter case, i. e. in the spiritual individual, the only *mala* (imperfection) that is continuing is the *āṇava* one. For, the *kārmika* and *māyīya malas* are already gone; and the transcending of even the

āṇava mala has, in principle, started. Intellectual approach, as in the lower stages, has already been transcended and one has begun to grasp the Absolute in immediate experience, which latter means that, to whatever extent, i. e. however partly and distantly, one has got installed in the Absolute's standpoint after all. This is *śuddha-vidyā*, the region of spirit proper where since one gets into it one comes to be blessed: absolute *śakti* begins to descend on him, as a result of which he attains the Absolute's standpoint more and more. The individual standpoint does not, however, disappear altogether in this region: the real standpoint here is the individual's; only, absolute *śakti* descending more and more, one participates more and more in the Absolute's standpoint too. The individual, here, is the Sāṁkhya *purusa*, although of various grades of fulness of the Absolute. This *āṇava-mala* is almost on the point of dissolution with the *sadāśiva tattva*. It disappearing altogether we have *savimarśa-sāmarasya* and, after that, *tattvātīta sāmarasya*.

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(12)

Śrīkṛṣṇa = *Pūrṇa* = Śiva = Absolute. Rādhā = *antaraṅga-svarūpa-śakti* which is in the state of *sāmarasya*. *Vahiraṅga-svarūpa-śakti* = *citkanā* = *jīva* as *spiritual* = *śuddha-tattvas* among which some, in spite of their lingering *āṇava-mala*, are very near Śrīkṛṣṇa and some more distant = the inmates of Vṛndāvana and Dwārakā = *Śadāsiva*, *Īsvara*, other *mantreśvaras*, *vidyeśvaras*, *vidyās*, *mantras*, etc., even those who are at the level '*māya* to *puruṣa*.' All the *tattvas* from *prakṛti* to *kṣiti* constitute *jaḍa* *śakti*, with which coinhabits the 'units of *vahiraṅgaśakti*'—*jīvas* with *māyīya* and *kārmika* limitations. This is why the *jīvas* too—of course, as *jīvas*—are *jaḍa*, i.e. mere items of Nature.

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Śiva-Śakti-sāmarasya = *Pūrṇatā* (Absoluteness or Perfection) can be understood in two different ways. One is as the 'dead' Śiva (śava) containing *Śakti* as *latent*. But the other way is to have it as active Śiva in which Śakti, appearing as *Cit-śakti* (reflective subjectivity), i.e. as *vimarśa*, immediately operates as *icchāhśakti*, meaning that at that stage Śiva, through the instrumentation of Śakti, witnesses the entire creation disinterthat way, begins now to move again, in a counterclockwise direction, away from that centre, rehabilitating in forward direction the entire Nature from which he had systematically receded, and the Self, comes now to be realized as verily constituting Nature, and constituting it wholly. This is Consciousness self-consciously turning into Nature : Consciousness is now realized as the Truth-of-Nature that shows itself as much in its analytic self-centeredness as also in the form of Nature.

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(14)

Ānanda is, at the very root, fulness (*pūrṇatā* = perfection). It is the Absolute at its deepest, highest profoundity. *Cit* is less deep and profound; *sat* still less deep (and profound).

(15)

For Advaita-Vedānta, its Brahman, the Ultimate, is Śiva isolated from Śakti. Advaita-Vedānta has rejected Śakti altogether—as much the *antaraṅga-śakti* as the *vahiraṅga* one. And yet they call this Brahman *pūrṇa* (perfect). This implies that no transcendentalist can take the transcendent reality as just another reality coordinate with Nature (*jiva* and *jagat*). Nature *and* Brahman—this is a meaningless expression. Just similarly, the First Cause is not one of the phenomena (phenomenal causes). Another appropriate name of this transcendence is *svātantrya*, freedom at its climax. Freedom (we may, if we like, call it even 'free will') is never a phenomenal determinant (*vide* the concept of *adhiṣthatṛkārana*).

(16)

Māyā which is *jaḍaśakti* constructs *another* (i.e. *object*) phenomenologically and Brahman in its *sat*-aspect covers it. But the central operative factor here too is the *antaraṅgaśakti*. *Māyāśakti* only activates this *antaraṅga-sakti* operative in *taṭastha-śakti*.

(17)

Śūnya = gap. After the stage of Brahman-in-itself (i.e. that of *niṣkala* Siva), what is first created through the instrumentation of Śakti as *vimarśa* is *Śūnya*, i.e. the consciously held gap = self-negation, just another name of which is forward-lookingness.

(18)

Sākṣin is the connoisseur, the disinterested perceiver of how the world has been and is being created. But to be the creator—anthor of creation is a higher, richer, affair.

(19)

Pralayakaivalya means turning into bare in-itself-ness, as happens in *pralaya* (complete dissolution of Nature). *Vijñānakaivalya* = the Brahmanhood of Advaita-Vedānta is realized just at the entrance to the *śuddha* region otherwise called *baindavajagat*, i.e. just after *māyā* is crossed—or, as in Sāṁkhya, after *prakṛti* is crossed. Those who stop with it fail to enter the *baindavajagat*. *Śuddhakaivalya*, on the other hand, is realized only at the highest level of *baindavajagat*, i.e. at the level of *Sadāsiva* which is just at the entrance to *Śāktajagat*. It too crossed, i.e. after *śuddhakaivalya*, one enters the *Śāktajagat* which (for the Vaiṣṇavas is the abode of *Bhagavān*).

(20)

Citśakti is (consciousness as) *subjectivity*. It operates first as *icchā*, and this *icchā* is verily *jñāna* also. *Icchāśakti*, turning active, grows into *kriyāśakti*, otherwise called *visarga*. Prior to that it remains non-different with *bindu*. But even as aetive it does not forfeit its non-activity. The two points of *visarga* symbolize this simultaneous activity and non-activity. Another name of *visarga-śakti* is *paramā* (ultimate *Kuṇḍalinī* and it has on one side *śaktikuṇḍalinī* and on the other *prāṇakuṇḍalinī*. *Visarga* = phenomenological construction = 'intention' (intentionality).

(21)

Bhakti is *rāgānugā* in so far as it is viewed from the individual point of view; it is *rāgātmikā* in so far as it is viewed from the point of view of the Absolute. *Rāgātmikā* *bhakti* is a ray of light emanating from the divine body of ŚrīRādhā, the *Hlādinī-śakti* of Śrīkṛṣṇa. Another name of *rāgātmikā bhakti* is *bhāva*. *Bhāva*, again, undergoes higher and higher sublimation as we ascend spiritually. The highest in this line is Love (*prema*). Spiritual pursuit in its fullest manifests this *prema-bhakti*; but this *prema-bhakti* itself is manifested in greater and greater measure as we rise further and further in spritual life. The fullest manifestation of love in this line is *mahābhāva*. *Rādhābhāva* is just another name of this *mahābhāva*.

(22)

Siva is *Cit* (Consciousness) as such. *Citkalā = hārdakalā = citśakti = ādi-śakti.*

(23)

The *kāraṇa-deha* which is subtler than the 'subtle body' (*sūkṣma* or *liṅga deha*) of Sāṁkhya is just one particle of *pradhāna*. An infinite number of such partcicles continuously emanate from *pradhāna* so long as it undergoes *sarūpa-pariṇāma*, i.e. continues as homogeneously dynamic. Each such particle is a subtlest body (*kāraṇa-deha*). The *cit*, i.e. *paramātman* that, as *draṣṭā* or *sākṣin*, perceives this subtlest body (*kārana-deha*) and, through that, the corresponding subtle body (*sūkṣma-deha*) is therefore a particular (*viśeṣa*). This particularity the *cit* acquires because of its special concern for (special reference to = *ābhimukhya* = *sannidhi*, i.e. relevance, for) that particle of *pradhāna*. It follows that, as *draṣṭā*, *puruṣa* (= *paramātman*) is many in number. Yet, however, as there is *one* water as the common stuff of the many waters which are really many because of the manyness of their receptacles, so is the case with Sāṁkhya *puruṣa*. For Advaita-Vedānta, this pointedness—this reference—of *puruṣa* to *pradhāna* is after all an illusion, and therefore its manyness. too is illusory. *Ābhimukhya* or *sannidhi* is the same thing as phenomenological forward-lookingness = intentionality. The *puruṣa* of Sāṁkhya has as much this intentionality as also its analytic self-containedness, whereas the *paramātman* of Advaita-Vedānta has only the latter. The Śaiva position, as distinct from both the Sāṁkhya and Advaita-Vedānta, is that this analytic self-containedness and this intentionality are only the two aspects of one and the same thing, viz. the integral indentity of the *pūrṇa* Absolute.

(24)

Aṇutva = the shrinkage, self-contraction, of Śiva (*Ātman*) = its self-concealment. *Māyā* causes the experience of (metaphysical separateness of objects from consciousness (= *vāk* = cognition). When *māyīya-mala* is added to *ānava-mala* *Ātman* becomes *puruṣa*. *Kārma-mala* attaches only to *puruṣa*s.

(25)

In the *aśuddha* region darker (impure) *kalā*, technically called *mala-kalā*, increases as we descend down successive *tattva*s, and—what is the same thing the other way round—it thins down progressively as we rise higher and higher. This so far as the *aśuddha* region is concerned. But with the emergence of *śuddhavidyā* pure (*śuddha*) *kalā* increases progressively as we rise.

(26)

Mahābindu = Śiva-Śakti-sāmarasya = Kāmakalā. Between *Mahābindu*, on the one hand, and Śiva and Śakti as *tattva*s, on the other, there is *hārdakalā*. *Kāmakalā = Śrīvidyā = Tripurasundarī.*

(27)

Descent of power (*saktipat*) is *icchāśakti*, and *diksa* (initiation by *guru*) is *kriyaśakti*.

(28)

As Śrīkṛṣṇa is full-valued, so is his intrinsic *svarūpa-śakti*. Another name of this *svarūpa-śakti* ts *citkalā*. But it as much contains a measure of *kalā* as is, at the same time, above all such *kalā*s. This exactly is *śakti* as perfect (*pūrṇa*). All the infinite measures (*kalā*s) are present in it and yet it transcends them all. As containing infinite *kalā*s it is called *Śoḍaśī Kalā*. But as transcending even these infinite *kalā*s, it is *Saptadasī Kalā*. Of it the word '*kalā*' will be used but only to be negated in that very use.

(29)

Sat-śakti (existence as function) is *sandhinī kalā*; similarly, *cit-śakti* is *samvit-kalā*; and *ānanda-śakti* is *hlādinī kalā*. The difference between them consists in the progressive increase or decrease of *cit-kalā*.

(30)

Distinction between biological, psychological, spiritual and Absolutistic (original) responses. Biological response is entirely subject to Nature. (At this stage, physical entities and their 'reactions' are only to be utilized. This *utilization* is what is meant by 'original response'.) Psychological response is, in one dimension, wholly 'natural', but, in another dimension (which is a little higher), a little toward spirit, i.e. a little spiritual, though yet wholly involved in Nature. The highest sub-stage of this half-spiritual psychological life is *sattvapuruṣānyathākhyāti* of *buddhi*. Psychological entities—in so far as they work freely—constitute the *tānmātrika* body in contrast to the *sthūlabhautika* body where these *tanmātras* remain wholly submerged (practically undistinguished). The *tānmātrika* body (including at its highest stage *prakṛti* = *triguṇa*) is still an aspect of Nature. (cf. Heidegger and many Existentialists.) This is *sādhana* (either thought-*sādhana* = thinking about Nature or *yogic sādhana*).

But *yogic sādhana* is at all possible if only some idea of 'spirit' has dawned. Spirit is wholly beyond Nature (i.e. with *kārmika* and *māyīya pāsas* off) but still retains individuality (i.e. some shrinkage of the Absolute) = *āṇava mala*. It is pure individual self, absolutely transcending Nature. This pure *jīvāṇu* is *mukta* (spiritual = free from Nature—might be, also controlling Nature, though all freely). But it has various degrees of perfection (fulness = *pūrṇatā*)—beginning from *puruṣa*, through *māyā*, right up to beings at the *Īśvara* and *Sadāśiva* stages. Degree of perfection = *kalā*.

The Absolute (*Pūrṇa*—*pūrṇa icchā*, *jñāna*, *kriyā*—all together = *vimarśa* = *citśakti* in *sāmarasya* with Śiva) constitutes the fourth and final stage.

The individual standpoint has to be distinguished from the standpoint of the Absolute. The 'individual' may be psychological or spiritual. At the spiritual stage, however, there is some sort of '*living* the Absolute standpoint' from the very beginning, though it constantly alternates also with the individual standpoint. At this stage the *māyīya mala* is over, but *āṇava mala* continues. It is only at the fourth stage that the standpoint is wholly Absolutistic.

(31)

There are three kinds of *anāsakti* (non-attachment)—(i) purposeful indifference due to disgust, (ii) spiritual dissociation as a result of practice *(sādhana)* and (iii) joyful non-attachment, i.e. treating things and persons wholly in their interests, not in *my* i.e. of the natural *I)* interest in any manner.

(32)

While the *sādhaka* leaves his body (i.e. dies) when he has attained *parama-siddhi* (Śivahood) this is not for the *yogin*. The *iṣṭarūpa* (the aspired-for form of the Absolute) which the *sādhaka* realizes (attains) at the end of his spiritual pursuit is what the *yogin* starts with in his *yoga* as the spiritual pursuit.——The *yogin* needs not *relinquish* his desires (*vāsanās*). He moves from the beginning in the path of fulness.

The way of *yoga* does not open up without the grace of *Parameśvara* (i.e. without *śakti* descending from him); and obtainment of that grace or *śakti* is the same thing as one's installation in the region of *śuddha-vidyā*. One on the way of *yoga* begins with *baindava* (*mahāmāyika*) *deha*.

(33)

The first five of the *cakras* are made each principally of one of the five *bhūtas*. Only *ajñānacakra* is the sum of *manas*, *buddhi*, *citta* and *ahaṁkāra*.

(34)

To have a human body does not necessitate that the man in him is awakened. For long he remains still an animal (*paśu*), and wholly at the mercy of Nature. It is only the sense of freedom which arouses humanity proper, i.e. *vīrabhāva*. During the first stages of the awakening of this freedom it works in the form of alternative possibilities. It is only later that freedom proper *(svātantrya)* appears on the scene. Eventual spirituality = divinity (দিব্যত্ব) *(bhagavadbhāva)* is the culmination of this freedom = humanity. (মনুষ্যত্ব)

(35)

The ways of attaining *bhagavaddṛṣṭi* (transcendence) are: (i) the urge to know that which being known, everything is known, (ii) the urge to get rid of all suffering, (iii) the urge to know the world *as a whole*, (iv) devotion = self-surrender, (v) constant meditation on the Absolute as withdrawing everything upto itself, (vi) God's grace, (vii) disgust for the world, (viii) the urge to avoid death = total extinction, (ix) the urge to understand 'form' itself as other than matter, i.e. to dissociste this *form* from the form-matter complex. (About this last, be it noted that the *matter* cannot, that way, be dissociated from form). There are other ways too of attaining to this *bagavadbhāva*.

(36)

When one crosses the world wholesale. i.e. transcends it altogether, he finds himself installed in purest *caitanya* (consciousness as it is in itself). As we stand today, in the world this consciousness stands mixed up with the inert that is not consciousness. It is only when this consciousness is separated from (extracted out of) the world and placed above it, as out of all relation to the inert, that it is nameable as 'pure consciousness'. That exactly is Brahman, Śiva or Pure Light (Consciousness). That way, it totally transcends the world: as the absolutely self-contained, disinterested witness of the whole world it stands as trascendent, wholly unconnected with the world. As soon, however, as *kriyā-śakti* (as primal creation) starts its role in that consciousness this transcendent reality, remaining all through as transcendent, yet gets immanent in the world. It is this *kriyā-śakti* which explains why and who the transcendent Consciousness is yet the *possibility* of everything in the world. This is the Absolute as *Paramaśiva*.

(37)

In Sufi *sādhana* love occupies an exalted place. So also in Vaiṣṇava *sādhana* and equally in that of the Sahjiyās and the Bauls. Yet, however, there are subtle differences in the very taste of this ethereal love. Nowhere except in (and through) the *human* body is there any full integral taste (experience) of love; and this is why even God, in attraction for, and out of deference to, love, forgoes his many excellences (*aiśvarya*) and assumes human body. The vaiṣṇava lovers understood this thoroughly well and, therefore, counted *mādhurya* (sweet love, not quiet surrender) above all divine excellences. Love that is

here because of excellences on either or both of the sides is ever integral: it is always *conquest* of either by the other, ever literally receiprocal and, therefore, sweet. This is not ossible of realization except in (and through) some human ody. The Sufis did not have this integral experience. When hey loved human beings it was only symbolical, they meant it or God. Human love was, for them, at most a gateway to ove that is divine. The Sufis' love is not exalted enough to llow scope even for God to take upon himself a human body or fully tasting (experiencing) the integral love. In effect, it means hat it is man who, through genuine love, is raised to the status of od himself, not that God is dragged down to the status of man.

Another important point. What is the relation between *kāma* sexual desire) and (sweet) love proper, called *prema*? *Kāma* never (sweet) love proper. What is the distinguishing mark f *kāma*? What does it mean when it is said that the (sweet) ove between Rādhā and Kṛṣṇa is totally void of all *kāma*? The Sufi love also is void of *kāma*. Does bodily relation turn love nto *kāma*? No. Both in Rādhā's love and the Sufis' love for God body plays some good part. What, then, is the distinction etween love proper and *kāma*? The reply is: *kāma* is *ātmen- riyaprīti-icchā* while *prema* (love proper) is *Kṛṣṇendriyaprīti-icchā*. t is *kāma* when it is meant for one's own pleasure (with or without the pleasure of God), but it is *prema* when it is meant *nly* for the pleasure of God.

(38)

Dharmakāya (of the Buddhists) = the ultimate pure Conscious- ess (pure subjectivity) = the Absolute. *Dharmakāya* is beyond all ifferentiating speech *(vāk)*, beyond even *paśyantī*, and is one *samarasa)* with *parā vāk* or just *pāra vāk* itself. All Enlightened ubjects have absolutely the same, and numerically one, *dharmakāya*; hey differ (though in number only) in their *sambhogakāya*, etc. It s as though all radii are meeting at one and the same *dharmakāya* as he centre. No *vāsanā* (disposition)—*kliṣṭa* (impure), *kliṣṭākliṣṭa* impure-pure) or *akliṣṭa* (pure)—lingers in *dharmakāya*.

Sambhogakāya is *siddha-deha*, i.e. the body (= the status) attainable through *sādhana*, a body which is subtlest—subtler than even the *kāraṇa-deha*—the body which is but joy (bliss) concrete and which, as subjectivity, phenomenologically 'intends', i. e. constructs, the world, for the first time, of course. in *cidakasa*, i. e. in the *śuddha* region. This construction or creation (which is substantially nothing but knowledge and joy) is numerically different for each such *sambhogakāya* subject. This is pure (*śuddha*) creation = pure (*śuddha*) experience (*bhoga*) = pure enjoyment. However, this *sambhogakāya* contains in itself *akliṣṭa vāsanā* (pure dispositions).

Nirmānakāya is another type of *śuddha-deha* : it too is a body or status of subjectivity attainable through *sādhana* and, therefore, beyond the empirical world, though it is constructed, i.e. phenomenologically 'intended', but this time out of *māyīya* (i e. empirical) traces and dispositions. *Nirmāṇakāya* contains *kliṣṭākliṣṭa* (pure-impure) *vāsanās* (dispositions).

As contrasted with all these, the *buddha*-bodies (i. e. empirical and half-empirical-half-transcendental philosophies) that we construct in and about the *māyīka jagat* (the world that is wholly phenomenal) are called *nirmāṇa-kāyas*, and they are infinite in number. The *buddha*-bodies (here the transcendental philosophies) that we construct in the *śuddha māyika* (i. e. *śuddhāśuddha*) *jagat*, through *śuddha* forms of speech (*madhyamāvāk*) operative in that field, constitute the *sambhogakāya*. These *sambhogakāyas* too are infinite in number. But the *dharmakāya* which is but the non-differentiated *parā vāk* that is pure consciousness (= pure subjectivity) is numerically one for all the '*buddha*'s (Enlightened ones). This *Dharmakāya* = *Citśakti*.

If this *dharmakāya* corresponds to the Śaiva's *bindu* then the status called 'Śiva and Śakti in one' will be at another step higher. This higher status may be called *svabhavakāya*.

(39)

There are various spiritual stages of high order like *nirvāṇa*, *parinirvāṇa*, *mahāparinirvāṇa*, quietitude of Brahman, Śivahood, perfect (integral) freedom (i.e. *parameśvaratva*), 'to be beyond all speech' (absolute non-differentiation), eternal divine reciprocity with the Divine. Some, again, can, at even the ultimate stage, experience differences.

In olden times the Buddhists aspired for cessation of all suffer-
ig.——. *Nirvāṇa* is nothing but attainment of this absolute cessa-
on of (all) suffering——. Along with the cessation af all suffering
ne experiences the cessation of existence too.

Śuddha-vāsanā (pure disposition) is the disposition toward
moving others' sufferings. This *śuddha-vāsanā* continues as long
there is *akliṣṭa-jñāna* (pure cognition). It is because of the con-
nuation of this *śuddha-vāsanā* that *citta* is saved from getting lost
nirvāṇa ; and with that *śuddha-vāsanā* continuing, the seeker (*citta*)
oves for attaining *mahājñāna* (supreme perfect knowledge). The
ta, so moving, is called *bodhicitta* or *bodhisattva*. It is *citta*
taining its most condensed, concise, form, and the more it pro-
esses in that line the higher and higher levels it attains, leaving
hind the levels that are lower. Progressing in this manner—
ing from one level to another—when it reaches the tenth level,
attains the highest Enlighenment called *buddhajñāna*. This is the
eal of the *bodhisattva* life.

If having got rid of *kliṣṭa-ajñāna*, one does not exert oneself
fructify the *akliṣṭa-vāsanās*, it means an easy passage to *nirvāṇa*,
e absolute cessation of suffering. The Buddhists, however, do not
el attracted toward this, even though it may be the great Enlighte-
ent *(buddhatva)* itself. Like the Śaiva and the Śākta tāntrikas
ey recommend rather the fructificatien of *akliṣṭa-vāsanās* (in pre-
ence to attaining great Enlightenment straightaway) and, that
y, traversing the entire *śuddha* region of *mahāmāyā* and then
nscending it. This is the genuine *yoga* path as distinct from that
sādhana. One who is on this path experiences increasing compa-
on *(karuṇā)* and joy *(ānanda)*, and *prajñā* also goes on increasing.

(40)

Prāṇa = empirical life—life that is physical (more correctly,
ological) and psychologicol. *Manas* = transcendental life (life at
e transcendental level) = the entire *bhāva*, i.e. *śuddha*, region. The
m '*prāṇa*' is also used in a wider sense, covering both these.

(41)

Parā vāk is Śiva's first and most primary self-consciousness.
is *parā vāk* constitutes Śiva's first awakening : here, for the first
ne, the *anuttara* consciousness-in-itself (*cit-svarūpa*) changes into

consciousness as subjectivity. The *I* sensed here is *purṇa* (perfect, integral, full) *I*, and that for two reasons :

First, at this stage there is no other *I* competing with this *I*. Secondly, this *I* contains everything—every item created—implicitly within itself and, that far, as one with itself.

(42)

At the level of object-in-general (*Idam* posited for the first time) the *pramātā*, i.e. the subject, is *mantramaheśvara* ; the office is that o *Sadāsiva* ; and the *prameya*, i.e. the object, is the object-in-genera (the great *Idam*). In the case of categories (which are specifications of the object-in-general) the *pramātā* (subject) is *mantreśvara*; the office is that of *Īśvara*; and the *prameya*s are the categories. In the case of *śuddhavidyā*, the *pramātā* consists of each of the *mantras*= Platonic Ideas, and they are as much *pramātā*s as *prameya*s (objects). Their number is legion; they include even the ordinary universals.

So far with the roles of *paśyantī* and *madhyamā vāk*. Below tha there are, on the one side, *pralayakala* and *vijñānakala jīva*s and, o the other side, *prakṛti*. *Vijñānakala jīva*s are the *purusas* of Sāṁkhya got free from fusion with all modes of *prakṛti*, though retaining thei individualities (all unconsciously), as happens in periods of grea cosmic dissolution (*pralaya*).

Below the *vijñānakala-jīvas*, *pralayakala-jivās* and *prakṛti*, ther is the whole region of fusion, starting with *prakṛti-as-other-than*-and *independent-of*-consciousness-that-is-*puruṣa* and ending with *pṛthvi tattva* (soil), with all of which *puruṣa* gets *erroneously* fused an behaves, that way, as animal (*paśu*), and without any the leas measure of freedom at the lower levels.

Pralayakala and *vijñānakala jīva*s have no *kartṛtva* (agency) Śiva alone is the agent, and Paramaśiva is the *parama-kartā* = perfect *I*

Vijñānakala aṇus (all of them, particularly those who are highe in rank, are not *jīva*s in any sense, but are yet individuals) are o there different levels. At the lowest level they have realized themselves as dissociated completely from *prakṛti*. ('*Viveka*' mean dissociation.) At the next higher level they have dissociated themselves from both *prakṛti* and *māyā*, and at the highest level from *mahāmāyā*. This level-difference is due to the different optimum measures of mixture of *acit* with *cit*.

(43)

*Jīva*s are covered (and, that far crippled) with two kinds of *ajñāna* -*puruṣeya* (what cripples the *puruṣa*) and *bauddhika* (what cripples e *buddhi* of that particular individual). *Pauruṣeya ajñāna* cannot be moved except through *dīkṣā* (spiritual initiation). Hence whatever pe of *sādhana* one pursues, and to whatever extent, without *dīkṣā*, s *pauruṣeya ajñāna* continues. This *pauruṣeya-ajñāna* is really that rough which the Absolute (*Parameśvara*) itself plays the part of a *va* in the world-drama. Hence till this (*pauruṣeya-ajñāna*) is removed ere in no chance of realizing this *Parameśvara*-hood. Removal of ere *bauddhika-ajñāna* is of no abiding value. If one succeeds in st removing the *pauruṣeya-ajñāna* and then, while still alive, removes e *bauddhika-ajñāna*, he realizes *cit*-in-itself as the ethereal joy and ts liberated (*mukta*) white still alive—he is then *jīvanmukta* ; and ter death—inasmuch as he has then the *pauruṣeya-jñāna*, he attains *armeśvara*-hood——. Should one succeed in removing the *uruṣeya-ajñāna* he is sure to attain perfection (*pūrṇatva*) sooner or ter. *Bauddha-jñāna* means only the removal of *bauddha-ajñāna*, othing else.

(*Pauruṣeya-ajñāna* = *āṇava-mala* = Śiva's self-shrinkage.)

(44)

Beyond *annamaya-kośa* (inert matter) and *prāṇamaya-kośa* (gross ving body) there is *manomaya-kośa* (mind as the psychologist underands it). In its turn, this *manomaya-kośa* has several layers. *Buddhi* ntellect) has its play at the farthest innermost layer of this mind, here, from some distance as it were, the mind perceives the *sāttvika* pure) *bhāva*s. At this stage it turns into *vijñānamaya-kośa* which is alled 'overmind' : it means that what here perceives the entire *bhāva* *śuddha*) region (with its details) is the *mind* = *I*. The whole standoint here is still that of the mind. That is true also of the *ānanda*-*aya-kośa*, because among the *bhāva*s what is perceived now is somehing more than *vijñāna*, viz. *ānanda*.

After this stage there occurs a total revolution of standpoint. he standpoint since then is precisely that of what have so long een perceived from outside by the mind. It is now the standpoint f the *bhāva*s themselves and of *ānanda* in addition—the standpoint, n other words, of the transcendent region itself. At this stage, that transcendent reality toys with the mind and the overmind= *buddhi*. In effect, the transcendent realizes, i.e. consciously enjoys itself through the medium of its own evolute, the mind.

This transcendent, so far, is however only *citśakti* (active functional *cit*). It is *citśakti* both in its individual *(āṇava)* form and in its universal form (i.e. as *bindu* = *mahāmāyā* or *parā-śakti*). The standpoint at this stage, is that of active (transcendent) *cit*, i.e. of Absolute Subjectivity.

What follows next is standpoint of Śiva himself—of Śiva as Consciousness-in-itself, apart from all subject-object distinction. The Śiva that, from the standpoint of active *cit*, was so long in the form of a circle within the triangle of *tricit* (i.e. bounded by three *citśaktis*) is now found to have contained, i.e. bounded, verily that triangle : the triangle is now perceived as the Śakti of Śiva and as progressively coinciding with that circle by increasing the number of sides indefinitely.

(Freedom finds its scope first in the *manomaya-kośa*.)

All the above points are relevant for *yoga*, not for *sādhana*. When the *sādhaka* attains the standpoint of the transcendent he immediately gets lost in it, loses all consciousness of himself.

(45)

Manomaya-kośa has two divisions. One is 'overmind' and the other is 'supermind'. The overmind is 'in itself', whereas the supermind is the *sūtradhara*, i.e. one that holds the key.

The *manomaya-kośa* being completely evident, there is fulness of moral life. As, again, the spiritual life attains its fulness one goes over to the *ānandamaya-kośa* and begins divine life (*divyajīvana*). Fulness of this divine life is the attainment of Godhood *Bhagavadbhāva*).

(46)[1]

At the level of *manas-ahaṁkāra* the objects are foreign. This the *mānasa* level (mental level).

At the *buddhi* level it is realized for the first time that not only this *buddhi* but equally *manas* and *indriyas* anticipate bjects (objects-in-general) *sui generis*, meaning that (the individual) *uruṣa*, through this *buddhi* and *manas* and *indriyas*, constructs, of tself, *a priori* types of objects (objectivity)—first, *uttaramānasa* hich is but this anticipation in a dim form, next, *prabhāsamānasa* hich is the clear anticipation, then, *bodhimānasa* which is the *flash* hat the whole world is so constructed, and, next, *adhimānasa* which s the sustained flash of this constructedness of the world. The act f construction attains objectivity, i.e. the status of object, in the erspective of this constructed *whole* world.

All this, however, from the individual standpoint ; and what ave been realized so far are individual *śuddha puruṣa* and its (*aparā*) *rakṛti*, which *prakṛti* is not the *prakṛti* of Sāṁkhya but only the *ānasa-śakti* of the *puruṣa*. *Puruṣa* by itself is *akṣara* = substanively, i.e. statically, in-itself,

Even after this *adhimānasa*, and really in its inner depth, there is he level of *atimānasa* where the standpoint is that of Śiva himself. he particular *Jīva* (individual), and with it all the *Jīvas* (indiviuals), at this stage, constitute the *(parā) prakṛti* of Śiva (*Puruṣottama*). is Śiva who acts through every *Jīva*. This is cosmic outlook,

(47)

The concept of *pūrṇatā* is that of *sāmya* = dialectical *balancing* s balancing on a rope), no dialectical fulfilment as in Hegel or arx. Ego-centricity and other-centricity are here balanced in the perturbed sense of duty. At this stage, again, all different pinions on one and the same snbject are balanced in the peaceful ttitude of alternation, they being only different philosophies in ifferent contexts. Here, similarly, are inward and outward attiudes balanced either in Husserl's phenomenological 'intention' or Kant's transcendental anticipation of object-in-general.

We never mean that the balance in question is the absence of l activity. It would certainly be no activity if by 'activity' were eant what is produced through *rāga* (attachment) and *dveṣa* (averon). The activity here is all rational activity, and nothing more.

This 'reason', again, is not opposed to the emotional side. There ay well be emotion unaffected by *rāga* and *dveṣa*. Its another name *bhakti*.

This balance = *samyā* = *samatā* = *madhyama-panthā*. It is not *marasya* which is quite another concept.

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[1] This is from Anirvan. It may be noted that the ways the concept of overmind till now elaborated are not all identical, and similarly with the concept of 'supermind'. One may compare these profitably with the corresponding notions in Sri Aurobinda's philosophy.

(48)

While on the descent, i.e. in the way of creation, no *aṇu* (individual) has to pass through the stages of *Īśvara* and the like. This is testified to by the fact that in the way of ascent (i.e. *sādhana* as progressive dissociation), when he has *Brahmajñāna* not only all *vyaṣṭi-ajñāna* but even *māyā* as the collective *ajñāna* also is over ; and yet *Īśvara* toys precisely with this collective *ajñāna*. Secondly. even though creation proceeds in two parallel lines, viz. as collective and as individual, the individual line is clean one step below the collective line : it finds its scope only in the *śuddhāśuddha* and *aśuddha* regions.

It is only the *yogins* who, while on one line of ascent, enter the *śuddha* region and even create things as *Īśvara* and the *mantras* do, and this creation is parallel with God's creation-act.

(49)

Āṇavopāya = (i) ritualistic exercises, (ii) following social customs and (iii) proceeding through systematic study. *Śāktopāya* = transcendental reflection but aided through healthy *tarka*. Whenever doubt arises, there is fresh approach either through constructive ratiocination or through transcendental reflection started once again. *Śāmbhavopāya* means that doubt still arising, one has more careful transcendental reflection which automatically clarifies position and presents the truth. What *anupāya*, as distinct from all these, means is that because of God's special grace, there never arises any doubt : situations get automatically more and more transcendentally clarified. There is spontaneous unfoldment of higher and higher, subtler and subtler, truths.

(50)

Another name of dissociation is *upasaṁhāra* which is not only withdrawal of oneself from objects but also withdrawal of these objects into oneself. Dissociation generates *I*-sense : it is consciousness as subjective with a significant role of *vīmarśa*. The *anuttara cit* (Śiva) is no subjectivity : it is Consciousness-in-itself and, for that reason, non-individual too. The very moment this Śiva dissociates itself, it in that very act (posture) also constructs—one may say, reconstructs—(phenomenologically) the subject it dissociates from. The dissociation and the construction, thus, are basically one and the same act, only moving in two different directions—along the lines of ascent and descent.

Meaning of [illegible] – [illegible]
वेदान्त [illegible] 10-11, 5-7 ([illegible])
[illegible] – 10-11
साधना (अंतरंग/बहिरंग) 13-14
बौद्ध/[illegible] [illegible] 15-16
Three phases of [illegible] – 15
Three fundamental modes of transcendental experience 7-11
Ist mode : transcendental consciousness as pure anticipation – 7
II In-itselfness of that consciousness – (pure-ego) – 8
III Pure consciousness as an intrinsic act of reference – 10
4-6th modes 11-13
[illegible] – 9, 10.
विमर्श – 10
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